c9b81a18da - United States Department of State (2024)

Following their takeover in August, the Taliban did not establish a clear and cohesive legal framework, judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms. The Taliban conveyed that those laws enacted under the former government of Afghanistan that were in effect prior to their takeover remained in effect unless the laws violated sharia. Taliban leaders issued decrees specifying acceptable behaviors under their interpretation of sharia, but variously described them as “guidelines” or “recommendations” and unevenly enforced them. Press reports following the Taliban takeover raised fears the group would consider Christian converts as apostates. These reports, combined with statements from some Taliban leaders starting in August reserving the right to enforce harsh punishments for violations of the group’s strict interpretation of sharia, drove some Christian converts into deeper hiding, according to International Christian Concern, an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) that focuses on persecution of Christian communities. At year’s end, there were no reports of Taliban representatives having directed sharia-related punishments. According to Amnesty International, Taliban fighters killed 13 Shia Hazaras in Daykundi Province on August 31; the Taliban denied the allegations. In November and December, the Taliban detained 28 members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Kabul. According to members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, the Taliban falsely accused them of belonging to ISIS-Khorasan (an affiliate of ISIS and a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K). The Taliban held 18 of them through year’s end. The NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW)reported the Taliban expelled Shia Hazara members from their homes in several provinces in October, in part to redistribute land to Taliban supporters. In August, Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said in an interview with National Public Radio (NPR) that the group would respect the rights of members of religious minority groups, including Shia Hazaras. On November 16, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told the press, “We are providing a safe and secure environment for everyone, especially the Hazaras.” Both prior to and immediately following the Taliban takeover, predominantly Shia Hazara communities expressed fear the Ashraf Ghani administration and the Taliban lacked the ability to protect them from violence and discrimination. According to Hazara community and NGO representatives, Shia Hazaras continued to face longstanding and widespread discrimination by Ghani government officials in public service delivery, public sector hiring, and other areas before August 15.After the Taliban takeover, Taliban leaders publicly pledged to protect the rights of Sikhs and Hindus, although some Sikhs and Hindus reported they had ceased to congregate at their gurdwaras (places of worship), and others sought to resettle abroad due to fear of violent attacks by the Taliban and ISIS-K. In November and December, high level Taliban representatives held meetings with leaders of Shia, Sikh, and Hindu communities, reportedly to offer protection and improve relations. According to community representatives, in these meetings the Taliban laid out rules for the behavior of women, forbade the playing of music, and presented restrictions on businesses owned by minority religious group members. Some Hazara political figures expressed continued concern over the Taliban’s commitment to support freedom of worship but commented that this engagement represented a shift from the Taliban’s approach between 1996 and 2001. According to civil society groups, at year’s end, approximately 150 members of the Sikh and Hindu communities remained in the country, down from approximately 400 at the start of the year. The Taliban closed the Ministry for Women’s Affairs in September, announcing the reconstituted Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, charged with enforcing the Taliban’s interpretation of sharia, would be housed in the same building. While enforcement varied by province and district, local Taliban representatives enforced decrees on gender segregation, women’s dress and head covering, men’s facial hair, unaccompanied women, and music. On December 3, Taliban “Supreme Leader” Hibatullah Akhunzada issued a decree stating that women should not be considered property and must consent to marriage. Media reported the Taliban framed the decree as a call to adhere to broader Islamic law on women’s rights. Some observers praised the decree; others said it did not go far enough because it did not mention a woman’s right to work or to access education and other public services.

the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (ISIS-K claimed responsibility. ISIS-K also conducted such attacks against other groups. In total, for the first six months of the year, 20 incidents targeted the Shia Hazara community resulting in 143 killed and 357 injured, compared with 19 attacks attributed to ISIS-K and other anti-government elements in 2020. According to UNAMA, during the second half of the year, attacks claimed by or attributed to ISIS-K increased and expanded beyond the movement’s previous areas of focus in Kabul and the eastern part of the country. Between August 19 and December 31, the United Nations recorded 152 attacks by the group in 16 provinces, compared with 20 attacks in five provinces during the same period in 2020. In addition to targeting the Taliban, ISIS-K also targeted civilians, in particular Shia minorities, in urban areas. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for suicide attacks on two Shia mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar cities on October 8 and 15. On October 8, an ISIS-K suicide bomber killed 70 to 80 members of the Hazara community at a mosque in Kunduz. On October 15, a suicide bomber attack targeting the largest Shia mosque in Kandahar, the Fatima Mosque (also known as the Imam Bargah Mosque), killed more than 50 worshippers and injured at least 100. Two December 10 attacks in western Kabul targeting a predominantly Shia Hazara neighborhood remained unclaimed at year’s end. Prior to the Taliban takeover, antigovernment forces carried out several attacks on religious leaders that resulted in fatalities. According to the Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs (MOHRA), over the last two decades, the Taliban and other extremist groups had killed 527 religious scholars, including approximately 50 Sunni and Shia religious leaders killed between February 2020 and July 2021. Prior to their August takeover and as previous years, the Taliban killed and issued death threats against Sunni clerics for preaching messages contrary to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam. Taliban fighters killed progovernment imams and other religious officials throughout the country, and the Taliban warned mullahs not to perform funeral prayers for Ghani administration security officials. On May 8, unidentified individuals detonated a car bomb in front of the Sayed ul-Shuhada school in a predominantly Shia Hazara community, killing at least 85 civilians and injuring another 216. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. According to press interviews in October, Shia Hazaras struggled to take what some characterized as a “life or death” risk to go to mosque on Fridays.

Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Sunni Muslim minority groups continued to report that some Sunni Muslims verbally harassed them, although Hindus and Sikhs stated they still were able to practice their respective religions in public prior to August 15. According to international sources, Baha’is and Christians continued to live in constant fear of exposure and were reluctant to reveal their religious identities to anyone. Christian groups reported public sentiment, as expressed in social media and elsewhere, remained hostile towards converts and to Christian proselytization. They said individuals who converted to or were studying Christianity reported receiving threats, including death threats, from family members. Christians and Ahmadiyya Muslims reported they continued to worship only privately and in small groups, at home or in nondescript places of worship, to avoid discrimination and persecution. Prior to the Taliban takeover in August, observers said local Muslim religious leaders continued their efforts to limit social activities, such as concerts, which they considered inconsistent with Islamic doctrine.

The U.S. embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31. In October and November, the U.S. government condemned ISIS-K attacks on Shia mosques and engaged Taliban leadership to press for the protection of religious minorities from repression and violence. On November 29-30, a U.S. government delegation met with senior Taliban representatives in Qatar. The U.S. delegation expressed “deep concern regarding allegations of human rights abuses and urged the Taliban to protect the rights of all Afghans, uphold and enforce its policy of general amnesty, and take additional steps to form an inclusive and representative government.” After August 31, the U.S. government also conveyed this message consistently in meetings with the so-called Taliban Political Commission in Doha, Qatar, through the Afghanistan Affairs Unit. efore the Taliban takeover in mid-August, U.S. embassy officials worked with the government to promote understanding of religious freedom and the need for the acceptance and protection of religious minorities. To enhance the Ghani administration’s capacity to counter violent religious extremism and foster religious tolerance, embassy representatives met with the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) and MOHRA, among other government agencies. The embassy regularly raised concerns about public safety and freedom to worship with security ministers. Until the Taliban takeover, embassy officials continued to meet regularly with leaders of major religious groups, as well as religious minorities, scholars, and NGOs, to discuss ways to enhance religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue. While working with the Ghani administration, the embassy sponsored programs for religious leaders to increase interreligious dialogue, identify ways to counter violent religious extremism, empower female religious leaders, and promote tolerance for religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 37.5 million (midyear 2021). According to Pew Forum data from 2009, Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 80-85 percent of the population, and Shia make up approximately 10-15 percent.

According to religious community leaders, the Shia population, approximately 90 percent of whom are ethnic Hazaras, is predominantly Jaafari, but also includes Ismailis. Other religious groups, mainly Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, and Christians, together constitute less than 0.3 percent of the population. According to Sikh leaders, there are fewer than 150 members of the Sikh and Hindu communities remaining in the country, compared with an estimated 400 at the start of the year and 1,300 in 2017. Most members of the Sikh and Hindu communities are in Kabul, with smaller numbers in Ghazni and other provinces. Hindu community leaders estimate there are fewer than 50 remaining Hindus, all male and primarily businessmen with families in other countries.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim community in the country numbers in the hundreds. Reliable estimates of the Baha’i and Christian communities are not available. There are small numbers of practitioners of other religions. There are no known Jews in the country, following the departure of the country’s last known remaining Jew after the Taliban takeover.

Hazaras live predominantly in the central and western provinces as well as in Kabul; Ismaili Muslims live mainly in Kabul and in the central and northern provinces. Followers of the Baha’i Faith live predominantly in Kabul, with a small community in Kandahar. Ahmadi Muslims largely live in Kabul.

Religion and ethnicity in the country were often closely linked. Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Muslim minorities reported continued harassment from Muslims, although Hindus and Sikhs stated that prior to the Taliban takeover, they continued to be able to publicly practice their religions.

According to international sources, Baha’is and Christians lived in constant fear of exposure and were reluctant to reveal their religious identities to anyone. According to some sources, converts to Christianity and individuals studying Christianity reported receiving threats, including death threats, from family members opposed to their interest in Christianity. They said fears of violent societal repression had further increased since the Taliban takeover.

According to Christians and Ahmadi Muslims, members of their groups continued to worship only in private to avoid societal discrimination and persecution, including harassment from neighbors and coworkers. They also said that following the Taliban takeover in August, relatives and neighbors who were aware of their identities were more likely to treat them harshly or report them to the Taliban, whether out of self-preservation or to curry favor with the Taliban.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, women of several different faiths, including Sunni and Shia Islam, continued to report harassment from local Muslim religious leaders over their attire. Clerics in numerous provinces preached that woman must wear modest dress and that the faithful should publicly enforce a strict implementation of sharia law. As a result, some women said they continued to wear burqas or other modest dress in public in rural areas and in some districts in urban areas, including in Kabul, before the Taliban takeover, in contrast to other more secure, Ghani administration-controlled areas, where women said they felt comfortable not wearing what they considered conservative clothing. Almost all women reported wearing some form of head covering. Some women said they did so by personal choice, but many said they did so due to societal pressure and a desire to avoid harassment and to increase their security in public. Prior to the Taliban takeover, observers said local Muslim religious leaders continued their efforts to limit social activities, such as concerts, considered by the religious leaders to be inconsistent with Islamic doctrine. Following the Taliban takeover, media reported instances of local Muslim religious leaders becoming more prohibitive of such activities.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, Ahmadiyya Muslims said they did not proselytize due to fear of persecution. Ahmadiyya Muslims reported an increasing need to conceal their identity to avoid unwanted attention in public and their intent to depart the country permanently if there was a peace agreement with the Taliban. Before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community said they were able to intermittently perform weekly congregational prayer at a nondescript location in Kabul. According to international Ahmadiyya Muslim organizations with close ties to Ahmadi Muslims in the country, following the Taliban takeover, fear of persecution by the Taliban and its sympathizers had driven community members to refrain from worship at their center in Kabul. Approximately 100 Ahmadi Muslims departed the country in the aftermath of the Taliban takeover. As of year’s end, hundreds remained in country. Ahmadi Muslims said they received direct as well as indirect threats against their safety in the form of notes, telephone messages, and other menacing communications because of their faith. Ahmadi Muslim representatives said they did not initially report or publicize these threats because they feared additional verbal harassment and physical abuse from Taliban representatives.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, Christian representatives reported public opinion, as expressed in social media and elsewhere, remained hostile toward converts to Christianity and to the idea of Christian proselytization. They reported pressure and threats, largely from family, to renounce Christianity and return to Islam. They said Christians continued to worship alone or in small congregations, sometimes 10 or fewer persons, in private homes due to fear of societal discrimination and persecution. The dates, times, and locations of these services were frequently changed to avoid detection. There continued to be no public Christian churches. Following the Taliban takeover, Christians described raids by Taliban on the homes of Christian converts even after they had fled the country or moved out. Christian sources stated the Taliban takeover emboldened intolerant relatives to threaten them with violence and inform on converts should they continue their practice of Christianity.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, some Sikhs and Hindus had refused to send their children to public schools because other students harassed their children, although only a few private school options were available to them due to the decreasing sizes of the two communities and their members’ declining economic circ*mstances. According to community members, since the Taliban takeover, the small number of remaining Sikh and Hindu children did not attend school due to school closures related to COVID-19 and inclement winter weather.

Until the Taliban takeover, Kabul’s lone synagogue remained occupied by the self-proclaimed last remaining Jew in the country, and a nearby abandoned Jewish cemetery was still utilized as an unofficial dump; reportedly many abandoned Islamic cemeteries were also used as dumping sites. The lone known Jew departed Afghanistan in late August, saying he feared the Taliban would be unable to protect him from an ISIS-K attack.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, NGOs reported some Muslims remained suspicious of development assistance projects, which they often viewed as surreptitious efforts to advance Christianity or engage in proselytization.

On August 31, the U.S. embassy in Kabul suspended operations.

In October and November, the U.S. government condemned ISIS-K attacks on Shia mosques and engaged Taliban leadership to press for the protection of religious minorities from repression and violence. On November 29-30, a U.S. government delegation met with senior Taliban representatives in Qatar. U.S. government officials expressed “deep concern regarding allegations of human rights abuses and urged the Taliban to protect the rights of all Afghans, uphold and enforce its policy of general amnesty, and take additional steps to form an inclusive and representative government.” U.S. representatives also expressed concern over the status of religious minorities in a meeting with senior Taliban representatives in Islamabad, Pakistan, in December. The U.S. government also conveyed this message consistently in meetings with the “Taliban Political Commission” in Doha after August 31 through the Afghanistan Affairs Unit.

Before the Taliban takeover in mid-August, U.S. embassy officials worked with the government to promote understanding of religious freedom and its importance as well the need for the acceptance and protection of religious minorities. In meetings with members of the President’s staff, the ONSC, MOHRA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, and the Ulema Council, embassy officials promoted understanding of religious freedom as well as the need to enhance the government’s capacity to counter violent religious extremism.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, senior embassy officials engaged leaders of the Sikh and Hindu communities in June to understand their concerns and their ability to practice their faith freely.

Until the Taliban takeover, embassy officials met with both government and religious officials to promote cooperation with ulema councils and emphasize the potential strong impact international Islamic scholars could have on moderating the Taliban. The embassy coordinated with the ONSC, as well as other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, to promote respect for religious diversity. While working with the Ghani administration, the embassy sponsored programs for religious leaders to increase interreligious dialogue, identify ways to counter violent religious extremism, empower female religious leaders, and promote tolerance for religious diversity.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the embassy also used social media to support religious freedom. On May 20, the Ambassador, responding to a Taliban-attributed attack in Ghor in which three Hazara shopkeepers were killed, condemned via Twitter the Taliban’s and ISIS-K’s targeting of Hazaras. This followed the Ambassador’s condemnation of the May 8 attack on a Kabul girls’ school in a Hazara community that resulted in the deaths of more than 80 persons.

Following the Taliban takeover, the United States continued to support the Afghan people. The United States remained committed to providing humanitarian assistance and basic needs support to the Afghan people and continued to advocate for the need to respect the human rights, including religious freedom, of all Afghans through its engagements with the Taliban.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 164.1 million (midyear 2021). According to the 2013 government census, the most recent official data available, Sunni Muslims constitute 89 percent of the population and Hindus make up 10 percent. The remainder of the population is predominantly Christian, mostly Roman Catholic, and Theravada-Hinayana Buddhist. The country also has small numbers of Shia Muslims, Ahmadi Muslims, Baha’is, animists, agnostics, and atheists. Leaders from religious minority communities estimate their respective numbers of adherents to be between a few thousand and 100,000.

Ethnic minorities concentrated in the CHT and northern districts generally practice non-Islamic faiths. The Garo in Mymensingh are predominantly Christian, as are some of the Santal in Gaibandha. Most Buddhists are members of the indigenous populations of the CHT. Bengali and ethnic minority Christians live in communities across the country, with relatively high concentrations in Barishal City and Gournadi in Barishal District, Baniarchar in Gopalganj District, Monipuripara and Christianpara in Dhaka City, and in the cities of Gazipur and Khulna.

The largest noncitizen population is Rohingya. Human Rights Watch estimates approximately 1,500 Rohingya in the refugee settlements are Christians. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said approximately 400 refugees are Hindu, while activists and leaders on the ground say the number is closer to 550-600. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than one million Rohingya refugees have fled Burma in successive waves since the early 1990s. Since August 2017, approximately 769,000 Rohingya fleeing violence in Burma have taken refuge in the country, bringing the total to more than 918,000. Nearly all who arrived during the 2017 influx sought shelter in and around the refugee settlements of Kutupalong and Nayapara in Cox’s Bazar District.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and other religions.” The constitution stipulates the state should not grant political status in favor of any religion and bans religiously based political parties. It provides for the right to profess, practice, or propagate all religions “subject to law, public order, and morality” and states religious communities or denominations have the right to establish, maintain, and manage their religious institutions. The constitution states no one attending any educational institution shall be required to receive instruction in, or participate in ceremonies or worship pertaining to, a religion to which he or she does not belong.

Under the penal code, statements or acts made with a “deliberate and malicious” intent to insult religious sentiments are subject to fines or up to two years in prison. Although the code does not further define this prohibited intent, the courts have interpreted it to include insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The criminal code allows the government to confiscate all copies of any newspaper, magazine, or other publication containing language that “creates enmity and hatred among the citizens or denigrates religious beliefs.” The law applies similar restrictions to online publications. While there is no specific blasphemy law, authorities use the penal code, as well as a section of the Information and Communication Technology Act and the Digital Security Act, to charge individuals for acts perceived to be a slight to Islam. The Information and Communication Technology Act criminalizes several forms of online expression, including “obscene material,” “expression(s) likely to cause deterioration of law and order,” and “statements hurting religious sentiments.” The Digital Security Act likewise criminalizes publication or broadcast of “any information that hurts religious values or sentiments,” by denying bail to detainees and increasing penalties on conviction of up to 10 years in prison.

The constitution prohibits freedom of association if an association is formed for the purpose of “destroying religious harmony,” the peaceful coexistence of religious communities, or creating discrimination on religious grounds.

Individual houses of worship are not required to register with the government. Religious groups seeking to form associations with multiple houses of worship, however, must register as NGOs with either the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) if they receive foreign assistance for development projects or with the Ministry of Social Welfare if they do not. The law requires the NGOAB to approve and monitor all foreign-funded projects. The NGOAB Director General has the authority to impose sanctions on NGOs for violating the law, including fines of up to three times the amount of the foreign donation, or closure of the NGO. NGOs are also subject to penalties for “derogatory” comments about the constitution or constitutional institutions (i.e., the government). Expatriate staff must receive a security clearance from the National Security Intelligence, Special Branch of Police, and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence; the standards for these clearances are not specified.

Registration requirements and procedures for religious groups are the same as for secular associations. Registration requirements with the Ministry of Social Welfare include certifying that the name being registered is not already taken, and providing the bylaws/constitution of the organization; confirmation of security clearances for leaders of the organization from the National Security Intelligence; minutes of the meeting appointing the executive committee; a list of all executive committee and general members and photographs of principal officers; a work plan; a copy of the deed or lease of the organization’s office and a list of property owned; a budget; and a recommendation by a local government representative.

Requirements to register with the NGOAB are similar.

Family law concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption contains separate provisions for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians. These laws are enforced in the same secular courts. A separate civil family law applies to mixed-faith families or those of other faiths or no faith. The family law of the religion of the two parties concerned governs their marriage rituals and proceedings. A Muslim man may have as many as four wives, although he must obtain the written consent of his existing wife or wives before marrying again. A Christian man may marry only one woman.

Hindu men may have multiple wives. Officially, Hindus have no options for divorce, although informal divorces do occur. Hindu women may not inherit property under family law. Buddhists are subject to the same laws as Hindus. Divorced Hindus and Buddhists may not legally remarry. Divorced men and women of other religions and widowed individuals of any religion may remarry. Marriage between members of different religious groups occurs only under civil law. To be legally recognized, Muslim marriages must be registered with the state by either the couple or the cleric performing the marriage; however, some Muslim marriages are not registered. Registration of marriages for Hindus and Christians is optional, and other faiths may determine their own guidelines.

Under the Muslim family ordinance, a Muslim man may marry women of any Abrahamic faith; however, a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim. Under the ordinance, a widow receives one-eighth of her husband’s estate if she is his only wife, and the remainder is divided among the children; each female child receives half the share of each male child. Wives have fewer divorce rights than husbands. Civil courts must approve divorces. The law requires a Muslim man to pay a former wife three months of alimony, but these protections generally apply only to registered marriages; unregistered marriages are by definition undocumented and difficult to substantiate. Authorities do not always enforce the alimony requirement even in cases involving registered marriages.

Alternative dispute resolution is available to all citizens, including Muslims, for settling out of court family arguments and other civil matters not related to land ownership. With the consent of both parties, lawyers may be identified to facilitate the arbitration, the results of which may be used in court.

Fatwas may be issued only by Muslim religious scholars, and not by local religious leaders, to settle matters of religious practice. Fatwas may not be invoked to justify meting out punishment, nor may they supersede existing secular law.

Religious studies are compulsory and are part of the curriculum for grades three through ten in all public government-accredited schools. Private schools do not have this requirement. Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian students are supposed to receive instruction in their own religious beliefs, although the teachers are not always adherents of the students’ faith.

The code regulating prisons allows for observance of religious commemorations by prisoners, including access to extra food on feast days or permission to fast for religious reasons. The law does not guarantee prisoners regular access to clergy or regular religious services, but prison authorities may arrange special religious programs for them. Prison authorities are required to provide prisoners facing the death penalty access to a religious figure from a faith of their choice before execution.

The Restoration of Vested Property Act allows the government to return property confiscated from individuals, mostly Hindus, whom it formerly declared enemies of the state. In the past, authorities used the act to seize property abandoned by minority religious groups that fled the country, particularly following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In response to the violence and destruction that occurred in October following a Facebook post that spurred attacks against Hindus, government officials at the highest levels, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, condemned the attacks and called the violence and destruction of Hindu temples and property un-Islamic. The Ministry of Religious Affairs donated building supplies and food packages to Hindu families, and the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, in conjunction with the government, provided tents to displaced victims. To stop the further spread of violence, the government took action to remove postings from social media that it considered provocative, such as fake pictures that triggered attacks on Hindus. Some human rights organizations, however, said the government’s actions to arrest and charge thousands of individuals were overbroad and, in some cases, deliberately targeted political rivals. By October 26, police arrested 583 suspects for their roles in the violence and brought 102 criminal charges against 20,619 individuals, including the local man who first publicized the supposed desecration on Facebook. Authorities charged a Hindu youth under the Digital Security Act for alleged anti-Islamic speech he posted online October 17, which they said angered Muslims and led to anti-Hindu reprisals in the northwestern city of Rangpur. On October 20, the government announced formation of a National Human Rights Commission panel to investigate October 17 attacks on Hindu establishments in the Peergang area of the northwestern district of Rangpur. The government stationed border guard forces and Rapid Action Battalion units around the country to prevent violence and successfully maintained peace during the subsequent Hindu holiday, Diwali, on November 4.

Some Hindu community leaders said the actions the government took in response to the communal violence helped calm the situation. Other Hindu organizations disagreed, saying the government took insufficient measures to quell the violence and stated the government’s failure to punish perpetrators of previous periods of religious violence contributed to October’s events. When the Foreign Minister stated four Muslims and two Hindus died during the violence but neither Hindu died due to communal attacks and no temples were destroyed, Hindu organizations strongly protested, noting this contradicted other official government statements. The Bangladesh Hindu Law Reform Council said the Foreign Minister’s statement was an attempt to cover up anti-Hindu attacks, and some human rights activists said the Foreign Minister’s statement enabled further violence. One international Hindu organization said police stood by in many locations rather than protecting Hindus from mob violence, and that the government arrested several Hindu individuals, which the organization called “prisoners of conscience,” for sharing information about the ongoing violence on social media.

On February 10, a judge of the Anti-Terrorism Special Tribunal in Dhaka sentenced to death eight Islamic militants for killing a publisher in 2015. Two of the eight sentenced men remained at large at year’s end. The tribunal convicted the men, members of the Islamic militant group Ansar al-Islam, of hacking to death Faisal Abedin Deepan, a publisher of books on secularism and atheism.

On February 16, a court sentenced five men to death and one to life in prison for the 2015 killing of atheist blogger Avijit Roy. The trial began in the Anti-Terrorism Tribunal in April 2019 and was delayed several times due to COVID-19.

A special tribunal in Dhaka sentenced to death 14 members of the banned Harkak-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Islamist group on March 23 in a case involving a conspiracy to assassinate Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2000. Prosecutors alleged the defendants, members of a group that was banned in 2005, planted a bomb at a political rally where Hasina was scheduled to address supporters the following day. Of the 14 sentenced, five remained fugitives at the end of the year.

On November 23, the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty of Salauddin Salehin, a member of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), who was convicted in the 2004 killing of Goni Gomez, a Christian convert from Islam, in Jamalpur. The Dhaka Speedy Trial Tribunal initially sentenced Salauddin to death in 2006.

On November 1, a tribunal in Rajshahi that handles cybercrimes sentenced three individuals to 10 years in prison under the Information and Communication Technology Act for sharing a satirical cartoon and comments the tribunal deemed obscene about the Prophet Muhammad in 2013 from a Facebook account. According to the prosecution, two of the convicted defendants allegedly shared a distorted picture of the Prophet on a Facebook account in the name of a Hindu man who had nothing to do with the posting. The third defendant then printed and sold copies of the cartoon to Muslim villagers. In response, local Muslims set on fire the home of the Hindu man. In addition to the three individuals sentenced to prison, authorities charged seven others in the wake of the incident, but the court acquitted them.

In April, police arrested more than 300 members of the Islamist group Hefazat-e-Islam over deadly protests around the March visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Accusing Modi of stoking religious discrimination against Muslims in India, the group led violent protests across several districts during Modi’s two-day visit.

On February 25, Forest Department officials tore down a Sathirampara Seventh-day Adventist church in Bandarban District. The congregation was replacing the bamboo hut they had been using for many years with a more permanent brick building. A Forest Department official said the community did not have a permit to build on the land, and that in the village “there are only three or four Christian families; there is no need for a church.”

In October, the Bangladesh Cyber Tribunal formally charged Baul folk singer Rita Dewan with blasphemy stemming from a February 2020 incident when a lawyer accused her of making derogatory comments against Allah during a musical competition, for which she issued an apology afterward. Criminal charges were brought against Dewan that same month under the penal code and Digital Security Act, and a court issued a warrant for her arrest in December 2020. Dewan surrendered to authorities and was granted bail in January.

Human rights organizations reported an increase, compared with 2020, in the use of extrajudicial fatwas by village community leaders and local religious leaders to punish individuals for perceived “moral transgressions.” The incidence rose from eight cases in calendar year 2020, to 12 cases from January to November. One organization which closely tracked the issuance of these fatwas attributed the rise to a deterioration of law and order and unrest due to COVID-19.

Thousands of mosques, including Baitul Mukarram National Mosque in Dhaka, operated under the direct authority of the Islamic Foundation; imams and employees of those mosques were funded by the government. Mosques not overseen by the Islamic Foundation still operated with oversight from a governing committee that was dominated by local ruling party politicians and administration. Islamic leaders said the government continued to influence the appointment and removal of imams and to provide guidance on the content of sermons to imams throughout the country. This included issuing written instructions highlighting certain Quranic verses and quotations of the Prophet Muhammad. The government also instructed imams to denounce extremism. Religious community leaders said imams in all mosques usually continued the practice of avoiding sermons that contradicted government policy.

The BHBCUC said property-restitution cases were on hold, as tribunals and appellate tribunals were not in session from March 2020 to October 2021. According to the Ministry of Land’s 2018-2019 report, the most recent figures available, as of 2018, authorities had adjudicated 26,791 of 114,749 property-restitution cases filed under the Restoration of Vested Property Act. Of these judgments, the owners, primarily Hindus, won 12,190 of the cases, recovering 10,255 acres of land, while the government won the remaining 14,791 cases. Media reports and rights activists attributed the slow return of land seized under relevant legislation from Hindus who had left for India to judicial inefficiency and general government indifference.

Freedom House’s 2021 report assessed religious minorities remained underrepresented in politics and state agencies, and that members of ethnic and religious minority groups faced some discrimination under the law, as well as harassment and violations of their rights in practice.

Religious minorities continued to state that religious minority students sometimes were unable to enroll in religion classes because of an insufficient number of teachers for mandatory religious education classes for students of non-Islamic faiths. In these cases, school officials generally allowed local religious institutions, parents, or others to hold religious studies classes for such students outside school hours and sometimes exempted students from the religious education requirement.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs had a budget of 22.4 billion taka ($260.47 million) for the 2021-2022 fiscal year, which covers July 2021-June 2022. The budget included 19.35 billion taka ($225.0 million) allocated for development through autonomous religious bodies. The government provided the Islamic Foundation, administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 17.58 billion taka ($204.42 million). The Hindu Welfare Trust received 1.724 billion taka ($20.05 million), and the Buddhist Welfare Trust received 32 million taka ($372,000) from the allocation. While the Christian Welfare Trust did not receive development funding from the budget, it received 10.3 million taka ($120,000) to run its office. For comparison, in 2020, the ministry had a budget of 16.93 billion taka ($196.86 million), including 14.25 billion taka ($165.70 million) allocated for development through autonomous religious bodies. The government provided 8.12 billion taka ($94.42 million) for the Islamic Foundation, 1.435 billion taka ($16.69 million) for the Hindu Welfare Trust, 46.8 million taka ($544,000) for the Buddhist Welfare Trust, and seven million taka ($81,400) for the Christian Welfare Trust.

Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and members of other minority religious communities, who are also sometimes members of ethnic minority groups, continued to report property and land ownership disputes and forced evictions, including some involving the government, that remained unresolved at year’s end. Some human rights activists said it was often difficult to determine whether these disputes and evictions were a result of deliberate government discrimination against religious minorities or of government inefficiency. The government continued construction projects on land traditionally owned by indigenous communities in the Moulvibazar and Modhupur forest areas. In January, more than 1,000 ethnic Garo and Koch individuals, mostly Christians, rallied at a bus stop in Tangail to protest a notice from the Forest Department ordering them to vacate their ancestral lands in the Modhupur forest. According to minority religious associations, land disputes occurred in areas near new roads or industrial development zones, where land prices had increased. They also stated local police, civil authorities, and political leaders enabled property appropriations for financial gain or shielded politically influential property appropriators from prosecution. Some human rights groups attributed the lack of resolution of some of these disputes to ineffective judicial and land registry systems and the targeted communities’ insufficient political and financial clout, rather than to government policy disfavoring religious or ethnic minorities. Indigenous groups in the CHT, in particular, have large communities of Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians. Some of these communities speak tribal languages and do not speak Bangla, making it difficult for them to access government services and further marginalizing these groups.

The government continued to place law enforcement personnel at religious sites, festivals, and events considered potential targets for violence, including during Diwali, Christmas, Easter, and the Buddhist festival of Buddha Purnima.

Due to COVID-19, President Abdul Hamid did not host his usual annual receptions to commemorate principal Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian holidays.

Freedom House in September assessed that members of religious minorities – including Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, and Shia and Ahmadi Muslims – faced harassment and violence, including mob violence against their houses of worship. According to the BHBCUC and the Hindu American Foundation (HAF), communal attacks against ethnic and religious minorities occurred throughout the year.

From October 13-24, during and after the Hindu festival of Durga Puja, national and local media reported that mobs attacked and destroyed Hindu homes and temples after a local man publicized a post on Facebook that showed the Quran on the lap of the deity Hanuman inside a Hindu temple in the city of Cumila. The post went viral and sparked violent reactions across the country. According to the World Hindu Federation (WHF) and the HAF, mobs vandalized more than 340 Hindu temples and Buddhist monasteries, vandalized or burned nearly 1,650 Hindu owned houses, and looted Hindu-owned shops and businesses. Reporting about the numbers of deceased varied: The Guardian reported seven persons died but the WHF said more than 14 Hindus died in the violence. According to media and official estimates, at least four Muslims were also killed through clashes with police. The UN attributed four deaths to the anti-Hindu violence but said others died due to subsequent law enforcement measures to quell the violence. The BHBCUC said communal violence against minorities continued throughout the year, stating mobs destroyed 70 temples and 100 homes and businesses. Ain o Salish Kendra, a domestic human rights organization, estimated that 3,769 attacks had taken place against Hindus since 2013, including those in the October violence. In response to the violence, there were several interfaith demonstrations throughout the country that denounced the attacks. Hindus refrained from public celebrations of Diwali on November 4 in favor of private ceremonies in their temples and homes. Hindu worshipers covered their faces with black cloth to protest the lack of security for Hindus.

According to Al-Jazeera, on June 19 in Bandarban in CHT, activists from an indigenous minority group killed an indigenous man because he converted to Islam.

Asia News reported the attack and death of Joy Haldar, a Christian student at St. Joseph’s High School and College. Eleven Muslim students sent Haldar death threats by phone before later attacking him and three other Christian students on May 16. Haldar sustained blows to the head and eventually died after 22 days in the hospital. The students attacked Haldar in a dispute over Pubg, an online video game. After Haldar’s brother filed a police complaint, the accused were detained and released on bail. “As Christians, we are a long way from enjoying security and justice,” the brother said.

On May 31, according to various media reports, two men with machetes attacked and left for dead Augra Jyoti Mahasthabir, a Buddhist monk from an indigenous community, at a monastery in Khagrachari in the CHT. The attackers, two Bengali construction workers who worked at the monastery, also looted money from the temple. The officer-in-charge of the Panchhari police station said police opened an investigation for attempted murder in the case.

On February 10, a group of Muslims destroyed the church sign of Emmanuel Church in Lalmonirhat District in the northern part of the country, cut down trees, vandalized the entrance to the church, and stole chairs and carpets. The local pastor said Muslims in the area were angry with Christians because new members had joined their faith community as converts from Islam. Media reported the destruction was spurred by anti-Christian propaganda at a local Islamic meeting place where Muslim religious leaders engaged in hate speech. The Bangladesh Christian Association condemned both incidents of violence.

According to media reports, on March 17, a crowd of Muslims vandalized dozens of Hindu residences and temples in Noagaon village in Sunamganj District after a Hindu man criticized Hefazat-e-Islam joint secretary general Mamunul Haque on Facebook. The media reported police arrested 113 persons, including a Jubo League (the ruling Awami League’s youth wing) party leader, following the attacks, and many of were released on bail. On March 25, police filed a Digital Security Act case against the man whose Facebook post sparked the attacks. The court granted his release on bail in September.

In September, Freedom House assessed recent violent incidents were “part of a pattern in recent years in which violence against religious or other minorities appears to have been deliberately provoked through social media.” Human rights organizations and religious leaders echoed this assessment, saying social media contributed to religious polarization and an increase in attacks on religious minorities.

On May 8, numerous individuals sent abusive comments to actor Chanchal Chowdhury’s Facebook account after he posted a photo with his mother to celebrate Mother’s Day. In the photo, his mother is wearing a vermilion bindi mark on her forehead. Numerous followers expressed surprise at Chowdhury’s religion, and some made abusive comments about his mother being Hindu. Some individuals also made negative personal comments about Chowdhury, and the comment thread was characterized by negative back and forth postings between Muslims and Hindus. In response, Chowdhury said, “What do you stand to gain or lose if I am a Hindu or Muslim? The biggest identity of everyone is that we are human beings. May these vulgar questions and embarrassing discussions stop everywhere. Come and let’s become human beings.”

Human rights activists expressed concerns regarding the wellbeing of Hindu and Christian groups, including the Rohingya Christian Assembly, in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. They said the Hindu community was segregated from the rest of the camp in response to an increase in violence against the community. Hindu leaders said they struggled to hold festivals, as these were prohibited without special permission, which was rarely given. Hindu leaders said there was inadequate access to the established temple, as access was only allowed for a maximum of 24 persons. Government officials, however, said limits on gatherings or building new permanent structures were a result of overall restrictions in the refugee camps. Authorities rarely granted permission to any group in the camps to gather during the year due to COVID-19 restrictions. Camp authorities did not allow any permanent structures, such as shelters, houses of worship, or learning centers, regardless of religious affiliation.

On September 29, unknown assailants killed prominent Rohingya leader Mohammed Mohib Ullah in Cox’s Bazar. Although authorities did not ascribe a motive for his killing, Mohib Ullah was known for being an active Rohingya community defender and rights advocate, including for religious freedom. The media reported police arrested up to a dozen suspects in October and November.

In November, the New York Times reported Rohingya Christian refugee families relocated to the island of Bhasan Char in the Bay of Bengal due to what they reported was persecution and violence against them in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. Members of the Christian minority in the camps stated the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a militant Rohingya group present in the camps, had temporarily abducted and tortured some Christian refugees.

Media reported that in September, Rohingya Muslims protested the burial of Mohi Uddin, a Christian Rohingya refugee, in the Kutapalong refugee camp, preventing the burial from taking place for 30 hours. According to the pastor of the Baptist church in Chattogram where Uddin was eventually interred, the burial of individuals of different faiths in the same place had not been an issue of contention at the camp in the past, but despite the intervention of the camp manager and UN staff, on this occasion Muslim Rohingya refugees formed a barrier to protest Uddin’s burial.

According to media, large protests took place before and during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh on March 26. On March 19, 500 Muslims protested in the street outside the Baitul Mokarram Mosque in Dhaka and 200 student activists marched through the streets on Dhaka University’s campus. The protestors said Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party were oppressing Muslims in India.

Media reported that on June 9, Christians and other religious minorities continued their annual observation of “Black Day” protests against the 1988 constitutional amendments establishing Islam as the state religion in the country.

According to local human rights organizations, a growing group of Hindu activists inside the country campaigned to reform Hindu family law to allow for greater rights for Hindu women, including female inheritance of property and provisions for divorce. According to media reports, Hindu groups they characterized as conservative protested in August the submission of a set of reform proposals to the Law Commission by the NGO Manusher Jonno Foundation (Foundation for Human Beings). The Bangladesh National Hindu Grand Alliance urged the government to take legal action against The Daily Star editor Mahfuz Anam and his wife Shaheen Anam, executive director of Manusher Jonno Foundation, who advocated changes in the law, for hurting religious sentiments of the Hindu community and creating chaos in Hindu families. These tensions among different elements within the local Hindu community continued through the end of the year, without changes to the family law.

Human rights NGOs continued to report harassment and social isolation of, and physical violence against, converts to Christianity from Islam and Hinduism. The NGOs said individuals commonly associated a person’s faith with his or her surname. Despite constitutional guarantees protecting an individual’s right to change faiths, the NGOs stated that when someone’s professed faith deviated from the faith tradition commonly linked with his or her surname, harassment, threats, and social isolation could ensue.

The Ambassador and other embassy representatives regularly met with officials from the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Social Welfare, and local government representatives to underscore the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. They discussed the importance of integrating religious freedom and other human rights into security policy and stressed the importance of respecting religious minorities’ viewpoints, minority religious inclusion within society, and protecting religious minorities from attacks.

Following communal anti-Hindu violence in October, the Ambassador visited several places of worship to meet with leaders of major religious communities to support interfaith harmony. He visited a Catholic church on October 26, Dhaka’s Star Mosque and madrassah on November 1, and the Hindu Dhakeshwari Temple on November 2. After his visit to the Shakyamuni Buddhist Temple on November 10, the Ambassador tweeted “The United States stands with everyone, everywhere, supporting interfaith harmony and the fundamental right of freedom of religion.” On November 17, a senior Department of State official met with interfaith community leaders for a discussion in which she emphasized that the United States deeply values religious tolerance and stands with Bangladeshis of all beliefs who were promoting diversity, unity, and mutual respect.

The United States provided $302 million in fiscal year 2021 for humanitarian assistance funding for programs in the country to assist Rohingya refugees and their host communities, emphasizing U.S. support for protecting vulnerable religious minority groups. In September, at the meeting of the UN General Assembly, the U.S. government announced nearly $180 million in additional funding. With this new funding, the U.S. response to the Rohingya crisis has reached more than $16 billion since August 2017.

As part of U.S.-funded training for community policing, the embassy continued to encourage law enforcement officials to protect the rights of religious minorities.

Throughout the year, the embassy continued public outreach programs encouraging interfaith tolerance among religious groups. On October 29, Department of State officials participated in a virtual meeting with Hindus and Christians, including the Bangladeshi diaspora community in the United States, to discuss communal attacks, possible causal factors, and appropriate response measures. Embassy officials attended religious festivals celebrated by the Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim communities and emphasized in these events the importance of tolerance and respect for religious minorities.

Throughout the year, the embassy published messages highlighting the U.S. government’s commitment to advancing religious freedom, including amplifying the Department of State’s Twitter messaging on International Religious Freedom Day. Embassy social media messages on religious tolerance reached more than 2.5 million individuals. The embassy released a statement on October 19 sending condolences to the families of victims of anti-Hindu violence and supporting freedom of religion.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials expressed support for the rights of religious minorities and emphasized the importance of their protection. Embassy officials continued to meet regularly with a wide range of religious organizations and representatives, including the Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, BHBCUC, HAF, Bangladesh Christian Association, Buddhist Religious Welfare Trust, Christian Religious Welfare Trust, World Buddhist Association Bangladesh, Bangladesh Buddhist Federation, Christian Freedom International, International Buddhist Monastery of Dhaka, and the Aga Khan Foundation. In these meetings, embassy officials, other U.S. government representatives, and representatives from the groups, discussed the state of religious freedom in the country, underscored the importance of religious tolerance, and identified challenges religious minorities encountered.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 21.4 million (midyear 2021). According to the 2006 census, 61 percent of the population is Muslim (predominantly Sunni), 19 percent is Roman Catholic, 4 percent belong to various Protestant groups, and 15 percent maintain exclusively indigenous beliefs. Less than 1 percent is atheist or belongs to other religious groups. Statistics on religious affiliation are approximate because Muslims and Christians often adhere simultaneously to some aspects of traditional or animist religious beliefs.

Muslims reside largely in the northern, eastern, and western border regions, while Christians are concentrated in the center of the country. Traditional and animist religious beliefs are practiced throughout the country, especially in rural communities. The capital has a mixed Muslim and Christian population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is secular, and both the constitution and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice. The constitution states freedom of belief is subject to respect for law, public order, good morals, and “the human person.” Political parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regional affiliation are forbidden.

The law provides that all organizations, religious or otherwise, may register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD), which oversees religious affairs. Registration confers legal status, and the process usually takes approximately three to four weeks and costs less than 50,000 CFA francs ($86). Religious organizations are not required to register unless they seek legal recognition by the government, but after registration they must comply with applicable regulations imposed on all registered organizations or be subject to a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 CFA francs ($86-$260). The ministry, through the Directorate for Customary Affairs and Worship, helps organize religious pilgrimages; promotes and fosters interreligious dialogue and peace; develops and implements measures for the construction of places of worship and the registration of religious organizations and religious congregations; and monitors the implementation of standards for burial, exhumation, and transfer of remains (which may include religious elements).

Religious groups operate under the same regulatory framework for publishing and broadcasting as other entities. MATD may request copies of proposed publications and broadcasts to verify they are in accordance with the nature of the religious group as stated in its registration. MATD also reviews permit applications by religious groups.

The government generally does not fund religious schools or require them to pay taxes unless they conduct for-profit activities. The government, however, provides subsidies to a number of Catholic schools as part of an agreement allowing students from public schools to enroll in Catholic schools when public schools are at full capacity. The government also provides subsidies to registered Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (commonly referred to as “Franco-Arabic”) schools for teacher salaries, which were typically less than those of public-school teachers. The government taxes religious groups only if they engage in commercial activities, such as farming or dairy production.

Religious education is not allowed in public schools. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate private primary and secondary schools and some institutions of higher education. These schools are permitted to provide religious instruction to their students. Schools (religious or not) must submit the names of their directors to the government and register their schools with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy. The government does not appoint or approve these officials, however. The government periodically reviews the curricula of new religious schools as they open, as well as others, to ensure they offer the full standard academic curriculum. The majority of Quranic schools are not registered and thus their curricula are not reviewed.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, security continued to deteriorate in the country, further weakening the government, according to media and experts. Following the terrorist attack that claimed the lives of 53 gendarmes in Inata (Sahel) on November 14, and a wave of civil society-led protests and demonstrations across the country, some peaceful and others violent, President Kabore appointed a new Prime Minister, and vowed to step up the fight against terrorism. According to sources, he reshuffled his cabinet and military leaders in an effort to establish a more effective “fighting” government and to satisfy protesters. During a parliamentary session on November 26, the Ministers of Defense and Security stated that the majority of those attacking security forces were from the country (Burkinabe) and expressed concern that security forces were hampered by the actions of Burkinabe on the ground who cooperated with extremist groups.

From August 9-13, trials involving 10 defendants facing terrorism charges began in Ouagadougou, the country’s first terrorism-related criminal proceedings. One defendant was acquitted, five other defendants were convicted and sentenced to between 10 and 21 years in prison. The court had not concluded trial proceedings for the remaining four by year’s end. One convicted defendant confessed to membership in Ansaroul Islam, considered a terrorist organization by the government and a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization, responsible for prior violent and deadly terrorist attacks. The defendant said he joined the group to “defend the Muslim religion.” He stated in the proceeding that he considered it a legitimate act to attack and burn a school and rob staff members because “they don’t pray and they have no religion,” and because the school is a government institution. More than 900 defendants facing terrorism charges remained in custody pending trial at year’s end.

The government stated that terrorists attacked religious institutions with the aim of dividing the population. On many occasions, representatives of the government acted with a stated intent to counter this influence and foster peaceful cohabitation between communities and followers of various religions.

President Kabore attended the second annual FAIB congress on August 8, during which FAIB President El Hadj Zoungrana condemned terrorist acts, thanked everyone involved in the fight against terrorism, and stated that “Islam is a religion of peace and respect for human life.”

On May 13, in a celebration during Ramadan, which coincided with the Christian Ascension holiday, Minister of State and Interior Clement Sawadogo commended the religious communities in the country for what he stated were the peaceful coexistence they had demonstrated. “When I see that Cardinal Philippe Ouedraogo has left his own faith’s celebration of Ascension Day to come here to commune with Muslims, it serves as a powerful symbol, and represents an advantage for our country which we must preserve. All believers must live in harmony, in peace, in joy so that our country is always a haven for peace.”

On July 21, Minister of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Zephirin Diabre and Minister of State and Interior Minister Clement Sawadogo attended the Eid al-Fitr (known locally as Tabaski) prayer ceremony in Ouagadougou. Sawadogo said, “[T]he government, through our presence, intends to commune with all the Muslims of Burkina Faso on this blessed day of Tabaski. It is an opportunity for us to show the gratitude of the government for all your prayers for us and for our country.”

The government allocated 75 million CFA francs ($129,000) each to the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and animist communities, the same level as in previous years. Sources continued to state that this funding was meant to demonstrate equitable government support to all religious groups in the country.

On August 6, the government issued a decree integrating the traditional animist communities into ONAFAR, providing animist communities with representation in the government agency responsible for promoting interreligious dialogue as well as preventing and managing conflicts of a religious nature.

The government continued to routinely approve applications from religious groups for registration, according to religious group leaders, although the government indicated it had rejected some on “moral” grounds, such as the moral character of the person or group, lawful conduct of activities, and transparency in disclosing sources of income. Government officials indicated mosques had been closed as a result of application denials on moral grounds, but the central government does not maintain statistics on these closures.

On May 6, the government made a final decision to convey a disputed plot of land in Ouagadougou to FAIB for the construction of a mosque and community center to benefit the Muslim community. The government also committed to allocate a separate tract of land to the legal owner of the disputed land, a Christian. The parties had agreed to this arrangement, and according to Clement Sawadogo, Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the government’s actions were intended to promote social cohesion and resolve tensions between Christian and Muslim communities resulting from the destruction of a mosque on the original plot of land in 2020. Some within the judiciary as well as some members of the Muslim and Christian communities stated they did not believe the government should involve itself in this legal matter. The Union of the Judiciary stated the ruling was “… a challenge to the independence and authority of the judiciary.”

In October, senior government officials indicated the government was monitoring preaching that could promote violence or intolerance on social media using ONAFAR. The MATD also announced the recruitment of a communication specialist to work on social media and strengthen the ONAFAR team.

The Director of Public and Political Freedoms within MATD stated in December that MATD was close to completing review of amendments to the law ensuring religious freedom for groups within the country’s secular government framework.

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups continued to operate throughout the year and increased their killings of individuals based on their religious identity, according to media reports. These attacks forced more populations to flee their villages, bringing more communes under the groups’ control, and preventing villagers from farming. The attacks spread to the south and west, the Cascades and the Boucle du Mouhoun Regions. Security experts stated that in the Est Region, terrorists/jihadis set up their own administrative structure requiring payment by the population of “zakat” or religious taxes. These groups included U.S.-designated terrorist groups Ansaroul Islam, Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun. Although many attacks in the country went unclaimed, observers again attributed most to three terrorist groups: Ansaroul Islam, JNIM, and ISIS-GS. Media reported that terrorist groups regularly targeted Muslim and Christian clergy, religious congregations, houses of worship, teachers, local government employees, and schools. According to local residents, terrorist groups were also responsible for killing imams whom the groups accused of collaborating with government security forces.

Media reported a number of attacks on places of worship, religious leaders, and religious services. Militants ambushed a group of villagers gathered for a Muslim naming ceremony on May 18 and during the attack killed 15 Muslim men in the Adjarara area of Oudalan Province. This attack was initially widely reported in international media as an attack on a Christian baptism, although sources later confirmed that all victims were Muslims, the international media reports being in error. Local media further suggested that the motive for the attack could have been reprisal for villagers having provided information to the government on the movements of armed militants through the area.

On April 11, militants killed two persons they had kidnapped 10 days earlier in front of the mosque of Babonga, Yagha Province.

On May 30, terrorists linked to the JNIM organization killed the imam of Bouli, in the Centre-Nord Region, along with his son, the village chief, and member of the state-sanctioned armed group the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland. Two others in a neighboring village were also killed.

On May 30, violent extremists kidnapped three Christian worshippers in Sanipenga during a church service in the Est Region.

On July 21, militants killed a man in front of the mosque of Boudieri; they had kidnapped the man nearly eight months prior on the road between Namagri and Boudieri in the Est Region. On July 29, suspected Islamic State – Greater Sahel (ISGS) militants kidnapped two persons in Bognori, a village in the Sahel Region. They took the two hostages to the village of Wouro Djama where they killed one in public in front of village’s inhabitants, who were forced to watch. Afterwards, attackers threatened the villagers with similar treatment if they did not strictly follow Islam. All victims in these cases were Muslims.

According to the Ministry of Education, as of November 30, terrorist violence forced nearly 3,000 schools to close, depriving nearly 500,000 children of education. Minister of Education Stanislas Ouaro expressed concern that school closures had spread to parts of the country formerly free of violent extremist activity, particularly in the Cascades and Sud-Ouest Regions. In a number of attacks, militants singled out and killed individuals wearing Christian imagery such as crucifixes, according to media reports and church leaders. Some attacks took place at houses of worship, both Christian and Islamic, during prayers or other services. According to many observers, attacks also targeted Muslims whom they said the attackers believed were insufficiently rigorous in their practice of Islam.

Attacks against Christians forced some to adopt new practices in their religious observance to avoid violent extremists, according to media, NGOs, and the government. Members of the Parish Saint Paul of Sandikpenga in the Est Region learned of threats to their church building and rescheduled a planned Mass for Pentecost. An arson attack destroyed the church later that day. Local residents indicated the church subsequently closed and church leaders told members to pray in their homes until further notice.

Evangelical Christian pastor Aristar Lankoande, a member of the International Missionaries Society (IMS), reported that as of November 8, 552 evangelical churches had closed in the Est Region, and IMS had sent 422 of its pastors to minister elsewhere. Church members in the region were also encouraged to instead pray in their homes.

On March 4, militants disrupted the celebration of life ceremony practiced in traditional religion for a deceased villager in Kodjema, in Gnagnan Province.

On March 6, attackers forcibly entered the village of Souloungou, also in the Gnagnan Province, and told the local population they would be forced to adopt Islamic dress and other religious traditions. This was one of several reported incidents of armed groups forcing local populations to adopt the practice of Islam according to their standards under threat of violence.

On April 29, violent extremists attacked the village of Solmonre in Sanmantinga Province during an iftar celebration, firing shots into the air and setting several houses on fire, including the local chief’s. Much of the village’s population subsequently fled the area.

On May 3, militants stopped a passenger bus in traveling between Diapaga and Fada, claiming they were searching for security forces. They then ordered the passengers not to get involved in conflicts between violent extremists and security forces and to adopt and practice Islam according to their standards.

On May 4, ISGS militants attacked the villages of Menzourou and Kaltewoute in the commune of Tin-Akoff, in Oudalan Province, Sahel Region. They killed the son of a marabout (Muslim religious teacher) in Menzourou and burned down several houses before retreating into the countryside.

On May 7, suspected JNIM militants took control of Douma in the commune of Tangaye, 28 miles from Ouahigouya in the Nord Region and forced the closure of schools unable to meet their demand for teaching in Arabic.

On May 20, nearly 160 militants suspected of belonging to the Katiba Macina group (an Ansar al Dine affiliate) invaded the village of Douma in the Nord Region, demanding that the women wear a veil and threatening to kill husbands whose wives did not comply. They also ordered men to adopt specific dress and grooming standards, including wearing short pants and growing beards. On May 25, militants forced populations at Tankougounadie-centre in the Sahel Region to do the same and adopt sharia.

On June 1, the populations of several predominantly Muslim villages in Tapoa Province were forced to flee after militants threatened them with violence if they did not follow certain commands. These included outlawing any religions besides Islam, forcing young people to marry, prohibiting the use of alcohol, banning the breeding of farm animals they considered offensive under Islam, and requiring villagers to join their fight.

On June 4, a video circulated widely online depicted three victims of an attack in Deou, Sahel Region, whose right hands had been amputated, allegedly by ISGS-linked militants. In the video, the victims were accused of robbery and the amputations were the punishment meted out under sharia, the first such reported incident in the country.

On June 6, suspected ISGS militants forcibly entered Lonadeni, a village in the Est Region, and threatened to kill anyone who engaged in indigenous religious practices.

On Sept. 15, a Catholic priest reported to local media that his local diocese had been forced to close a parish after violent extremists invaded its community and threatened non-Muslims with violence, forcing local clergy to flee mainly to Gaoua in the Sud-Ouest Region. He also reported that several towns in the region were unable to celebrate the Catholic feast of the Assumption out of fear of an attack by violent extremists.

On October 15, militants allegedly linked to Katiba Macina forced the closure of four schools in the villages of Gosson, Daka, Yankore et Bossoum in Sourou Province when they refused to adhere to their religious demands and teach in Arabic.

On October 25, unknown individuals destroyed an animist religious idol in the city of Orodara, which was meant to bless local families.

On November 4, a widely circulated video depicted the amputation by violent extremists of the hand of a young man accused of theft.

On Christmas Eve, priests, catechists, and some worshippers from the Parish of Titao, in the Lorum province, Nord Region, were forced to flee, helped by security forces, to avoid being attacked by jihadis. “This is the first time in 50 years that we did not celebrate Christmas at Titao,” stated Father Victor Ouedraogo, the manager of the Research Center for Interfaith and Social Dialogue (CRDIS) at Ouahigouya in the Nord Region.

Human rights organizations and religious groups continued to express concern that religiously targeted violence threatened what they termed the “traditional peaceful coexistence” of religious groups in the country. Observers continued to report the stigmatization of the predominantly Muslim Fulani ethnic community because of a perceived association with militant Islamist groups. They said this aggravated social tensions in some regions, since self-defense militias at times exacted vigilante justice on Fulani communities in the northern and central regions of the country because of this perceived connection to militant and terrorist groups.

Members of the Burkinabe Muslim Community Organization, the Catholic Archdiocese of Ouagadougou, and the Federation of Evangelical Churches continued to state that despite an increase in religiously motivated attacks, religious tolerance remained widespread as a common value, and numerous examples existed of families of mixed faiths and religious leaders attending each other’s holidays and celebrations. Members of the largest religious communities promoted interfaith dialogue and tolerance through public institutions such as FAIB, which conducted awareness campaigns throughout the country. They also worked through NGOs such as the Dori-based Fraternal Union of Believers, which encouraged various religious communities, specifically in the Sahel Region, to conduct social and economic development activities with the goal of reducing vulnerability to terrorist recruitment and fostering religious tolerance between the communities.

In January, the Catholic Archbishop of Ouagadougou, Cardinal Philippe Ouedraogo, denounced terrorist violence, calling it “an evil for humanity.” Ouedraogo also said he feared how jihadist and terrorists attacks were challenging social cohesion. He said, “Fundamentalism is gaining ground, due to the misinterpretation of the holy book. We already see tensions, as evidenced by fundamentalist signs including within religions…” He added, however, that Protestants, Muslims, and Catholics had met together with the Mogho Naba, a powerful traditional chief of the predominantly Muslim Mossi ethnic group, who had assisted in addressing and reducing such tensions. Describing the closure of three of the six parishes of the Diocese of Dori in the Sahel Region, Ouedraogo said, “All priests, sisters, and worshippers have fled” to Kaya (Centre-Nord Region). The Archbishop discussed his initiative to promote interfaith dialogue through the annual Christian-Islamic and interethnic couples pilgrimage to the Marian shrine of Notre Dame de Yagma near Ouagadougou, taking place in February, the second time for this pilgrimage.

Pastor Henry Ye, the President of the Federation of Evangelical Churches and Missions (FEME), stated that religious dialogue and tolerance was valued among religious leaders in the country, but observed that the broader religious community did not yet embrace this spirit at the same level. To counter pressures toward radicalization and violent extremism among youth in particular, he noted that the FEME held regular exchanges over social media among youth organizations of religious groups. Ye also described how acts of terrorism affected churches. For instance, all FEME-related churches in Yagha Province, Sahel Region were closed. Pastor Lankoande Isaie of the Assembly of God said that one group of violent extremists agreed not to close churches in Tapoa, Est Region, as long as members did not raise pigs or brew beer, and the men grew beards and wore short trousers.

Religious leaders continued to express their view that the foundation of interfaith dialogue in the country helped them resist and survive various crises over time, including the threat and challenge to interreligious and ethnic cohesion posed by terrorism. They said the government often called upon them for assistance in resolving socioeconomic tensions including a case involving destruction of a mosque in 2020 on disputed land, and tensions regarding the length of closure of places of worship during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Another case involved a protest and attack at FAIB headquarters regarding the perceived prolonged closure of a mosque, to which the government responded by reopening the mosque.

As in previous years, new Muslim and Protestant congregations continued to form without approval or oversight from existing Muslim and Protestant federations. Religious leaders stated the messages of tolerance by Muslim and Protestant federations were often undermined by small new religious groups that did not fall under their oversight and that took positions counter to the federations’ views. They said the lack of oversight made it difficult for official religious groups to monitor and regulate the activities and messages of these new groups.

On February 4, FAIB leaders cited the growing social stigmatization of their wives when they wear a veil. El Hadj Oumarou Zoungrana, then president of FAIB, also described FAIB’s newly-established National Technical Committee, charged with reviewing sermons for content promoting violence in sermons and speeches by imams, and reprimanding the offenders.

Embassy officials raised the continued increase in religiously motivated attacks, particularly in the Sahel, the Nord, the Ouest, the Sud-Ouest, and Est Regions, with government officials, including those in the MTAD, the Ministries of Defense and Security, and the Office of the President. Embassy staff regularly discussed events and policies affecting religious freedom with the MATD, and the Director General for Traditional Beliefs, which included discussing the equitable registration process for religious groups, a draft of a pending law on religious freedom, the equitable treatment of religious groups by the government, and the status of the relationship between the government and different religious groups.

The Ambassador and embassy officials met separately with Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders to encourage their efforts to promote interfaith dialogue and advocate for religious tolerance and freedom. During these meetings with religious leaders throughout the year, many discussed with the Ambassador the impact of the current violent extremism on the country’s tradition of peaceful coexistence of religious groups

On January 22, the Ambassador met with Cardinal Ouedraogo to discuss his views on needed support from the international community to end terrorist violence in the country.

On February 17, the Ambassador visited the headquarters of FEME and discussed with FEME leaders their views of the consequences of violent extremism on interreligious and intrareligious tensions, and the spread of ethnic division.

On January 27, the Ambassador hosted a roundtable with representatives of religious associations and NGOs working on interfaith dialogue. Participants suggested that giving more such opportunities to voices of persons supporting interfaith dialogue would promote increased social cohesion. One young participant working in the Sahel explained how he used the WhatsApp network to link with youth from 13 regions across the country to promote interfaith dialogue. “The idea is to train people including imams and other religious leader to be part of social media” in this effort.

Embassy representatives used social media platforms to reinforce messaging that promoted religious freedom and tolerance. The Ambassador regularly raised the need to counter the threats to the country’s tradition of religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy continued funding literacy programming in registered Quranic schools in northern parts of the country, the curriculum of which focused on peaceful dialogue, nonviolent conflict resolution, and religious tolerance.

The embassy provided the Association for Religious Tolerance and Interfaith Dialogue a $35,000 grant for activities such as advocacy, awareness campaigns, public messaging, community inclusion efforts, and conflict prevention.

Embassy officials organized or supported several activities to respond to the social divisions between religious groups. For example, the embassy supported training for religious leaders on building tolerance and stability in their communities, conflict management, and fostering inter- and intrareligious cohesion.

The 2008 constitution, drafted by the military, guarantees every citizen “the right to freely profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality, or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution.” The law prohibits speech or acts insulting or defaming any religion or religious beliefs. In December, the OHCHR stated that, since the coup, regime security forces had committed “an alarming escalation of grave human rights abuses.” As was the case in previous years and following the military coup in February, it was sometimes difficult to categorize incidents based solely on religious identity due to the close linkage between religion and ethnicity. During the year, there were reports of threats, detentions, and violence targeting minority religious and ethnoreligious groups. On May 24, media reported military forces bombed the Sacred Heart Church in Kayan Tharyar, Kayah State, killing four persons who had taken refuge there. According to media, on May 28, military forces fired upon the church of Saint Joseph in Demoso, Kayah State, and killed two men who were collecting food for internally displaced persons (IDPs). In April, local media reported that residents found the body of a Muslim muezzin, who was wearing a dress and lipstick, hanging in a mosque in Yangon Region. Residents said regime security forces likely had killed him. In September, regime soldiers shot and killed a Christian pastor in Chin State while he attempted to extinguish a fire started by artillery fire. In June, the prodemocracy NUG issued a statement promising to “seek justice and accountability” for crimes committed by military forces against more than 740,000 Rohingya and said if it returned to government, it would repeal a 1982 law denying citizenship to most Rohingya. In August, the NUG issued a statement in which it held the military regime responsible for having “perpetuated crimes against humanity,” including war crimes committed on the basis of religion. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that regime authorities had confined 144,000 predominantly Muslim Rohingya in camps within Rakhine State at year’s end. The government enforced extensive restrictions on in-country movement of Rohingya. According to humanitarian aid organizations, regime authorities made no genuine efforts to initiate the return of Rohingya refugees. In September, regime security forces arrested 30 Rohingya traveling without documentation and sentenced them to two years in prison. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a nonprofit human rights organization, as of December 6, the regime had detained 35 Buddhist monks and nine Christian leaders since the military coup. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), established by the UN Human Rights Council to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011 and to prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, continued to engage with local actors, including the NUG, to collect evidence of potential crimes but was not able to travel inside the country during the year. According to leaders of minority religious communities and human rights activists, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the inconsistent enforcement and interpretation of government regulations, in place before the coup and continuing afterward, exacerbated communal disparities during the year, with harsher outcomes reported for minority religious communities. Religious leaders also expressed concern that the regime might misconstrue religious assembly as part of prodemocracy activities.

According to local media, some armed ethnic organizations operating in the country continued to pose a threat to ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Arakan Army (AA), which continued to force local villagers, including Christian religious leaders, to work without pay and recruited villagers to attend military training camp. In September, gunmen shot and killed Rohingya Muslim activist and community leader Mohib Ullah in the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh. According to press reports, Ullah’s killers were likely associated with the insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Ullah had spoken out against ARSA militancy and abuses in the refugee camps in Bangladesh.

In July, the NUG announced its appointment of a Rohingya activist as an advisor to its “Ministry of Human Rights.” Members of ethnic minorities said they continued to face discrimination based on their ethnicity and religion. Rohingya continued to be perceived as foreigners, irrespective of their citizenship status, and as members of a religion commonly viewed with fear and disdain. There were continued reports of social stigma surrounding any assistance to or sympathy for Rohingya. Some civil society leaders said that even among otherwise tolerant individuals, anti-Rohingya sentiment remained prevalent. Some local media reports, however, said the Bamar ethnic majority’s empathy for the decades of persecution suffered by Rohingya and other minorities had grown due to their own post-coup experiences. A June public opinion poll found that when asked about relations among persons of different faiths in the country, 47 percent of respondents said that strict protection of one’s own religion would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future, while 48 percent said that granting more rights to religious minorities would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future.

Senior U.S. government officials – including the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Ambassador, and senior Department of State officials for East Asia and for human rights – consistently raised ongoing U.S. government concerns about religious freedom with the regime and other internal political actors, as well as with international organizations and also engaged in advocacy on social media calling for an inclusive democracy that respects all ethnicities and religions. Concerns raised included the plight of Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing minority religious communities in Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Shan, and Chin States amid escalating post-coup violence. The U.S. government pressed for full accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations, including those concerning religious freedom. The embassy amplified the Department of State spokesperson’s message on the fourth anniversary of the military’s August 25, 2017, ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.^[1] U.S. government officials continued to call for sustainable solutions to address the root causes of discrimination and religiously motivated violence. While embassy facilities in Yangon and Mandalay suspended most of their public programs following the coup, the embassy continued to prioritize ethnic and religious diversity in its exchange programs, selecting participants from Shan, Wa, Kachin, Kayah, Chin, Rakhine, and Mon ethnic groups, many of whom belong to religious minority groups. Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, continued to engage with Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations and NGOs, to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c) (5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 57.1 million (midyear 2021). According to the most recently available estimates, approximately 88 percent are Theravada Buddhists. Approximately 6 percent are Christians, primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations. Muslims (mostly Sunni) comprise approximately 4 percent of the population. There are small communities of Hindus and practitioners of Judaism, traditional Chinese religions, and animist religions. The 2014 census excluded Rohingya from its count, but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the deposed civilian government estimated the overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim Rohingya population at 1.1 million prior to October 2016. There are an estimated 600,000 stateless Rohingya in Rakhine State, and according to the United Nations, as of August 31, Bangladesh continues to host approximately 860,000 Rohingya refugees.

There is a significant correlation between ethnicity and religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Bamar ethnic group and among the Shan, Rakhine, Mon, and numerous other ethnic groups. Various forms of Christianity are dominant among the Kachin, Chin, and Naga ethnic groups. Christianity also is practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist, and some Karen are Muslim. Individuals of South Asian ancestry, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south-central region, are predominantly Hindu or Muslim, although some are Christian. Ethnic Rohingya and Kaman in Rakhine State, as well as some Bamar and ethnic Indians in Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Magway, and Mandalay Regions, practice Islam. Chinese ethnic minority groups generally practice traditional Chinese religions and to a lesser extent Islam and Christianity. Some smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions are animists, observing traditional indigenous beliefs.

Legal Framework

The 2008 constitution, drafted by the military junta in control at that time, states that every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice his or her religious beliefs. The constitution limits those rights if they threaten public order, health, morality, or other provisions of the constitution. It further provides to all citizens the right to profess and practice their religion if not contrary to laws on security, law and order, community peace, or public order and morality.

The law prohibits deliberate and malicious speech or acts intended to outrage or wound the religious feelings “of any class” by insulting or defaming its religion or religious beliefs. The law also prohibits injuring, defiling, or trespassing on any place of worship or burial grounds with the intent to insult religion.

All organizations, whether secular or religious, must register with the government to obtain official status. This official status is required for organizations to gain title to land, obtain construction permits, and conduct religious activities. The law on registering organizations specifies voluntary registration for local NGOs, whether religious in nature or not, and removes punishments for noncompliance for both local and international NGOs.

The law bars members of religious orders, such as priests, monks, and nuns of any religious group, from running for public office, and the constitution bars members of religious orders from voting. The government restricts by law the political activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (sangha). The constitution forbids “the abuse of religion for political purposes.” The election law states that a candidate’s parents must be citizens at the time of the candidate’s birth; authorities have denied citizenship to most Rohingya, thus precluding most Rohingya from running for office.

Although there is no official state religion, the constitution notes that the government “recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.” The constitution “also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution.”

The law bans any organization of Buddhist monks other than the nine state-recognized monastic orders. Violations of this ban are punishable by immediate public defrocking and criminal penalties. The nine recognized orders submit to the authority of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (SSMNC or Ma Ha Na), whose members are elected by monks.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture’s Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana (Buddhist teaching) oversees the government’s relations with Buddhist monks and schools. Religious education is not included in public schools; however, some schools with Buddhist-majority student bodies may start the school day with a Buddhist prayer.

Monastic schools, run by monasteries and nunneries in all states and regions of the country, serve approximately 320,000 students. Those that are officially registered use the official state primary and middle school curricula but also teach about Buddhist culture and ways of life.

Four laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion” remain in effect. One of the laws bans polygamy, making it a criminal offense to have more than one spouse, which observers say targets the country’s Muslim population. A marriage law specifically for Buddhist women stipulates notification and registration requirements for marriages between non-Buddhist men and Buddhist women, obligations that non-Buddhist husbands must observe, and penalties for noncompliance. A religious conversion law regulates conversion through an extensive application and approval process through a township-level Religious Board for Religious Conversion; however, the law is rarely applied, and many townships do not have conversion boards. The applicant must be older than 18 and must undergo a waiting period of up to 180 days; if the applicant still wishes to convert, the board issues a certificate of religious conversion. A population control law allows for the designation of special zones where population control measures may be applied, including authorizing local authorities to implement three-year birth spacing.

To register a Buddhist marriage, a couple must appear in court with their national identity card (which identifies their religion as Buddhist) and attest that they are married. Buddhist marriages may be registered at any court with relevant jurisdiction. Christian marriages are regulated under a Christian marriage act dating from 1872, and to be recognized, must be officiated by a Christian religious figure registered with the Supreme Court. There are only a handful of ministers or priests registered in the country. The officiating church must submit details of a marriage from its registry to the Supreme Court within three months of the marriage ceremony solemnization, and only the Supreme Court is permitted to recognize Christian marriages, making it nearly impossible for a Christian marriage to be legally recognized. Muslim marriages officiated by a mullah are recognized under the law with no court filing requirements.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

As was the case in previous years and following the military coup in February, it was sometimes difficult to categorize incidents based solely on religious identity due to the close linkage between religion and ethnicity. Both before and following the military coup and the deposition of the civilian government in February, there were reports of threats, detentions, and violence targeting minority religious and ethnoreligious groups, which, according to media reports, increased under the military regime. According to local and international NGOs, there continued to be almost complete impunity for regime security forces that had committed or continued to commit abuses, including what the NGOs said was genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim. Local media outlet The Irrawaddy reported in February that one of the military units responsible for the 2017 atrocities and other human rights abuses in Rakhine State against Rohingya was also involved in crackdowns on prodemocracy demonstrators following the military coup.

According to Agence France Presse (AFP) and other news sources, in February, following reports that military forces beat, arrested, and used rubber bullets against protestors in and around Myitkyina, the capital of predominantly Christian Kachin State, a Catholic sister knelt before security forces, begging them not to shoot children. In March, Pope Francis said, “I, too, kneel on the streets of Myanmar and say, ‘Stop the violence,’” referencing the actions of the Catholic nun from the Sisters of St. Francis Xavier.

In April, local media reported that residents found the body of a Muslim muezzin, who was wearing a dress and lipstick, hanging in a mosque in Yangon Region. Residents said regime security forces likely killed him. Also in April, according to local media outlet Myanmar Now, soldiers opened fire inside the Sule Mosque in Mandalay’s Maha Aungmyay Township, killing Ko Htet, who was sleeping inside the mosque when the attack started approximately10 am. He had spent the night there after fasting, as Muslims around the world began observing Ramadan. According to the news report, witnesses said soldiers started firing immediately after storming the mosque. Two others were injured in the shooting.

On May 24, local media reported that military forces bombed Sacred Heart Church in Kayan Tharyar, Kayah State, killing four persons who had taken refuge there, and that on May 28, government forces fired upon the Church of Saint Joseph in Demoso, Kayah State, and killed two men who were collecting food for displaced persons. Local media also reported military forces killed a volunteer from a Catholic seminary on May 29, in Kayah State. After the Sacred Heart bombing, Cardinal Charles Bo, Archbishop of Yangon, issued a statement on May 25, asking the junta not to target places of worship. Violence involving houses of worship and other holy sites continued however, including on June 6, when the military reportedly shelled another church in Kayah State that it stated was being used by “terrorists” to launch offensives against the regime.

In June, the opposition NUG issued a statement promising to “seek justice and accountability” for crimes the military committed against more than 740,000 Rohingya. In addition, the NUG said that if it returned to government, it would repeal a 1982 law denying citizenship to most Rohingya. In August, the NUG issued a statement in which it held the military regime responsible for having “perpetuated crimes against humanity,” including war crimes committed based on religion.

In June, Pope Francis lamented the suffering of IDPs in Burma, stating, “Churches, pagodas, monasteries, mosques, temples, just as schools and hospitals, [must] be respected as neutral places of refuge.”

In September, regime soldiers shot and killed Baptist pastor Cung Biak Hum in Chin State while he attempted to extinguish a fire started by artillery fire. A soldier reportedly cut off his finger post-mortem to remove his wedding ring. The general secretary of Chin Baptist Convention told local media, “The military should carefully distinguish between their enemies and civilians… If they continue this way, fighting could grow into a larger ethnoreligious conflict.”

In October, The Irrawaddy reported Buddhist Gurkha student Lin Paing Soe, from Kyaukse Technological University, was tortured to death while detained by regime security forces. According to the report, regime security forces used racial and religious slurs and beat him “inhumanely.” An October Associated Press report on the military’s use of torture included a story of an unnamed monk who described unsanitary conditions in detention and how the military forced him to defrock and “kicked him in the head, chest, and back.”

In February, regime security forces arrested Myanmar Now reporter Kay Zon Nway for her coverage of peaceful protests in Yangon and placed her in solitary confinement for staging a “hunger strike.” Her lawyer told local media that she was fasting for Ramadan. Kay Zon Nway was released from Insein Prison in June after 124 days in detention.

On February 1, Myanmar Now reported that regime security forces arrested and detained three senior influential monks, including vocal critic of the military Ashin Ariya Vansa Bivansa, better known as Myawaddy Sayadaw. Authorities sentenced him to six months in prison and subsequently released him on August 2, after serving his full sentence for defamation.

In May, the online Buddhistdoor Global journal and multimedia platform reported that the military raided a monastery in Mandalay purported to be associated with prodemocracy activities. A teacher from the monastery reported that he was beaten repeatedly by three members of the military before being sent to an interrogation center at Mandalay Palace.

In June, The Irrawaddy reported that regime security forces arrested three Christian pastors from Kachin State who organized a prayer for “peace in Myanmar.” If convicted, the pastors could serve up to three years in prison for incitement. Regime security forces released all three in October.

In August, Myanmar Now reported the military issued, then rescinded, plans that would have installed Buddhist monks at military checkpoints in Mandalay. Local monastics objected to the plan, with one Mandalay monk saying that the military was “…trying to exploit the religion for their political gains.”

On September 16, in Mandalay, armed men in plain clothes, accompanied by uniformed military, arrested Reverend Thian Lian Sang, an ethnic Chin pastor. According to the Baptist World Alliance, following his arrest, regime security forces entered Sang’s home, where they confiscated money and cellphones belonging to the Church and the pastor’s family.

In November, a regime court extended by two years the prison sentence of prominent Buddhist monk Ashin Thawbita, who was charged earlier in the year with violating a section on defamation in the telecommunications law for his comments on social media the military perceived to be defamatory. His new sentence stemmed from an additional charge of incitement under the penal code.

Religious leaders also expressed concern that religious assembly could be misconstrued by the regime as prodemocracy organizing. In June, according to multiple local media reports, soldiers in Mandalay beat Buddhist monks for reciting suttas (religious discourses) interpreted as antiregime.

According to media reports, in April, Christian leaders said regime security forces raided and searched several Christian churches across the country, including in Kachin State and Mandalay Region. Regime security forces reportedly said they were looking for individuals involved in illegal activities and for antiregime activists.

According to the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), Christians in Chin State and Sagaing Region experienced destruction of homes and places of worship and suffered physical violence by the military. Myanmar Now reported in December that in Thantlang, Chin State, the military had destroyed at least seven churches, in addition to 842 homes, in a series of arson attacks starting in October. In November, the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) condemned the military’s attacks on civilians, citing as an example the military’s continued shelling of the town of Thantlang and its setting fire to homes and churches. According to BHRN, the attacks were part of the “Kill all, burn all, and destroy all strategy the military is documented using against other ethnic and religious minorities.”

In October, media sources reported regime security forces arrested seven workers from the Catholic Church social agency Caritas (Karuna) who were on a mission to provide aid for IDPs in Kayah State. At year’s end, Church officials were working to secure the release of the aid workers. Local residents with knowledge of the situation said that it was common for the military to inflict violence against local residents in the area and make arbitrary arrests based on religious affiliation.

According to AAPP, the military regime had detained 35 Buddhist monks for participating in protests, as well as nine Christian leaders, and a Muslim religious leader for unexplained reasons since the military coup as of year’s end

According to the IIMM, it collected and analyzed more than two million pieces of evidence of possible human rights violations or abuses in Burma from 2019-2121, including reports of approximately 1,300 victims and eyewitnesses in Rakhine, Chin, Shan, Kachin, and Karen States.

According to The Union of Catholic Asian News, more than 100,000 persons, many Christians, remained in camps for displaced persons in Kachin and Shan States, while another 100,000, mostly Karen Christians, were in camps across the Thai border.

In August, the regime amended the penal code to include a provision on genocide. According to legal experts, the decision reflected an attempt to ease international pressure on the regime as it faced a genocide charge at a United Nations court for genocide and crimes against humanity committed by members of the military against Rohingya. According to The Irrawaddy, the provisions of the law include up to the death sentence for killings committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnic, racial, or religious group.

The regime enforced at least three different laws to limit gatherings, including religious gatherings. A gathering of five or more persons – including for religious reasons – could result in charges and punishment under a natural disaster management law (three months to three years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both), a communicable diseases prevention and control law (six months’ imprisonment or a fine), or Article 188 of the Penal Code – defiance of a government order (one to six months’ imprisonment or a fine).

On October 7, the UNHCR reported that regime authorities continued to confine approximately 148,000 Rohingya in 21 displacement camps. Restrictions on in-country movement of Rohingya remained extensive, with authorities requiring them to carry special documents and obtain travel permits even to travel within Rakhine State, where most Rohingya reside. According to humanitarian aid organizations, regime authorities made no new efforts to initiate the return of Rohingya refugees during the year, most of whom remained in camps in neighboring Bangladesh. According to these organizations, under the military regime, there was no possibility for the voluntary, dignified, safe, and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya.

The regime’s General Administration Department reinstated legal action against Rohingya traveling without documentation, a reversal of an April 2020 order. For example, in September, regime security forces arrested 30 Rohingya traveling without documentation and sentenced them to two years in prison. In November, Myanmar Now reported that regime authorities in Buthidaung, northern Rakhine State, had tightened travel restrictions on local Rohingya, requiring them to obtain a permission slip from an immigration office to leave the township. According to one Rohingya interviewee, previously Rohingya residents had to obtain a recommendation from their village administrator to travel outside the township but now immigration officials had to grant permission as well.

Rakhine local media reported human smuggling of Rohingya from Rakhine State to Malaysia continued, including eight identified cases in October. Radio Free Asia reported in December that a court in Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State sentenced 109 Rohingya to five years in prison with hard labor after convicting them on illegal immigration charges. The refugees had fled Burma during the military’s 2017 crackdown against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State and made their way to camps in Bangladesh; Burma’s navy intercepted them in late November as they attempted to reach Malaysia.

During the year, the regime tightly restricted external access to ethnic majority areas where religious minorities also live, including access by UN, humanitarian, and media organizations. Fighting between the military and some ethnic armed organizations, such as the Chin National Front, escalated after the coup, though it was difficult to categorize the increase in fighting as primarily religiously motivated. The United Nations reported that as of December 17, more than 296,000 persons were newly displaced since the coup, particularly in ethnic majority areas, including Kayah, Karen, Chin, and Shan States. According to UN reports, thousands more were displaced by year’s end, particularly in Kayah and Karen States in the southeastern part of the county. According to the Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG), as of the end of the year, more than 156,900 persons had been displaced since May, of which 95 percent were Karenni Christian, due to the escalation in violence between the military and ethnic armed organizations. According to The Union of Catholic Asian News, in April, more than 100,000 persons, many Christians, remained in camps for displaced persons in Kachin and Shan States, while another 100,000, mostly Karen Christians, were in camps across the Thai border.

The regime continued to restrict the right to freedom of association, including of religious groups. In the run-up to the November 2020 general elections, the now deposed NLD-led civilian government reinterpreted the law on registering organizations to require NGOs that received foreign funding to register with the government. After the coup, the regime required banks to report on all foreign funds received by both local and international NGOs. According to various religious groups and NGOs, the process to register an NGO remained lengthy and was often unsuccessful.

Religious groups throughout the country, including Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, and especially Muslims, continued to report difficulties and delays that could last for years in getting permits to allow construction of and repairs to religious buildings. Buddhist leaders said obtaining such permission was more difficult for non-Buddhist groups. Representatives of religious groups said the need for multiple permissions, unclear authority, and interminable delays in responses to requests for permits led them to construct places of worship without the required permissions. Others said it was necessary to bribe authorities to obtain permits.

According to local media reports, at least 30 churches and a mosque were damaged or destroyed during fighting between the military and joint ethnic armed organizations and opposition People’s Defense Force. CHRO reported that as of November, the military had destroyed 36 churches and Christian-affiliated buildings in Chin State. Similarly, KnHRG reported that as of December, the military had destroyed at least seven Christian churches in Kayah State.

In August, CHRO reported soldiers were camping in church compounds. They reportedly tore up Bibles, destroyed property, drank alcohol, and slaughtered livestock on church grounds. KnHRG reported similar incidents in the first week of December in Karenni State’s Demoso Township.

According to a BHRN report entitled Before Our Eyes, which it released in July, on February 28, eyewitnesses saw many military officers gathering around the gate of a mosque compound in Mandalay. They proceeded to shoot the gate open and advance into the compound. Eyewitnesses heard gunfire and saw military forces destroying the mosque’s interior. According to the BHRN report, on 18 March in Thingangyun township, police and military forces destroyed the doors of a Hindu temple.

According to local media and NGOs, there were no reports that the regime held perpetrators accountable for crimes against members of religious minority communities. NGOs also said that regime authorities prevented them from legally owning land and constructing religious buildings. In Rakhine State, according to the United Nations and media reports, the situation remained unchanged from 2019, with the movement of members of various ethnic and religious groups, particularly Rohingya, restricted by the regime. Restrictions varied governing the travel between townships of persons whom the government (before its removal in February) and the regime considered foreigners, including both Muslim and Hindu Rohingya, some other Hindus living in Rakhine State, and others in northern Rakhine State. Depending on the township, restrictions usually required the submission of an immigration form. The traveler could obtain this form only from the township of origin’s immigration and national registration department and only if that person provided an original copy of a family list, temporary registration card, and letters from two guarantors. The form typically authorized travel for two to four weeks but was issued almost exclusively for medical emergencies, according to human rights activists. Sources stated obtaining travel permits often involved extortion and bribes. Muslims throughout the country still faced restrictions on travel into and out of Rakhine State and reportedly feared authorities would not allow them to leave Rakhine State if they were to visit.

According to NGOs, such restrictions, which continued under the regime, continued to impede the ability of Rohingya to pursue livelihoods and education, access markets, hospitals, and other services, and engage other communities. Sources stated that individuals stereotyped by security forces as appearing to be Muslim continued to receive additional scrutiny on their movements in the region, regardless of their actual religion; obtaining these travel permits often involved extortion and bribes.

According to various religious organizations and NGOs, services to process the registration of NGOs, whether religious or not, were unavailable during the year because of regime-imposed COVID-19 protocols. According to representatives of some civil society groups, NGOs refrained from registering because doing so would require providing extensive information on the staff to the regime, which they preferred not to provide.

According to CHRO, neither the government overthrown in February nor the subsequent military regime issued any permits to Christian groups to register and own land and properties. All such registration applications remained pending at year’s end, with some pending for more than 16 years.

In areas with few or no mosques, Muslims often conducted prayer services and other religious practices, such as teaching, in private homes. As the democratically elected government had done before it, the regime Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture continued to restrict non-Buddhist religious teachings to government-approved religious buildings and prohibited prayer services and religious teaching in private homes.

Both prior to and following the military coup in February, COVID-19 restrictions limited access of members of minority religious groups to religious sites. This led to the suspension of applications by Christian groups to buy land in Chin State and Sagaing Region.

Sources continued to state that authorities of both the deposed democratically elected government and the regime generally did not enforce laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion.”

In June, the military regime ordered all primary schools to reopen following months of closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but approximately 90 percent of primary and secondary school students refused to enroll, many reportedly to protest against the military regime. Similarly, hundreds of university students refused to enroll, although it was unclear to what degree COVID-19 also played a role in their decision. In early July, following a third wave of COVID-19, the regime ordered all primary schools to close again; many schools did not reopen until the end of the year. Several Christian theological seminaries and Bible schools continued to operate, along with several Islamic madrassahs, in Yangon, Sagaing, and elsewhere. At year’s end, the regime ordered all institutions of higher learning to reopen on January 6, 2022.

Due to continuing regime-imposed restrictions of movement on Rohingya, many Rohingya could not access education in state-run schools. Rohingya and Kaman children in central Rakhine State had physical access to only one high school, located in Thet Kae Pyin, Sittwe township, according to international observers. Authorities generally did not permit Rohingya high school graduates from Rakhine State and others living in IDP camps to travel outside the state to attend college or university, but Rohingya students could take a limited number of online courses. Authorities continued to bar any university students who did not possess citizenship cards from graduating, which disproportionately affected students from religious minorities, particularly Muslim students. These students could attend classes and take examinations but could not receive diplomas unless they had a citizenship card, the application for which required some religious minorities to identify as a “foreign” ethnic minority.

On September 24, military regime-appointed Minister for Religious Affairs and Culture U Ko Ko issued an order to monasteries and convent schools not to accept long-term guests and requiring that temporary guests register at the ward administration office. According to local media outlets, the order explicitly named the CRPH, NUG, and other prodemocracy organizations, making clear it was designed to prevent these institutions from becoming safe havens for prodemocracy supporters.

In February, the regime granted amnesty to several high-profile ethnic Rakhine politicians, including Dr. Aye Maung and writer Wai Hin Aung, sentenced to long jail sentences for high treason under the deposed NLD government. In September, local media outlets reported that the regime had dropped charges against and released promilitary, ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, and several other monks. Media reports indicated that some Buddhist nationalists had joined a promilitary militant group called Phyu Saw Hti to assist the military regime in its counterinsurgency operations. The prior civilian government had charged Wirathu with sedition based on comments he made during a 2019 promilitary rally, where he criticized Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationships with foreigners and her wearing of high heels. According to press reports, Wirathu was widely known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and prejudice against Rohingya.

According to leaders of minority religious communities and human rights activists, during the COVID-19 pandemic, inconsistent enforcement and interpretation of COVID-19 pandemic regulations exacerbated communal disparities, with harsher outcomes for minority religious communities. In February, the regime-controlled Global New Light of Myanmar and Myawaddy News announced the regime had allowed the reopening of houses of worship. Some chose to remain closed due to COVID-19. According to media reports, Yangon authorities requested that Muslims observe Ramadan at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic led to additional government restrictions on all forms of worship, including Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim, but sources reported punishments for violations were disproportionally applied to religious minorities, restrictions that continued under the regime. Although Muslims said authorities had granted limited permission to slaughter cows during Eid al-Adha in prior years, COVID-19 restrictions prevented this activity during the year. Regime-controlled media continued to report frequently on officials and military personnel paying respect to Buddhist monks, offering donations at pagodas, and organizing “people’s donations” of money and food. Regime-controlled media also highlighted regime COVID-19 vaccination efforts. In August, The Irrawaddy reported that only citizens were eligible for the military’s nationwide COVID-19 vaccination program, which excluded noncitizens such as Rohingya.

Buddhists continued to make up nearly all senior officials within the military and civil service. Applications for civil service and military positions continued to require the applicant to list his or her religion.

Authorities continued to require citizens and permanent residents to carry government-issued identification cards that permitted holders to access services and prove citizenship. These identification cards indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity. Citizens were also required to indicate their religion on certain official applications for documents such as passports, although passports themselves did not indicate the bearer’s religion. Members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, continued to face problems obtaining identification and citizenship cards. Some Muslims reported they were required to indicate a “foreign” ethnicity if they self-identified as Muslim on their application for a citizenship card.

The regime halted the deposed government’s previous call for Rohingya to participate in the citizenship verification process and to apply for National Verification Cards (NVCs). Under the civilian government, NGOs reported that authorities coerced or pressured Rohingya to apply for NVCs. Rohingya generally expressed distrust of any documentation process that did not affirm their citizenship or that would grant naturalized versus full citizenship, which carries fewer rights under law. NGOs documented past cases where Rohingya were forced to identify as “Bengali” when applying for an NVC, with the implication that Rohingya are viewed as “foreigners” not entitled to full citizenship rights. The few Rohingya who did receive citizenship through the NVC process said they did not receive significant rights or benefits and that they had to pay bribes at different levels of government to receive the document. The regime announced a citizenship documentation project in May, which, it stated, was a concerted, nationwide effort to issue household registration lists and national identification cards and a means to prevent the kind of voter fraud the military regime said occurred in the 2020 general election. According to the director general of the Department of National Registration and Citizenship, as of November 5, the regime had issued 171,149 household lists and 567,371 national registration cards. Authorities issued no citizenship cards to Rohingya through this program by year’s end.

Statements by some authorities before and after the coup exhibited Buddhist nationalist sentiment. In August, CINC Min Aung Hlaing said in a speech, “Most of us are primarily Buddhists in our country. The Buddha devotees were disheartened in their faith in Buddhism during the previous five years. Since the time we took power, we have emphasized religious affairs under the provisions of the constitution.”

Regime-controlled media continued to report frequently on officials and military personnel paying respect to Buddhist monks, offering donations at pagodas, and organizing “people’s donations” of money and food.

In May, The Irrawaddy reported that the regime released Michael Kyaw Myint, the leader of the Yeomanry Development Party detained by the deposed civilian government. Kyaw had previously served a year in prison after leading an anti-Muslim mob in Yangon.

According to local media, some ethnic armed organizations operating in the country continued to pose a threat to ethnic and religious minority groups. The AA continued to force local villagers, including Christian religious leaders, to construct roads without any pay for their labor and recruited villagers to attend military training camp. According to a local source, the AA also forced Christian religious leaders to attend its administration training, often holding them against their will.

In September, gunmen shot and killed Rohingya Muslim activist and community leader Mohib Ullah in the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh. Ullah was known for his detailed compilation of abuses and atrocities committed in 2017 against Rohingya in Burma. According to press reports, his killers were likely associated with the insurgent group ARSA. Ullah spoke out against ARSA militancy and abuses in the refugee camps in Bangladesh.

In July, the NUG announced its appointment of a Rohingya activist as an advisor to its “Ministry of Human Rights.” The NUG’s August 24 statement on the anniversary of atrocities committed against the Rohingya received public support via social media. Some social media users commented that the coup had united the country against the military regime and had produced more sympathy for the Rohingya, which, they said, may have been responsible for a decline in online hate speech aimed at the Rohingya noted by some observers.

According to Muslim activists, Rohingya continued to be perceived as not truly belonging to the country, irrespective of citizenship status, and as belonging to a religion commonly viewed with fear and disdain. There were continued reports of social stigma surrounding any assistance to or sympathy for Rohingya. Some civil society leaders said that even among otherwise tolerant individuals, anti-Rohingya sentiment remained prevalent. There were continued reports of general anti-Muslim prejudice, including social pressure not to rent housing to Muslims in some areas. Some local media reports, however, said the Bamar ethnic majority’s empathy for the decades of persecution suffered by Rohingya and other minorities had grown due to their own post-coup experience of the brutal crackdown by regime security forces on innocent persons irrespective of ethnic and religious background. For example, a schoolteacher told the New York Times, “I saw soldiers and police killing and torturing people […] I started to feel empathy for Rohingya and ethnic people who have been suffering worse than us for many years.”

In June, a public opinion poll found that, when asked about relations among persons of different faiths in the country, 47 percent said that strict protection of one’s own religion would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future, while 48 percent said that granting more rights to religious minorities would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future.

Despite a continuing order by the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (SSMNC), an independent but government-supported body that oversees Buddhist affairs, that no group or individual operate under the banner of Ma Ba Tha, some branches of the group continued to use the name Ma Ba Tha, while others used the new name, Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation. According to Myanmar Now, in March SSMNC announced in a statement that it would suspend its activities and called on the military to end the violence and arrests. One of SSMNC’s 47 abbots said of the suspension, “It is similar to the [Civil Disobedience Movement].” According to local media, some Ma Ba Tha-affiliated monks held a rally in November in support of the military.

In March, protestors waved flags made of women’s sarongs in celebration of International Women’s Day. Regime-controlled Myawaddy News called the act “inappropriate” and “severely insulting to religion and contempt of [Buddhist] religion…and monks.”

Throughout the year, senior U.S. government officials – including the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the USAID Administrator, the Ambassador, and senior Department of State officials for East Asia and for human rights – consistently raised ongoing U.S. concerns about religious freedom, including the plight of the majority Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing Christian minority religious communities in Kachin, northern Shan, and Chin States amid ongoing violence, and also engaged in advocacy on social media calling for an inclusive democracy that respects all ethnicities and religions and against violence and hate speech against religious minorities. In July, the Secretary met with civil society representatives from diverse ethnic and religious groups in the country to discuss their calls to restore the country’s democratic transition.

The U.S. government continued to press for full accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations, including those concerning religious freedom. On February 10, the President issued Executive Order 14014, Blocking Property with Respect to the Situation in Burma, which stated, in part, the military “unjustly arrested and detained government leaders, politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, and religious leaders.” Pursuant to the Executive Order 14014 of February 10, 2021, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six officers of Burma’s military who played a direct role in the coup. OFAC also designated four military officials who were appointed to positions in the SAC following the coup and designated three entities operating in Burma’s gem industry that are owned or controlled by the military. In addition, OFAC designated 46 individuals, including the union ministers, immediate family members of military-related designated individuals, and 14 entities including the SAC between March and July 2021, pursuant to E.O. 14014.

U.S. government officials continued to call for sustainable solutions to the root causes of discrimination and religiously motivated violence. In July, the United States was among 15 countries from the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance to sign a joint statement that condemned “any attack on places of worship” and commended faith actors for their work in the prodemocracy movement and in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In an October statement about reported attacks in Chin State, the Department of State spokesperson condemned the “brutal actions by the Burmese military regime against people, their homes, and places of worship.” U.S. government support for the Burma-Bangladesh humanitarian crisis response included more than $124.6 million in 2021, with nearly $49.6 million for programs in Burma and approximately $75 million for programs in Bangladesh. Since August 2017, the U.S. government has provided more than $820 million in humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh and Burma, including $469 million in 2020, with $78 million for programs in Burma, $314 million for programs in Bangladesh, and $29 million in regional crisis response.

Embassy officials at all levels emphasized the importance of addressing the effects of ethnoreligious violence and hate speech, including anti-Muslim rhetoric. Embassy officials promoted religious freedom and meaningful inclusion during meetings with the opposition NUG, CRPH, and the National Unity Consultative Council, as well as with ethnic armed organizations and other ethnic and religious leaders.

Although embassy travel to ethnic and religious minority-predominant areas was curtailed in 2020 and 2021 by the COVID-19 pandemic and the February 1 coup, discussions of religious freedom and tolerance with NGOs and members of community-based organizations and religious communities continued.

The embassy emphasized the need for respect for religious freedom, tolerance, and unity in its interactions with all sectors of society, in public engagements, and through its social media accounts. Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, continued to engage with Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations and NGOs, to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy also posted content on Facebook, Facebook Stories, and Twitter to engage local audiences on the importance of religious pluralism, tolerance, and shared identity in democratic societies, including the recognition of minority religious holidays. The embassy amplified the Department of State spokesperson’s message on the fourth anniversary of the military’s August 25, 2017, ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, which some NGOs said was part of a larger campaign of genocide and crimes against humanity. The statement demanded accountability for those responsible and noted the $155 million in assistance announced earlier in May as part of the 2021 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. In September, an embassy tweet highlighted the Department of State’s announcement of $180 million in additional assistance for the humanitarian crisis facing Rohingya inside and outside the country. In addition, in October, the embassy amplified the Secretary of State’s statement on the killing of Rohingya Muslim leader Mohib Ullah, in which he praised Ullah’s advocacy for the human rights of Rohingya Muslims around the world. That same month, the Ambassador’s Thadingyut video message marking the end of Buddhist Vassa, an annual period of fasting and reflection, called for peace and prosperity for all during a time of hardship. The video received more than 200,000 views and 20,000 “likes,” with comments acknowledging U.S. efforts in raising awareness about shared values among all faiths.

The embassy regularly published statements highlighting concerns about religiously based tensions and anti-Muslim discrimination, as well as calling for respect for religious diversity, unity, and tolerance.

While embassy facilities in Yangon and Mandalay suspended most of their public programs following the coup, the embassy continued to prioritize ethnic and religious diversity in its exchange programs, selecting participants from Shan, Wa, Kachin, Kayah, Chin, Rakhine, and Mon ethnic groups, many of whom belong to religious minority groups. As in prior years, the embassy worked with and supported NGOs working on programs promoting religious freedom and tolerance, as well as with former participants of U.S. government exchange programs promoting tolerance and equal access to basic health care, education, and mental health resources, regardless of religious affiliation.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c) (5) of the Act.

[1] On March 21, 2022, the Secretary of State publicly announced his determination that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya in Burma.

In February 2014, armed forces of the Russian Federation seized and occupied Crimea. In March 2014, Russia claimed that Crimea had become part of the Russian Federation. The UN General Assembly’s Resolution 68/262 of March 27, 2014, entitled “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” and Resolution 75/192 of December 28, 2020, entitled “Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine),” declared continued international recognition of Crimea as part of Ukraine. The U.S. government recognizes Crimea is part of Ukraine; it does not and will not recognize the purported annexation of Crimea. Russian occupation “authorities” continue to impose the laws of the Russian Federation in the territory of Crimea.

On September 10, the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) published its Follow-up of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, stating that the “Russian occupation of Crimea has changed the perception of Ukraine’s historical and cultural heritage, both by the state and society.” According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, following Russia’s occupation of Crimea, many religious communities were essentially driven out of the peninsula through registration requirements under newly imposed Russian laws. Only the UOC-MP continued to be exempt from these registration requirements. According to the Religion Information Service of Ukraine (RISU), the number of denominations decreased from 43 in 2014 to 20 in 2021. Various sources reported that Russian “authorities” in occupied Crimea continued to persecute and intimidate minority religious congregations, including Muslim Crimean Tatars, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and OCU members and clergy. At year’s end, two Jehovah’s Witnesses were serving prison sentences for their faith. According to the NGO Crimea SOS, as of July, 74 (compared with 69 through October 2020) Crimean residents remained in prison in connection with their alleged involvement with the Muslim religious political organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in Russia but legal in Ukraine. Russian occupation “authorities” continued to subject Muslim Crimean Tatars to imprisonment and detention in retaliation for their opposition to Russia’s occupation by prosecuting them for purported involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to the international religious freedom NGO Forum 18, Russia continued to prosecute individuals for some types of worship, including imams leading prayers in their own mosques, as “illegal missionary activity.” UGCC leaders said they continued to have difficulty staffing their parishes because of the policies of occupation “authorities “and that they must register their congregations in Crimea as parishes of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, removing all reference to Ukraine in their name. Crimean Tatars reported police continued to be slow to investigate attacks on Islamic religious properties or refused to investigate them at all. The OCU reported continued seizures of its churches. According to the OCU, Russian occupation “authorities” continued to pressure the OCU Crimean diocese to force it to leave Crimea. On August 23, a judge fined Archimandrite Damian, the head of the St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki Men’s Monastery, for holding a church service on the private land on which the monastery stands, stating such worship constituted “unlawful missionary activities.” Religious and human rights groups continued to report Russian media efforts to create suspicion and fear among certain religious groups, especially targeting Crimean Tatar Muslims, whom media repeatedly accused of having links to Islamist groups designated by Russia as terrorist groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Russian media portrayed Jehovah’s Witnesses as “extremists.” In January, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision accepting for consideration Ukraine’s complaint alleging that Russia was responsible for multiple human rights violations in Crimea between February 27, 2014, and August 26, 2015. The court accepted Ukraine’s allegation of the harassment and intimidation of religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raids on places of worship, and confiscation of religious property.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, a radio survey in Crimea found 67 percent of those surveyed did not approve of Russia’s ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Jehovah’s Witnesses said that non-Jehovah’s Witnesses who observed Jehovah’s Witnesses being treated like criminals and accused of terrorism for their faith had increased sympathy for the organization.

The U.S. government condemned the continued intimidation of Christian and Muslim religious groups by Russian occupation “authorities” in Crimea and called international attention to religious rights abuses committed by Russian forces through public statements by the Secretary of State and other senior officials. In a September 5 press statement, the State Department spokesperson stated, “The United States strongly condemns the September 4 detention of the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyal and at least 45 other Crimean Tatars by Russian occupation “authorities” in Crimea. We call on the Russian occupation “authorities” to release them immediately. This is the latest in a long line of politically-motivated raids, detentions, and punitive measures against the Mejlis and its leadership, which has been targeted for repression for its opposition to Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea.” U.S. government officials remained unable to visit the peninsula following its occupation by the Russian Federation. Embassy officials, however, as well as other State Department officials and the Secretary of Energy, participated in the August 23 Crimea Platform Summit, an international gathering of senior officials to discuss the annexing of Crimea, in which human rights was one of five key topics. The Secretary of Energy, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, and a senior official from the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor gave remarks at the summit, whose joint declaration condemned the “continued violations and abuses and systematic undue restrictions of human rights and fundamental freedoms that residents of Crimea face,” including the right to religion or belief. Embassy officials continued to meet with Crimean Muslim, Orthodox, and Protestant leaders to discuss their concerns about actions taken against their congregations by the occupation “authorities” and to demonstrate continued U.S. support for their right to practice freely their religious beliefs.

The Crimean Peninsula consists of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) and the city of Sevastopol. According to State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2014 estimates (the most recent), the total population of the peninsula is 2,353,000. There are no recent independent surveys with data on the religious affiliation of the population, but media outlets estimate the number of Crimean Tatars, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, is 300,000, or 13 percent of the population.

According to information provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture in 2014 (the most recent year available), the UOC-MP remains the largest Christian denomination. Smaller Christian denominations include the OCU, RCC, UGCC, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, along with Protestant groups, including Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Lutherans. Adherents of the UOC-MP, Protestants, and Muslims are the largest religious groups in Sevastopol.

There are several Jewish congregations, mostly in Sevastopol and Simferopol. Jewish groups estimate between 10,000 and 15,000 Jewish residents lived in Crimea before the 2014 Russian occupation. No updates have been available since the occupation began. The 2001 census, the most recent, records 671 Karaites.

Legal Framework

Pursuant to international recognition of the continued inclusion of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine’s international borders, Crimea continues to be officially subject to the constitution and laws of Ukraine. In the aftermath of Russia’s occupation, however, Russian occupation “authorities” continue their implementation of the laws of the Russian Federation in the territory. The Muslim religious-political group Hizb ut-Tahrir is considered a terrorist organization under Russian Federation law but not under Ukrainian law. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian occupation “authorities” continue to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses in Crimea under a 2017 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

According to occupation “authorities,” fines for individuals conducting illegal missionary activity range from 5,000 to 50,000 rubles ($67-$670); the fine for legal entities is 100,000 to one million rubles ($1,300-$13,300).

Government Practices

According to the Kyiv-based Ukrainian human rights organization Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), the Russian government unlawfully incarcerated or imprisoned 117 individuals pursuant to politically or religiously motivated persecution in Crimea during the year, compared with 111 in 2020.

Human rights groups said occupation “authorities” continued to impede the rights of Crimean Tatars following the 2016 designation of the Mejlis, recognized under Ukrainian law as the democratically elected representative council of Crimean Tatars, as an extremist organization. Rights groups reported detentions and forced psychiatric examinations of Crimean Tatar Muslim prisoners continued throughout the year.

According to CHRG, as of December, 79 Crimean residents remained in prison for alleged involvement in Muslim religious organizations that are declared terrorist or extremist in Russia, although they are legal in Ukraine. In most cases, these were individuals accused of belonging to the “illegal” organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, but detainees also included individuals accused of belonging to Tablighi Jamaat and Takfir wal-Hijra. Observers believed these individuals were largely prosecuted in retaliation for their opposition to Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Occupation “authorities” placed three additional Crimean residents under supervision and banned them from leaving the occupied territory, and two more remained under house arrest. As of November, the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group reported Russian occupation authorities had detained 80 Crimean Tatars and other Ukrainian Muslims for supposed involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir, which the human right group described as a peaceful transnational Muslim party.

On August 16, the Southern District Military Court in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don sentenced Crimean Muslims Ruslan Mesutov and Lenur Halilov to 18 years each in prison, Ruslan Nagayev to 13 years, and Eldar Kantimirov to 12 years in prison for their membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir. “Authorities” arrested the four men in 2019 in Crimea after searching their homes.

According to the CHRG, on December 1, Russia’s Southern Area Military Court (YuOVS) in Rostov-on-Don extended to March 2022 the detention of Crimean Tatars Tofik Abdulgaziyev, Vladlen Abdulkadyrov, Izzet Abdullayev, Medzhit Abdurakhmanov, Imam Bilial Adilov, Servet Gaziyev, Dzhemil Gafarov, Alim Karimov, Seyran Murtaz, Erfan Osmanov, Erver Ametov, Osman Arifmemetov, Yashar Muedinov, Ruslan Suleymanov, and Rustem Sheikhaliyev.

In December, the Military Court of Appeal in Vlasikha, Russia upheld the decision of a lower court to hold in custody Crimean Tatars Ernest Ibragimov and Oleg Fedorov until February 2022.

On December 23 the same court upheld a lower court decision to hold in custody Crimean Tatars Raim Ayvazov, Farkhod Bazarov, Remzi Bekirov, Rizu Izetov, Shaban Umerov until February 16, 2022.

On December 23, YuOVS extended the detention period for Crimean Tatar Ismet Ibragimov until April 24, 2022.

According to press reports, on November 25, the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don extended until March 15, 2022 the detention of NGO Krymska Solidarnist (Crimean Solidarity) activist Remzi Bekirov. Crimean Solidarity is a human rights organization that opposes Russia’s occupation of Crimea. The court also extended until March 15 the detention period of Tatars Rustem Seitkhalilov, Seitveli Seitabdiyev, Asan Yanikov, and Ruslan Suleimanov.

According to Crimean Solidarity, during mass searches of Crimean Tatar homes on August 17, the FSB detained Rustem Murasov, Rustem Tairov, Dzhebbar Bekirov, Zavur Abdullayev, and Raif Fevziyev for their suspected membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir. Fevziyev was the imam of a mosque in Strohonivka village near Simferopol. According to the Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsperson, occupation “authorities” kept the imam in a damp and overcrowded prison cell containing six beds for eight inmates. One of Fevziyev’s cellmates reportedly suffered from a mental health disorder and posed a threat to the lives of other prisoners. According to the Radio Free Europe-associated news website Krym.Realii, in November, occupation “authorities” subjected the imam to forced psychiatric examination, keeping him in a hospital ward with four convicted murderers. During his detention, Fevziyev reportedly began to feel abdominal pain and could only ease it using medicine provided by his family. In December, Simferopol’s Kyivsky District Court extended his detention until April 11, 2022.

Krym.Realii reported that on December 21, the Leninsky District Court of Simferopol extended the detention of Murasov and Abdullayev until February 10, 2022. Krym.Realii quoted Murasov’s lawyer as saying that occupation “authorities” kept Murasov in a cell infested with rats, mice, and mold. In October, the court extended the detention of Rustem Tairov until January 11, 2022. The news outlet said that for two weeks Tairov suffered tooth pain, but the administration of his pretrial detention center ignored his request for medical assistance.

On July 30, Ukraine’s Consul General in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, described to the Crimea SOS-affiliated QirimInfo news website what he said were the worsening conditions of elderly Tatar prisoners Servet Gaziyev and Dzhemil Gafarov. The Consul General said Russian “authorities” did not provide adequate medical assistance to Gaziyev, who suffered a ministroke on June 28, until September 2. On October 29, Crimean Solidarity quoted lawyer Aider Azamatov as saying that during the year, an ambulance had to be called six times to provide urgent medical aid to Servet Gaziyev during his trial, and the judge insisted that Gaziyev speak Russian rather than Crimean Tatar. According to lawyer Lilya Gemedzhi, prior to his discharge from the hospital on September 25, unspecified individuals threw Gaziyev to the floor, beat him, and shaved his beard.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian occupation “authorities” continued to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses’ activities in Crimea, ostensibly under a 2017 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation outlawing the group. The OHCHR reported that all 22 congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses registered in Crimea had lost the right to operate since 2017. As a result, practicing Jehovah’s Witnesses risked retaliation by law enforcement and were subject to detention, house arrest, or travel restrictions. According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, four Ukrainian Jehovah’s Witnesses were serving sentences of six years or more, with at least 12 others facing such sentences.

The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group reported that on February 10, “authorities” searched the homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses Andriy Rogutsky and Lyudmila Shevchenko, removing Bibles, notebooks, and electronic devices. According to the website jw-russia.org, the items seized at Lyudmyla Shevchenko’s home included a book, “The Sacred Nativity Scene,” that did not belong to her and was not published by Jehovah’s Witnesses. She said security officials had planted and then “found” the book. During the search, Andriy Rogutskiy’s wife became ill and required an ambulance. Reportedly, “authorities” did not detain or charge the women.

In March, according to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, “authorities” carried out 11 armed searches and detained four Jehovah’s Witnesses. “Authorities” charged Taras Kuzio, who was previously charged in 2019, with “financing an extremist organization” and ordered him to remain under house arrest. They also ordered him to have no contact with others involved in the case and prohibited him from using the internet and sending or receiving mail. According to the CHRG, on July 29, “authorities” detained Jehovah’s Witness Petro Zhiltsov, whom they previously interrogated as a witness against Kuzio, and charged him with “organization of the activities of an extremist organization” and “financing of extremist activities.” The charges carry a sentence of up to 10 years. On July 30, “authorities” placed him under house arrest until his trial. On July 29, “authorities” opened a case against Daria Kuzio, the wife of Taras Kuzio, for “organizing of the activities of an extremist organization” and issued a travel restriction. On July 30, “authorities” combined the criminal cases against the Kuzios and Zhiltsov into one case. On August 10,” authorities” detained Sergei Lyulin, connected to Taras Kuzio, and transported him to Simferopol, a 16-hour journey, taping him to the seat of the luggage compartment of a minibus with his arms handcuffed to the ceiling. The court in Simferopol ordered his detention until September 4.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, on August 2, FSB investigators filed charges against Oleksandr Lytvyniuk and Oleksandr Dubovenko for “organizing the activities of an extremist organization.” The charges, which carry a sentence of up to 10 years imprisonment, stemmed from a Zoom conference that “authorities” said was to “attract new members of a banned organization.” On August 5, “authorities” searched at least eight Jehovah’s Witnesses’ homes for more than nine hours. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the FSB officers reportedly tried to force their way into one home by turning off the plumbing. Authorities removed individuals’ computers, personal notes that mentioned the Bible, and documents confirming ownership of their residences. They later held Lytvyniuk overnight, placing him under house arrest on August 6. “Authorities” placed Dubovenko, who was not at home during the searches, under house arrest on August 9.

According to Forum 18, Jehovah’s Witnesses Sergei Filatov and Artyom Gerasimov remained in prison in the town of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in Rostov Oblast, Russia – each serving six-year sentences since 2020 – and “authorities” did not allow them to receive letters from their families.

According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on May 24, Jehovah’s Witness Artem Shabliy’s trial for “drawing others into the activities of an extremist organization” began. The group stated that in May 2020, armed FSB, Russian National Guard, and masked riot police raided four homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Kerch, arresting Shabliy.

According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on October 22, a court in Sevastopol sentenced Jehovah’s Witness Ihor Schmidt to six years in prison for “organizing extremist activities.” Three other men, Yevhen Zhukov, Volodymyr Maladyka, and Volodymyr Sakada, arrested with Schmidt in 2020 and also charged with “organizing extremist activities,” remained imprisoned at year’s end.

According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on March 23, a court sentenced Jehovah’s Witness Viktor Stashevsky to six and half years’ imprisonment for “organizing extremist activities” and placed a seven-year restriction on his right to carry out public activities. Addressing the court before sentencing, Stashevsky said all charges against him would be dismissed if he were to stop being a Jehovah’s Witness, saying, “I do not plan to renounce my faith in God. I have been and remain a Jehovah’s Witness.” A judge dismissed his appeal in August.

In a review of the eighth periodic report on Ukraine, released in October, OHCHR cited the significantly limited freedom of religion in territories controlled by armed groups, noting that religious communities there faced selective restrictions. Valeriia Kolomiiets, the country’s Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration, reported to OHCHR that the Russian Federation continued to violate human rights in the temporarily occupied territories. Specifically noting the systematic persecution of the OCU, she reported that persecution on national and religious grounds was carried out systematically. According to the report, there continued to be a pattern of criminalization of affiliation with or sympathy toward Muslim groups banned in the Russian Federation that continued to disproportionately affect Crimean Tatars. According to the report, these cases raised concerns about the right to a fair trial, because detainees’ hearings often banned cameras, media, and family members from the courtroom. OHCHR reported that Russian courts in Crimea cited the “need to ensure the safety of the participants in the proceedings,” but defendants’ lawyers and family members said Russian occupation “authorities” excluded the public from court hearings to limit public awareness of trials, restrict public scrutiny, and exert additional pressure on the defendants.

According to Forum 18, Russian “authorities” continued to prosecute and fine individuals in Crimea for conducting missionary activity. Of the nine known prosecutions brought so far during the year, three were against imams and four against members of Sevastopol’s House of the Potter Protestant Church. The NGO stated that by law, “Russians conducting missionary activity” could incur a fine of 5,000 to 50,000 rubles ($67-$670), with the fine for organizations (legal entities) being from 100,000 to one million rubles ($1,300-$13,300). “Foreigners conducting missionary activity” could incur a fine of 30,000 to 50,000 rubles ($400-$670), with the possibility of expulsion from Russia.

On February 11, a judge fined Imam Murtaza Ablyazov the equivalent of approximately two weeks average local wages for conducting missionary activity by leading prayers in a mosque. On January 25, a judge fined Aleksey Smirnov and Ivan Nemchinov after identifying them as Potter Protestant Church leaders based on a social media post by a Church member.

On August 23, a judge fined OCU Archimandrite Damian, the head of the St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki Men’s Monastery, for holding a church service on the private land on which the monastery stands, stating such worship constituted unlawful missionary activities. This ruling followed an August 8 raid on the parish. Archbishop Klyment, Head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Crimea, called it “an appalling act of lawlessness. A priest is accused merely of praying to God in his own home.” According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Damian’s lawyer stated he planned to appeal, and said, “Russia is destroying yet another Ukrainian religious and cultural group and is continuing to purge Crimea of all that is Ukrainian.”

Renat Suleimanov, a member of Muslim group Tablighi Jamaat, remained under administrative supervision and on Russia’s Federal Financial Monitoring Service List of Terrorists and Extremists at year’s end. Russia continued to ban the Tablighi Jamaat Muslim missionary movement in Crimea under a 2009 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, although the movement remained legal in Ukraine. In January 2019, a Simferopol court sentenced Suleimanov to four years in prison on extremism-related charges for meeting openly in mosques with three friends to discuss their faith. The state released him in December 2020 and ordered him to spend one year under administrative supervision.

On January 14, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision accepting for consideration Ukraine’s complaint alleging that Russia was responsible for multiple human rights violations in Crimea between February 27, 2014, and August 26, 2015. Among the claims accepted was Ukraine’s allegation that the local “authorities” harassed and intimidated religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raided places of worship, and confiscated religious property in violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

On February 16, parliament appealed to international organizations and foreign governments to condemn the occupation of Crimea and to call for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners. It condemned the persecution and harassment of its citizens on ethnic, religious, political, and other grounds in the Russia-occupied area, emphasizing the unacceptability of restricting linguistic, religious, and other rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, in particular, Crimean Tatars.

On February 25, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy released a declaration that stated, “Residents of the peninsula face systematic restrictions of their fundamental freedoms, such as the freedoms of expression, religion or belief and association, and the right to peaceful assembly… The Crimean Tatars continue to be unacceptably persecuted, pressured, and [to] have their rights gravely violated. Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, and all ethnic and religious communities in the peninsula must be ensured the possibility to maintain and develop their culture, education, identity, and cultural heritage traditions, which are currently threatened by the illegal annexation… The ban on the activities of the Mejlis, a self-governing body of the Crimean Tatars, must be reversed.”

On November 24, the Religious Information Service of Ukraine reported that the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emine Dzhaparova, told the audience attending the Forum of the International Alliance on Freedom of Religion in Brazil that Russia continued to create artificial obstacles to the activities of any religious community that did not belong to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. She said Crimean Tatars had become the most persecuted religious community in occupied Crimea, with more than 120 imprisoned on trumped-up criminal cases. “In the occupied territories of Ukraine, Russia restricts missionary activities under the pretext of fighting so-called extremism. The Russian Federation is trying to stop the activities of all pro-Ukrainian organizations in occupied Crimea – in particular, religious communities of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Muslims.” Dzhaparova said that of the 49 religious communities that operated in Crimea at the beginning of 2014, only five were still operating.

According to Russia’s Ministry of Justice, as of the end of 2020 (the most recent information available), 907 religious organizations were registered in Crimea, compared with 891 in 2019. The number of religious organizations had dropped by more than 1,000 since the occupation began in 2014, the last year for which Ukrainian government figures were available. Registered religious organizations included the two largest – the Christian Orthodox UOC-MP and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea – as well as various Protestant, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Greek Catholic communities, among other religious groups.

On January 7, Metropolitan Epiphaniy told the Espreso.tv news agency that Russia wanted to eliminate the OCU’s presence in Crimea. In May, RISU reported Metropolitan Klyment of Simferopol and Crimea of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine said that at the beginning of the occupation, 49 Ukrainian Orthodox religious organizations were operating in Crimea, but only six remained. In August, RISU reported that Iryna Verihina, a representative of the Commissioner for the Observance of the Rights of Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, said that because of Russian repression, only five of 49 OCU religious organizations remained in Crimea, and only four of 22 clergymen.

Human rights groups reported Russian occupation “authorities” continued to require imams at Crimean Tatar mosques to inform them each time they transferred from one mosque to another.

The RCC continued to operate in the territory as a pastoral district directly under the authority of the Vatican. “Authorities” permitted some Polish and Ukrainian RCC priests to stay in the territory for only 90 days at a time and required them to leave Crimea for 90 days before returning.

UGCC leaders said they continued to have difficulty staffing their parishes because of the policies of occupation “authorities”. They said “authorities” continued to require them to register their congregations in Crimea as parishes of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, removing all reference to Ukraine in their name, and to operate as a part of the pastoral district of the RCC.

According to the pro-Ukraine Voice of Crimea news website, on August 8, representatives of the Center for Combating Extremism, led by police major Vladimir Gorevanov, stormed into a church at the OCU Monastery of St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki in Balky Village, Bilohirsk District. The representatives forced the monastery’s abbot to halt the morning religious service and ordered all its participants to exit to the backyard so “authorities” could document the monastery’s “illegal missionary activity.” On August 23, the Bilohirsk District Court ordered the abbot, Archimandrite Damian, to pay a fine of 15,000 rubles ($200).

On September 10, the Executive Board of UNESCO published its Follow-up of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine), pursuant to the decisions and resolutions by the UNESCO Executive Board and the general conferences. According to the document: “Over seven years of occupation… systemic political persecution, physical and psychological pressure, annihilation of the independent media, discrimination on the basis of religion, [and] violation of ownership and language rights forced more than 45,000 Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians to leave the occupied peninsula. The Russian Federation continues to prosecute ethnic and religious communities that refuse to recognize the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and seek to preserve their native language, religious, and cultural identity. The Russian occupation of Crimea has changed the perception of Ukraine’s historical and cultural heritage, both by the state and society. Russia has appropriated Ukrainian cultural property on the peninsula, including 4,095 national and local monuments under state protection. Appropriation of monuments is in itself a violation of international law. However, it is equally important that Russia uses such appropriation to implement its comprehensive long-term strategy to strengthen its historical, cultural, and religious dominance over the past, present and future of Crimea.”

The OCU continued to call on the Ukrainian parliament to finalize the approval of a 2020 decision by the Cabinet of Ministers to transfer the Saints Volodymyr and Olha Cathedral, the only OCU church building in Simferopol and the location of the OCU diocesan administration, from the ownership of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to central government ownership. OCU sources believed this transfer would enable Ukraine to take Russia to international courts over its refusal to allow OCU members to use the premises. According to RISU, on June 28, the Russian-controlled Arbitration Court of Crimea ordered the transfer of the cathedral premises to the use of the Russian Ministry of Property of Crimea. Klyment said he would appeal this decision.

Crimean Tatars reported police continued to be slow to investigate attacks on Islamic religious properties or refused to investigate them at all.

On April 20, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol expressed outrage over the desecration of an old Islamic cemetery in Kamyanske village, Leninsky District. Construction equipment scattered human remains while digging a trench though the burial area as part of a pipeline project. Occupation “authorities” had reportedly not taken the cemetery into account when planning the construction. After complaints from local residents, authorities suspended the work to allow the Muslim community to rebury the remains.

According to Freedom House, the Russian FSB continued to encourage residents to inform on individuals who expressed opposition to the purported annexation, including expressing support for Crimean Tatars, condemning the designation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hizb ut-Tahrir as extremist groups, or opposing the oppression of the OCU.

Religious and human rights groups continued to report Russian media efforts to create suspicion and fear of certain religious groups, especially targeting Crimean Tatar Muslims, whom media repeatedly accused of having links to Islamist groups that were designated by Russia as terrorist, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Russian media also portrayed Jehovah’s Witnesses as extremists.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, a radio survey in Crimea found 67 percent of those surveyed did not approve of Russia’s ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that respondents, seeing “ordinary citizens” treated like criminals and accused of terrorism for their faith, had increased sympathy for the organization.

On November 2, the Unian.net news website reported “authorities” in Crimea placed under house arrest a suspect who had allegedly painted offensive graffiti on a wall of a Christian church in Leninsky District.

The U.S. government condemned the continued intimidation of Christian and Muslim religious groups by Russian occupation “authorities” in Crimea and called international attention to religious abuses committed by “authorities.” On February 26, on the seventh anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the President released a statement saying, “The United States does not and will never recognize Russia’s purported annexation of the peninsula, and we will stand with Ukraine against Russia’s aggressive acts.”

Also on February 26, the Secretary of State released a statement saying, “Russian occupation authorities have sustained a brutal campaign of repression against Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, and members of other minority ethnic and religious groups in Crimea. Russian occupation authorities have raided mosques and homes… Russia’s repression has left Crimean residents in a constant state of fear, unable to live their lives freely.”

In a September 5 press statement, the State Department spokesperson stated, “The United States strongly condemns the September 4 detention of the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyal and at least 45 other Crimean Tatars by Russian occupation authorities in Crimea. We call on the Russian occupation authorities to release them immediately. This is the latest in a long line of politically-motivated raids, detentions, and punitive measures against the Mejlis and its leadership, which has been targeted for repression for its opposition to Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea.”

U.S. government officials remained unable to visit the peninsula due to its occupation by the Russian Federation. U.S. government and embassy officials, however, participated in the August 23 Crimea Platform Summit, an international gathering of senior officials convened to discuss the situation in Crimea, in which human rights was one of five key topics. The Secretary of Energy, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, and a senior official of the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor gave remarks at the summit. In a joint declaration, Crimean Platform Summit participants condemned the “continued violations and abuses and systematic undue restrictions of human rights and fundamental freedoms that residents of Crimea face,” including the right to religion or belief. Participants also pledged in the joint statement “to urge the Russian Federation to ensure that all persons belonging to ethnic and religious communities in the peninsula, including ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, are fully able to enjoy their human rights and given the possibility to maintain and develop their culture, education, identity, and cultural heritage traditions, which are currently severely threatened by the temporary occupation.”

Embassy officials also continued to meet with Crimean Muslim, Orthodox, and Protestant leaders to discuss their concerns about actions taken against their congregations by the occupation “authorities” and to demonstrate continued U.S. support for their right to practice freely their religious beliefs.

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Ukraine

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 110.9 million (midyear 2021). According to 2016 U.S. government estimates, 44 percent of the population adheres to the EOTC, 31 percent are Sunni Muslim, and 23 percent belong to evangelical Christian and Pentecostal groups, including the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church, and Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus. Most observers believe the evangelical Christian and Pentecostal proportion of the population has increased since the last national census was conducted in 2007. The EOTC predominates in the northern regions of Tigray and Amhara, while Islam is most prevalent in Afar, Oromia, and Somali Regions. Established Protestant churches have the most adherents in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s (SNNP) Region and Gambella Region and parts of Oromia Region.

Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Eastern Rite and Roman Catholics, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and practitioners of indigenous religions. The Rastafarian community numbers approximately 1,000 and its members primarily reside in Addis Ababa and the town of Shashemene in Oromia Region.

Legal Framework

The constitution requires the separation of state and religion, establishes freedom of religious choice and practice, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the government shall not interfere in the practice of any religion, nor shall religion interfere in state affairs. It permits limitations on religious freedom as prescribed by law to protect public safety, education, and morals as well as to guarantee the independence of government from religion. The law criminalizes religious defamation and incitement of one religious group against another.

The law permits sharia courts to adjudicate personal status cases, provided both parties are Muslim and consent to the court’s jurisdiction.

Registration and licensing of religious groups fall under the mandate of the Directorate of Faith and Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Peace, which requires unregistered religious groups to submit a founding document, the national identity cards of its founders, and the permanent address of the religious institution and planned regional branches. The registration process also requires an application letter, information on board members, meeting minutes, information on the founders, financial reports, offices, name, and symbols. Religious group applicants must have at least 50 individuals for registration as a religious entity and 15 for registration as a ministry or association; the rights and privileges are the same for each category. During the registration process, the government publishes the religious group’s name and logo in a local newspaper. If there are no objections, registration is granted. Unlike other religious groups, the EOTC is not registered by the Ministry of Peace but obtains registration through a provision in the civil code passed during the imperial era that is still in force. Registration with the ministry confers legal status on a religious group, which gives the group the right to congregate and to obtain land to build a place of worship and establish a cemetery. Unregistered groups do not receive these benefits. Religious groups must renew their registration at least once every five years; failure to do so may result in a fine.

Registered religious organizations are required to provide annual activity and financial reports. Activity reports must describe proselytizing activities and list new members, newly ordained clergy, and new houses of worship.

Under the constitution, the government owns all land; religious groups must apply to both the regional and local governments for land allocation, including for land to build places of worship.

Government policy prohibits the holding of religious services inside public institutions, per the constitutionally required separation of religion and state. The government mandates that public institutions take a two-hour break from work on Fridays to allow Muslim workers to attend Islamic prayers. Private companies are not required to follow this policy.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in public and private schools, although both public and private schools may organize clubs based on shared religious values. The law permits the establishment of a separate category of religious schools under the auspices of churches and mosques. The Charities and Societies Agency, a government body accountable to the federal attorney general, and the Ministry of Education regulate religious schools, which provide both secular and religious instruction. The Ministry of Education oversees the secular component of education provided by religious schools.

The law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion.

The law allows all civil society organizations and religious groups to engage in advocacy and lobbying activities and to collect and obtain funding from any legal source.

Religious groups undertaking development activities are required to register their development arms as charities with the Charities and Societies Agency and to follow legal guidelines originating from the Charities and Societies Proclamation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The conflict that erupted in northern Ethiopia in November 2020 spread to other regions during the year and victims of violence included religious figures. According to media, at least 78 priests were reportedly killed in Tigray during the first five months of the year by soldiers from the national army and Eritrean troops. The Telegraph reported the killings based on a church letter to the Synod of the EOTC that said “priests, deacons, choristers and monks” had been “massacred” over a period of five months.

In April, according to media, Co-Patriarch Mathias, an ethnic Tigrayan, accused the government of genocide in Tigray. In a video shot the previous month on a mobile phone and taken out of the country, the Co-Patriarch addressed the Church’s millions of followers and the international community, saying his previous attempts to speak out were blocked. “I am not clear why they want to declare genocide on the people of Tigray,” the Co-Patriarch said, speaking in Amharic. “They want to destroy the people of Tigray,” he added, listing alleged atrocities including massacres and forced starvation as well as the destruction of churches and looting.

On February 25, the Europe External Programme with Africa reported that one monk was killed during the bombing and looting of Debre Damo Monastery in Tigray in January. Reportedly, Eritrean troops aligned with the Ethiopian National Defense Forces were responsible for the attack. The Times reported other buildings had been completely destroyed, including monks’ ancient dwellings. Many reporters cited ethnic grievance as the basis of the attack and said there was no evidence the attack was religiously motivated.

On May 9, according to the Addis Standard, government security forces dispersed thousands of Muslims from Meskel Square where the Muslim community in Addis Ababa had organized a Grand Iftar event during Ramadan. In response to videos and photos showing security forces firing teargas at the crowds, Muslim activists and clerics on social media decried the government’s actions as religiously motivated. Some members of the EOTC said Meskel Square was the EOTC’s traditional property. City officials, however, said the violent dispersal was due to safety concerns arising from the unexpectedly large number of attendees and ongoing construction in Meskel Square. City officials consequently canceled the event and rescheduled it for May 11. According to the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), the rescheduled event was held peacefully. ENA also reported that the purposes of the event included demonstrating that Ramadan was a time of compassion, sharing, and supporting one another in line with Islamic teachings and praying for the unity of the country. Despite the delay, event organizers thanked city administrators for allowing the event to take place. Mayor of Addis Ababa Adanech Abiebie stated that the square belonged to all citizens – not just Christians – and called for Ethiopians to unite and celebrate religious differences.

In June, police accused a preacher from the Mahibere Kidusan – an EOTC congregation – of supporting the TPLF, which parliament had designated as a terrorist group. Police reportedly arrested members of the Mahibere Kidusan for taking pictures of police officers during a demonstration outside the home of EOTC Co-Patriarch Mathias. Demonstrators marched to show solidarity with Mathias after he publicly condemned the ongoing war in Tigray and characterized abuses against Tigrayans as genocide.

According to media, in July, police officers raided a church in Addis Ababa, interrupting prayers and forcing a dozen ethnic Tigrayan priests and monks into a pickup truck; they were released several weeks later.

In August, Minister of Health Lia Tadesse thanked the IRCE for holding a high-level advocacy meeting on reduction of stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS and their families. She tweeted, “Our Creator does not stigmatize and discriminate; let’s not stigmatize and discriminate.”

On January 5, the BBC reported the government agreed to repair the al-Nejashi Mosque that was damaged in 2020 during the conflict in Tigray. Local Muslims said the mosque was the oldest in Africa. The government said a nearby church would also be repaired.

During the year, the government provided funding to religious schools, including 250 Catholic schools and 219 Islamic schools.

Human rights groups stated that societal violence was on the rise, especially in the context of the conflict in the northern part of the country. Because ethnicity and religion are often closely linked and because criminality, politics, access to resources, and historical grievances were also drivers of violence, it was difficult to characterize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In October, the Amhara Region Islamic Affairs Supreme Council said the TPLF had demolished a historic mosque in Zarema town, North Gondar, Amhara Region. The secretary general of the council said the attack proved TPLF’s continued antireligious stand. He said the TPLF had destroyed several other mosques and religious sites in the region and massacred religious students in madrassahs.

On March 5, according to the Addis Standard, members of the OLA killed 29 individuals in Abo Church in Debos Kebele, East Wollega, Oromia Region. Witnesses said victims were marking the beginning of the EOTC’s two-month period of fasting. Reports stated members of the OLA stormed into the church, immediately killing the church administrator. The OLA members took the rest of the victims to a nearby forest and killed them.

In May, the EOTC stated that the government allowing Muslims to hold the Grand Iftar celebration in Meskel Square – of which the EOTC claimed traditional “ownership” – could threaten coexistence between the country’s Christians and Muslims. The EOTC advised Muslims to hold the event at its usual venue, Abebe Bikila Stadium. After the government disrupted the celebration on May 9 and despite the EOTC’s protests, the rescheduled celebration took place peacefully on May 11 in Meskel Square.

The Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) expressed continued concern about what it said was the influence of foreign Salafist groups within the Muslim community. The EIASC accused foreign Salafist groups of forcibly taking control of local mosques. The EIASC said it continued to hold these foreign groups responsible for the exacerbation of tensions between Christians and Muslims and within the Muslim community.

According to the Catholic Near East Welfare Association and the EIASC, the number of Islamic religious schools was growing. Abdul Geni Kedir, a headmaster at one school, said that the expansion of the schools, which were “significantly contributing to the spread of the faith,” reflected the steady increase of the community’s influence in society. He said, “Islamic education has been reinforced by the burgeoning Islamic media and related public activities. Now, we have private newspapers, television stations, educational videos, and there is an increase in the production of multilingual traditional and modern Islamic hymns.”

Observers described a small revival of Waaqeffanna – an indigenous religion in Oromia – especially on university campuses.

The IRCE continued to include representatives from the EOTC, EIASC, Catholic Church, and several evangelical Christian groups, including the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church, and Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus.

In May and December, the Ambassador hosted EOTC Co-Patriarch Mathias to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Tigray and Mathias’ public statement that genocide was occurring in Tigray. In a Facebook post following the May meeting, the embassy reported that the Ambassador discussed the humanitarian situation in Tigray as well as the Co-Patriarch’s video message on the crisis released a week earlier and reported widely in local press. The Ambassador invited the Co-Patriarch to attend future interfaith community meetings to “further explore and continue their conversation.”

The U.S. government awarded several grants to the IRCE and other faith-based organizations to fund projects that encouraged religious tolerance. In September, the embassy awarded funding to the Ghion Peace, Reconciliation and Development Association for a program promoting religious tolerance. The program trained 60 youth and faith-based organizations to facilitate consultative workshops on peacebuilding and conflict mitigation within Amhara and Qimant communities. Participants then led discussions with over 200 youth from the towns of Gondar and Chilga/Aykel on peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

In October, the embassy provided funding to the IRCE to design a two-day program for religious leaders on conflict prevention and mitigation, to be conducted in 2022. This program, designed to encourage peacebuilding and religious and ethnic tolerance, would bring together IRCE members across the country to engage on security issues, including the conflicts in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar. The embassy provided logistical and technical support to the IRCE as it began organizing the meeting and identifying potential conflict mitigation roles for regional and religious leaders at the community level. The two-day program would establish a six-month engagement plan framework.

In August, the embassy provided funding to the Inter-Religious Council in Dire Dawa to facilitate a program to promote interreligious peacebuilding and tolerance in Harar, Chiro, and Dire Dawa by empowering leaders to work with youth and women in their constituencies to promote interreligious peace.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (midyear 2021). According to a 2021 Georgian National Statistics Service estimate, the population is 3.7 million. According to the 2014 census, GOC members constitute 83.4 percent of the population, followed by Muslims at 10.7 percent and members of the Armenian Apostolic Church at 2.9 percent. The remaining 3 percent includes Roman Catholics, Yezidis, Greek Orthodox, Jews, growing numbers of religious groups defined by the law as “nontraditional” such as Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and individuals who profess no religious affiliation.

Ethnicity, religious affiliation, and region of residence are strongly connected. Most ethnic Georgians affiliate with the GOC. A small number of mostly ethnic Russians are members of several Orthodox groups not affiliated with the GOC, including the ROC, Molokani, Starovery (Old Believers), and Dukhobory (Spirit Wrestlers). Ethnic Azeris are predominantly Shia Muslims and form the majority population in the southeastern region of Kvemo-Kartli. Other Muslim groups include ethnic Georgian Muslims in Adjara region and Chechen Kists in the northeast; both groups are predominantly Sunni. Ethnic Georgian Sunni Muslims are also present in the south-central region of Samtskhe-Javakheti. Ethnic Armenians belong primarily to the Armenian Apostolic Church and constitute the majority population in Samtskhe-Javakheti Region.

Reliable information from the Russia-occupied regions of Georgia continued to be difficult to obtain. According to the 2016 census conducted by de facto Abkhaz authorities (the most recent), there were 243,000 residents of Russia-occupied Abkhazia. A survey conducted in 2003 by the de facto authorities listed 60 percent of respondents as Christian, 16 percent as Muslim, 8 percent as atheists or nonbelievers, 8 percent as followers of the pre-Christian Abkhazian religion, and 1 percent as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, or adherents of other religions. The remaining 7 percent listed no preference.

According to a 2015 census conducted by de facto South Ossetian authorities, there were 53,000 residents of Russia-occupied South Ossetia, of whom the majority were Orthodox Christians. Minority groups included Muslims and the Right Faith, a pre-Christian ethnic Ossetian religion.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of belief and religion, subject to considerations of public safety and the health and rights of others, and equality for all regardless of religion. It prohibits persecution based on religion and prohibits compelling anyone to express his or her opinion about religion. It also prohibits political parties that incite religious strife. The law provides for freedom of religious belief, denomination, and conscience, including the right to choose and change religious affiliation.

The constitution recognizes the GOC’s special role in the country’s history but stipulates the Church shall be independent from the state and that relations between the GOC and the state shall be governed by a constitutional agreement (concordat). The concordat grants the GOC rights not given to other religious groups, including legal immunity for its patriarch and a consultative role in government, especially in state education policies, and reiterates an exemption of Church clergy from military service (although by law, clergy from all religious groups are exempted). The concordat states that some of its provisions require additional legislation before they may be implemented, including the GOC’s right to a consultative role in state education policies. There is currently no implementing legislation for the concordat. Changes to or cancellation of the concordat require a three-fifths majority of parliament and the consent of the GOC.

A religious group may register with the National Agency of the Public Registry (NAPR) as a legal entity under public law or as a noncommercial entity. Both statuses offer equivalent benefits, including legal recognition, tax exemptions for donations and other “religious activities,” (a term not clearly defined by law), and the right to own property and open bank accounts. The civil code defines the activities and rights of denominations registered for legal entity under public law status. Unregistered religious groups may conduct religious activities but do not receive the legal status or benefits conferred on registered groups. Unregistered religious groups may have a charter and ownership of property may be based on that charter. The property should be registered with the National Registrar. They may maintain a bank account with a commercial bank, based on national bank regulations. Unregistered groups may also invite clergy to the country.

To register as a legal entity under public law, the law specifies a religious group must have a historic link with the country or be recognized as a religion “by the legislation of the member states of the Council of Europe.” A religious group must also submit to the NAPR information regarding its objectives and procedures and a list of its founders and members of its governing body. Religious groups registering as noncommercial entities do not have to demonstrate historic ties to the country or recognition by Council of Europe members but must submit to the NAPR similar information on their objectives, governing procedures, and names of founders and members of their governing body. There is no appeal mechanism for groups that are denied registration as a legal entity under public law, but they may reapply to NAPR.

The state recognizes only civil marriages; it does not recognize marriages conducted by the GOC or other religious groups, regardless of their registration status.

The law grants the GOC exceptions from several requirements applicable to other religious groups, including payment of taxes on the construction, restoration, and maintenance of religious buildings and the payment of taxes on property. It exempts the GOC, but not other religious groups, from taxes on “profit from the sale of crosses, candles, icons, books, and calendars used…for religious purposes.” In addition, the law states only the GOC may acquire nonagricultural state property through a direct sale by the government. Should other religious groups wish to acquire this type of property, they must participate in public tenders. Only the GOC has the right to acquire agricultural state property free of charge; all others must pay a fee. The law grants the Church ownership over state forests located near or adjacent to GOC churches and monasteries.

The criminal code prohibits interference with worship services, persecution of a person based on religious faith or belief, and interference with the establishment of a religious organization; the code does not define “establishment.” Interference with the establishment of a religious organization is punishable by a fine, “corrective labor” (community service) for up to one year, house arrest for six months to two years, or imprisonment for up to two years. Violations committed by public officials are considered abuses of power and are punishable by larger fines or longer terms of imprisonment if committed by force of arms or by insulting the dignity of a victim, although the law does not define “insult” and does not specify an amount or time limit for punishment under those circ*mstances. In cases of religious persecution, the perpetrator may face imprisonment for up to three years, depending on the use or threat of violence, his or her official position, and the damages caused. In cases of unlawful interference with the right to perform religious rituals involving the use or threat of violence, offenders may face imprisonment for up to two years; in cases where the offender holds an official position, the offender may face up to five years in prison.

According to a Ministry of Justice decree, accused and convicted individuals may meet only with spiritual representatives of the GOC and registered religious organizations. Prison regulations state prisoners have the right to possess and use religious literature and objects of worship.

The law prohibits restitution to religious organizations of religious buildings and their ruins previously owned by these groups and currently under state ownership, including historical religious buildings confiscated by the Soviet regime. The prohibition, however, does not apply to the GOC, which, per the terms of its concordat with the government, is entitled to receive all previously confiscated property. For other religious groups, the government, through NAPR, lends the property on a for-use-only basis to the groups as legal entities under public law; this is not considered a transfer of state property.

The law stipulates that five religious groups are eligible to receive government payments in compensation for damages they experienced during the totalitarian Soviet regime: the GOC, the Muslim community, represented by AMAG, the Roman Catholic Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the Jewish community. According to the law, the government may not pay such compensation to any other religious group.

Although the law states that public schools may not be used for religious indoctrination, proselytizing, or forcible assimilation, the concordat accords the GOC the right to teach religious studies in public educational institutions; however, there is no implementing legislation allowing the GOC to do so. The concordat also authorizes the state to pay for Georgian Orthodox religious schools, although the government does not do so. The law states that students may pursue religious study and practice religious rituals on school grounds “of their own accord,” but only after school hours. Outside instructors, including clergy of any faith tradition, may only attend or direct students’ religious education or activities if students invite them to do so; school administration and teachers may not be involved in this process. The law includes no specific regulations for private religious schools. Private schools must follow the national curriculum, although they are free to add subjects, including religious studies, if they wish.

The MOIA’s Department of Human Rights is responsible for assessing whether crimes are motivated by religious hatred and for monitoring the quality of investigations into hate crimes.

By law, the Prosecutor General’s Office, which is separate from the MOIA, prosecutes human rights violations involving religious intolerance, while the Public Defender’s Office serves as the country’s human rights ombudsman and monitors complaints of restrictions on religious freedom. The Public Defender’s Office (Human Rights Ombudsperson) is a watchdog rather than an investigatory body; it and makes recommendations to the MOIA and the State Inspector Service. The Public Defender’s Office’s Tolerance Center (composed of leaders from minority religious groups) carries out educational activities and monitors and analyzes cases of religious and ethnic discrimination. It also coordinates the Council of Religions and Council of Ethnic Minorities, which are affiliated with the Public Defender’s Office. The Council of Religions has a civic mandate to protect religious freedom; facilitate a constructive multilateral dialogue among various religious groups; promote a tolerant, fair, and peaceful environment for religious groups; and engage religious minorities in the process of civic integration. It produces an annual report on the status of religious freedom in the country that includes policy recommendations.

The State Inspector Service, a separate investigative body from the Prosecutor General’s Office, investigates crimes such as torture, degrading treatment, and abuse of power or office perpetrated by law enforcement and public officials if committed with the use of force or in violation of human dignity and involving discriminatory elements, including religious motives. Following an investigation, the service may refer these cases to the Prosecutor General’s Office for prosecution. The service has never received any information on a religiously motivated crime since its creation in 2019.

The mandate of SARI, which is part of the Office of the Prime Minister, is to promote and ensure peaceful coexistence based on principles of equality and tolerance. Its responsibilities include researching the existing religious situation and reporting to the government, preparing recommendations and drafting legal acts pertaining to religion for government consideration, and serving as a consultative body and intermediary for the government in disputes arising between religious associations. SARI may issue nonbinding recommendations to relevant state institutions regarding approval of applications for the construction of religious buildings, determination of their locations, and transfer of such properties to religious organizations. By law, SARI distributes government compensation to the GOC and to Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Armenian Apostolic religious organizations registered as legal entities under public law for “the material and moral damages inflicted upon them during the Soviet period.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 30, the government ended a curfew that it had instituted in November 2020 in response to COVID-19, but some restrictions on large social gatherings remained in place. Prior to the end of the curfew, minority religious leaders and religious freedom NGOs stated curfew rules were not applied equally, as the government granted blanket exceptions for the GOC to organize gatherings on GOC holidays, including Orthodox Christmas Eve on January 6 and Orthodox Easter Eve on May 1, while other minority religious groups had to apply on each occasion for one-time exceptions for their holidays and to submit to SARI full lists of expected attendees. Critics said this created a barrier to freedom of assembly for religious purposes and caused concern that the State Security Service was tracking minority religious groups’ members. According to a TDI report on religious freedom, the government stated in response to criticism that any religious group could submit a list of clergy and parishioners to SARI, and it would issue one-time curfew passes for those on the list. TDI, the Union of Georgian Muslims, the Supreme Theological Division of the Muslims of Georgia, the Evangelical Church, the Evangelical Baptist Church, the Church of the Gospel Faith, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, the Word of Life Evangelical Church, the Friends Society – Quakers, the Svedenburg Religious Society, the Church of the Anointed Christians, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Salvation Army called this process discriminatory and an unjustified collection of personal data and did not apply for permits.

From June 30 to the end of the year, permits for public gatherings, including religious gatherings, were no longer required, although the government issued recommendations to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. At year’s end, however, restrictions remained on “large-scale” social gatherings that applied to wedding receptions.

On August 1, Nika Gvaramia, director general of the pro-opposition television channel Mtavari Arkhi TV, reported the State Security Service was spying on clergy, including GOC clergy, among other groups. In September, transcripts of telephone conversations were published on the internet and widely covered in the media. These appeared to document widespread surveillance by the State Security Service of religious leaders, including their interactions with political leaders, journalists, and foreign diplomats. The government and ruling Georgian Dream Party denied the legitimacy of these documents, while NGOs, journalists, and religious leaders stated many of the documents were accurate. Numerous political and civil society leaders expressed concern that the State Security Service monitored private conversations with their personal religious or spiritual leaders and said such activity had a chilling effect on religious freedom, as it confirmed their suspicion the State Security Service was monitoring religious groups.

In September, the NAPR registered the Jehovah’s Witnesses Christian Organization in Georgia as a legal entity under public law. Previously, the group was registered as a noncommercial entity. The group stated it sought the change to bring the Jehovah’s Witnesses Christian Organization in Georgia to an equal legal status as other recognized religious groups. Because noncommercial entities and legal entities under public law receive the same benefits, the group did not gain additional benefits. The NAPR denied the registration applications of six organizations due to “non-existence of legal grounds envisioned by legislation”: the Evangelical Church – Source of Life; Protestant Confession – Presbyterianism; the Georgian Christian Evangelical Protestant Church – Biblical Friends (Quakers); the Caucasus Orthodox Catacomb Church; the Evangelical Church; and the Georgian Christian Protestant Church – Eternal Freedom.

Most prisons continued to have Georgian Orthodox chapels and areas for prayer. Authorities allowed Muslims to pray in their cells or prayer areas and to possess Qurans and prayer rugs. According to SARI and Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Baptist, Muslim, and Jewish groups, prisoners had access to counseling and services appropriate to their religious group upon request. The government provided accommodation for the dietary restrictions of Muslim and Jewish prisoners. During religious holidays, prisoners were exempt from fulfilling their regular duties.

According to NGOs and minority religious groups, many religious issues, such as tax exemptions and restitution issues, continued to lack a clear legislative framework. SARI and some religious groups’ representatives, including members of the Jewish community and the Armenian Apostolic Church, said they remained in favor of drafting a new, broader “law on religion” to define which groups would be eligible for these and other benefits and to address issues pertaining to the registration and legal status of religious groups and the teaching of religion in public schools. Many civil society representatives and members of other religious groups, including some individuals from the Muslim community, the Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Baptist Church, however, remained opposed, arguing such legislation would create a hierarchy of religious groups and allow the government to discriminate against smaller religious communities and increase its leverage over them. Critics of such a law also stated it might include new criteria for registration that would be difficult for nontraditional religious groups to meet. They expressed concern that it would also expand the role of SARI, which some smaller groups said they viewed as an entity that promoted government control of religious organizations rather than a protector of religious freedom. They advocated instead for making benefits available to all religious groups or to none.

Parliament again failed to amend the law granting the GOC tax and property privileges not available to other religious groups, despite the Constitutional Court ruling in 2018 that the law was unconstitutional and instructing parliament to make legislative changes to either abolish the privileges or grant them to all religious organizations no later than December 31, 2018. Although the Constitutional Court’s ruling was legally binding, the court had no means to enforce parliament’s compliance.

On November 16, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against the government, finding police had abused and discriminated against four Muslim Georgians during their arrest while at a protest in Mokhe village in 2014. The four were protesting the government’s efforts to forcibly remove a mosque’s minaret in the village of Chela in Samtskhe-Javakheti Region after the municipal government stated it had been constructed without a proper permit. The ECHR awarded three claimants 1,800 euros ($2,000) each and one claimant 3,900 euros ($4,400) compensation.

In July, TDI filed a case with the Constitutional Court, disputing the constitutionality of provisions in the law prohibiting restitution to religious organizations other than the GOC of religious buildings and ruins they previously owned that were currently under state ownership. TDI stated the disparate treatment constituted discrimination toward minority religious communities. On August 6, the Constitutional Court registered the lawsuit, but at year’s end, it had not yet decided whether it would hear the case.

Many religious property cases pending before the courts and with SARI failed to make progress during the year. Religious groups said this was partly due to institutional inefficiencies and partly due to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

On April 30, the Constitutional Court agreed to hear a case brought by nine religious groups alleging that the GOC’s exclusive property tax exemption on land used for noneconomic purposes violated constitutional guarantees of equality before the law. The court ruled in 2020 the plaintiffs’ case had merit and that it would accept it for substantive consideration. On December 28, the Constitutional Court combined this case with two other cases submitted by TDI during the year. TDI’s first case, submitted to the Constitutional Court in April on behalf of nine religious associations, disputed the constitutionality of import tax regulations that allowed the GOC to import religious items free of duty while requiring all other religious groups to pay tax on them. On June 23, the court partially accepted the constitutional claim of the nine religious associations for consideration on the merits. In the second case, submitted in July, TDI challenged the constitutionality of the law prohibiting religious organizations, other than the GOC, from regaining full legal ownership of property that was seized by the Soviet regime and currently under state ownership.

At year’s end, the Constitutional Court had not ruled on whether it would hear another case brought by nine religious organizations, Christian and Muslim, challenging restrictions on the rights of religious organizations other than the GOC to purchase or exchange state-owned property. The court heard arguments on the case in early 2020.

NGOs and some Muslim community leaders again stated the government continued to favor and influence the state-funded AMAG religious group, including by selectively transferring land to AMAG and influencing the selection of AMAG’s religious leader. The groups again said AMAG was a “Soviet-style” organization that served as a tool of the state to monitor and control religious groups. Several Muslim groups remained critical of AMAG for insisting it represented all Muslim communities in the country within one organization.

The Armenian Apostolic Church continued to petition SARI for restitution of five churches in Tbilisi and one in Akhaltsikhe, all of which the GOC also claimed and which authorities registered as state property. As of year’s end, SARI had still not responded to any of the Church’s 57 petitions, 20 of which it filed in 2015 and 37 in 2018, for ownership or right-of-usage status. The Church reported it operated all 57 churches in the country but did not own any of them. The Church also stated it had not petitioned NAPR during the year to register them as Church-owned property. According to the Armenian Apostolic Church, SARI said in 2020 that the Church had not provided sufficient evidence of ownership but that it was in communication with the Church and expressed willingness to cooperate in the future. According to Armenian Apostolic Church representatives, they did not engage SARI or petition NAPR on this issue during the year, as they did not see such efforts as productive.

Muslim community members continued to state there was a lack of transparency in government decisions regarding construction of mosques. The Muslim community continued to dispute the government’s ownership, as a legacy of the Soviet era, of mosques in Kvemo Kartli, Adigeni, and Adjara. The government also said that, in some cases, the existing mosques were former Georgian Orthodox houses of worship converted during the Ottoman and Persian empires or were constructed during those periods on land where Georgian Orthodox houses of worship had once stood. AMAG reported that when the government transferred state-owned mosques, it only did so for AMAG to use for a 49-year or unlimited period; the government did not transfer full ownership of the property or land.

On September 13, the Kutaisi Court of Appeal upheld a 2019 decision by the Batumi City Court that the Batumi city government had discriminated against the New Mosque Construction Fund (an entity representing members of the Batumi Muslim community seeking to establish a new mosque) by denying, in 2017, the permits necessary to build a new mosque on land the fund owned. The NGO Social Justice Center (formerly Human Right Education Monitoring Center) reported the Batumi city government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The New Mosque Construction Fund filed its own cassation appeal, which was pending at year’s end, requesting that the appeal by the Batumi city government be partially annulled. If the cassation appeal were to be granted, the Batumi city government would be ordered to issue written consent to start the first stage of construction permitting for the new mosque, according to the Social Justice Center.

The government continued to pay subsidies for the restoration of religious properties it considered national cultural heritage sites. The National Agency for Cultural Heritage, housed within the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport, allocated 2.25 million lari ($732,000) during the year for the restoration of religious monuments, all belonging to the GOC, compared with 1.91 million lari ($621,000) in 2020.

On April 12, the Supreme Court upheld a 2018 lower court decision that the Kobuleti city government must connect an Islamic boarding school in Kobuleti, near Batumi, to utility services. The court ordered the Kobuleti city government and a company contracted for the work to connect water and sewage systems to the school, but at year’s end neither the municipality nor the company had taken action, and the school was unable to enforce the court decision. The boarding school, which remained incomplete, was the subject of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim protests in 2014.

The GOC did not offer any formal religious studies classes in public institutions. Although the GOC had the right to have direct involvement in public institutions, such as schools, under the concordat, the government did not define clear legal structures for it to do so. The Social Justice Center said that, unlike in previous years, it had not received any reports of visits to classes in public schools by GOC clergy during regular school hours, a practice prohibited by law.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, most schools continued to rely on online instruction from January until September. TDI stated the Ministry of Education did not report to it any complaints of religious discrimination, but TDI remained concerned that students were hesitant to report such cases for fear of reprisal from fellow students, teachers, or school officials.

As in previous years, TDI stated that the MOIA generally correctly applied the appropriate articles of the criminal code in most cases and the quality of investigations of crimes motivated by religious hatred continued to improve. The institute stated, however, that the Prosecutor General’s Office continued to fail to determine whether an individual was a “victim” of a crime under law (defined as a person who has incurred moral, physical, or material damage as a result of a crime) or to indict individuals for religiously motivated crimes.

Following a 2020 ruling by the Tbilisi City Court that the government was obliged to accommodate students’ religious beliefs when scheduling national examinations, TDI reported that during the year all national exams were scheduled on weekdays. In 2020, TDI had represented two Seventh-day Adventist university applicants who were contesting the scheduling of an entrance exam on a Saturday, in the Tbilisi City Court case. TDI had also asked the court to find that the Ministry of Education had discriminated against the applicants because of their religion and to award “symbolic compensation” of one lari ($0.33) for “moral damages,” but at year’s end, the court had not yet issued a ruling on the matter.

During the year, the government directly allocated from the state budget 25 million lari ($8.13 million) to the GOC and SARI reported it allocated 3.5 million lari ($1.14 million) to the four other eligible religious communities to provide partial compensation for damage caused during the Soviet regime. The 3.5 million lari ($1.14 million) was distributed as follows: 2.2 million lari ($715,000) to the Muslim community, represented by AMAG; 400,000 lari ($130,000) to the Roman Catholic Church; 600,000 lari ($195,000) to the Armenian Apostolic Church; and 300,000 lari ($97,600) to the Jewish community. These were the same as the 2020 amounts. SARI again said the remaining one million lari ($325,000) would be distributed among the religious communities “later.” SARI’s position was that the payments were of “partial and of symbolic character,” and that the government continued to take into account levels of damage and “present day negative conditions” of religious groups in determining compensation. NGOs and religious groups continued to criticize the exclusion of other religious groups, including the Evangelical Lutheran Church, from the legislation designating the five groups eligible to receive compensation, and they questioned the criteria the government used to select which groups received compensation.

At year’s end, the MOIA Department of Human Rights conducted seven in-person training sessions for a total of 274 employees in Tbilisi and Batumi, as well as three online sessions. At these events, it trained MOIA employees on aspects of religious discrimination and hate crimes. Fifteen employees completed the ministry’s remote learning course on hate crimes investigations. In June, in partnership with a program by the Council of Europe on fighting discrimination, hate crimes, and hate speech, 20 staff members of the MOIA’s territorial and structural units received training on issues pertaining to crimes motivated by intolerance. Also in June, 40 managers participated in a four-day training course organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to increase awareness of issues of discrimination (including religious discrimination) and related crimes.

During the year, the media outlet Alt-info, widely described as far right, repeatedly aired criticism of Turkey and Islam. On March 29, it broadcast a statement by Georgian Idea Party (also widely considered to be far right) leader Guram Palavandishvili, who said, in part, “Why do we want Turkey, is it not an occupier? Today we do not want Islam either… We are unequivocally against their [Turkish] politics, which is our occupier, and against their religion, which is confronting our religion.”

The Public Defender’s Office and NGOs reported that in January, a ruling Georgian Dream Party member of parliament, commenting on violence between ethnic Georgian Christians and ethnic Georgian Muslims in the village of Buknari over the construction of a mosque, described the violence as between “Georgians and Muslims.” The Public Defender’s Office, in its Special Report on Combating and Preventing Discrimination and the State of Equality, called the statement “problematic.”

Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained occupied by Russia and outside the administrative control of the central government. Reliable information from those regions continued to be difficult to obtain. According to the “constitution” adopted in Abkhazia, all persons in the region are equal before the law regardless of religious beliefs and everyone has the right to freedom of religion, conscience, and belief. It forbids the formation of associations or parties or activities that incite religious discord. The “constitution” of South Ossetia guarantees freedom of conscience and faith but states, “Orthodox Christianity and traditional South Ossetian beliefs represent one of the foundations of the national self-awareness of the Ossetian people.”

The ROC and the GOC both formally recognized the Orthodox churches in Abkhazia as well as in South Ossetia as belonging to the GOC, but GOC representatives said de facto authorities in South Ossetia continued to pressure Orthodox churches to merge with the ROC. Sources stated that the ROC tacitly and unofficially supported breakaway churches that did not have official autocephaly from the GOC. De facto authorities continued to restrict GOC clergy’s accessing these areas. Some religious figures in Abkhazia continued to support turning the region’s Orthodox churches into an autocephalous Abkhaz Orthodox Church, while others wished to subordinate them to the ROC, and still others wished to subordinate them to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, according to GOC and other religious officials. Orthodox priest and self-declared head of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church Vissarion Aplia continued to call for independence from the GOC. On October 12, the GOC Patriarchate invited Aplia to a dialogue in Tbilisi. Aplia told an Abkhaz TV network on October 21 that the “issue is not decided in Tbilisi, but rather in Moscow, so let us return there and talk.”

Representatives of the GOC remained unable to travel to or conduct services in Russia-occupied Abkhazia, including in the majority-ethnic-Georgian Gali District. According to GOC representatives, the district’s ethnic Georgian population continued to have to travel to Tbilisi-administered territory to celebrate religious holidays. GOC worshipers in Abkhazia were unable to travel to Tbilisi-administered territory to celebrate Orthodox Christmas (January 7) or Orthodox Easter (May 2) due to the closure of the Enguri crossing point from February 2020 to July 2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the lifting of coronavirus restrictions, de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to restrict movement across the division line with the rest of Georgia and to detain and fine residents for “illegal border crossings,” according to multiple reports by international and domestic observers.

According to the report Freedom of Religion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia issued in July by the think tank DRI, the GOC was unable to exercise de facto jurisdiction in Abkhazia and GOC clergy could not conduct church services there. The report stated ethnic Georgian worshipers who identified with the GOC experienced discrimination, while ethnic Abkhaz Muslims did not. It stated that Eid al-Adha was an official holiday, and that during Orthodox services, “clergy mention all the Orthodox Patriarchs, except the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia.”

De facto authorities in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses. According to DRI’s report, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostals in Akhalgori, South Ossetia could assemble freely, although the “KGB” (the de facto security services) often summoned them for interrogation in previous years.

The June SARI report Occupation Heritage stated that only five GOC clergy and one church remained operational in Russia-occupied South Ossetia. According to the report, de facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia sold Orthodox artifacts and painted over or damaged uniquely Georgian religious symbols.

According to GOC representatives, de facto authorities allowed the GOC to conduct services in South Ossetia, despite a de jure ban. DRI’s report Freedom of Religion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia stated the number of GOC clergy in South Ossetia was “extremely low.” According to the report, one GOC church remained open in Akhalgori, South Ossetia, with one priest, and there were two nuns remaining in the Ikoti Monastery and one monk at the Trinity Monastery, also in South Ossetia. The report stated there was also one Ossetian church in Akhalgori, subordinated to the Diocese of Alania, which held services occasionally, conducted in the Ossetian language.

During the year, the Human Rights Department of the MOIA investigated 13 cases involving crimes reported as religiously motivated, compared with 22 cases in 2020 and 44 cases in 2019. These included three cases of violence (zero in 2020); one case of domestic violence (zero in 2020); one case with multiple criminal code violations, including violence, a threat, and liability for a domestic crime; two cases of criminal threats (zero in 2020); one case of persecution (four in 2020); and five cases of damage or destruction of property (five in 2020). In one case, a man abused his wife physically and psychologically because he was irritated by her praying. Religious organizations and NGOs, which also tracked cases, said COVID-19 pandemic restrictions made gathering sufficient data on exact figures for the current or previous year difficult, but that due to government- and self-imposed COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on public activity, crimes committed against religious groups declined, compared with prepandemic years.

According to the Social Justice Center, on January 12, in Buknari Village, Chokhatauri District, Guria Region, a group of Christians assaulted two teenage Muslim boys, injuring the teens, who required medical treatment. The incident reportedly occurred while the boys were going to or from a local prayer room established in a private home. The center said authorities arrested, tried, and convicted one of the Christians and sentenced him to prison, but further details of the case were unavailable. Following the assault, Muslims from the area and neighboring regions held demonstrations in the village, resulting in clashes between Muslim demonstrators and Christians. Police intervened and SARI Chair Zaza Vashakmadze said that the Muslim community’s rights had been protected, a statement that many NGOs and members of the Muslim community disputed.

The Public Defender’s Office reported it received six complaints of discrimination or hate crimes based on religion during the year, compared with seven in 2020. Three cases involved potential hate crimes. One of these involved the religious conflict in Buknari and another stating that the investigation into events surrounding the dismantling of the mosque in Mokhe in 2014 was insufficient and was carried out only in response to a case at the European Court of Human Rights. In the third case, on March 25, a person threw a Molotov co*cktail in a Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall in Mtskheta. The attack destroyed several items, but the hall was unoccupied at the time and there were no injuries. According to the Public Defender’s Office, authorities officially recognized the Jehovah’s Witnesses as targets of a religiously motivated crime in the incident. At year’s end, the investigation of the attack was ongoing. The other three complaints the Public Defender’s Office received involved discrimination cases, one pertaining to speech that incited discrimination because of religion; and two others alleging the Penitentiary Service did not post the list of food allowed for Muslims on religious holidays. The Public Defender’s Office stated that cases from previous years remained largely unresolved, partly because of what it described as a lack of urgency and resources from the government.

According to media, in May, in Dmanisi City in Kvemo Kartli District, ethnic Georgians and ethnic Svan (an ethnic subgroup of Georgians) Christians clashed with ethnic Azeri Muslims when an ethnic Azeri shopkeeper refused to sell alcohol on credit to a group of ethnic Svans, who then attacked the shopkeeper and vandalized the store. Fellow Azeris came to the shopkeeper’s defense, causing ethnic Georgians to enter the violence en masse on the side of the Svans. Participants spoke of the violence, which had both ethnic and religious dimensions, in terms of “Muslims versus Christians.” The media report stated that on May 18, the mufti of eastern Georgia, Etibar Eminov, and the head of the communications office of the patriarchate of Georgia, Andrija Dzhagmaidze, went to the district with Georgian Dream Member of Parliament Sozar Subari and persuaded the communities to cease hostilities.

During the year, the Prosecutor General’s Office prosecuted five individuals for crimes motivated by religious intolerance. One was charged with persecution, one with domestic violence, one with rape and “disclosure of secrets of personal life,” and two with exceeding official powers. On April 10, the Tbilisi City Court convicted an ethnic Azerbaijani Muslim man of “regular violence” and sentenced him to a two-year suspended sentence. The appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence on November 29; the Prosecutor General’s Office appealed the decision to the Court of Cassation, arguing for a heavier sentence. The Prosecutor General’s Office cited both religious and gender discrimination, stating the man had systematically assaulted his wife and threatened to kill her on several occasions from 2017 until April 2021 because she attended a Christian church and wore a cross. The prosecutor’s appeal was pending at year’s end.

On September 16, the Tbilisi City Court convicted a man of rape and “unlawful obtaining, storage, use, dissemination of or otherwise making available secrets of personal life” and sentenced him to seven years in prison. The Prosecutor General’s Office stated the man raped a female Jehovah’s Witness on two occasions and took sexually explicit photographs of her in 2020. According to the prosecutor, the crime was motivated by religious and gender discrimination, and the defendant told the victim she deserved to be raped because she was a Jehovah’s Witness.

Jehovah’s Witnesses again said there were fewer attacks against members compared to prepandemic years because the group, in response to COVID-19 restrictions, shifted to online activities and ceased conducting public outreach, including door-to-door proselytizing. At year’s end, Jehovah’s Witnesses had reported six religiously motivated incidents to the government, compared with eight in 2020. Of the reported incidents, one involved attempted arson (the Molotov co*cktail incident of March 25 in Mtskheta), two instances of vandalism against Kingdom Halls in Martkopi and Mtskheta, and three break-ins and/or thefts. Jehovah’s Witnesses said at year’s end, the six cases remained under investigation, along with five of eight cases from 2020. Of the other three 2020 cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses stated one investigation was ongoing; in another, the court found the attacker guilty of persecution; and in the third, charges were dropped after the vandal paid compensation for damages.

On December 24, 2020, the Tbilisi City Court upheld its earlier conviction in the case of an individual who verbally insulted, then physically attacked, a Jehovah’s Witness who had just left a religious service at a Kingdom Hall in Tbilisi. The victim required medical treatment for injuries to his eye and lip, and the attacker was found guilty of “purposeful, less grave damage to health.”

During the year, some religious leaders stated SARI pressured AMAG as well as the Tbilisi Synagogue to publish statements against the LBGTQI+ advocacy organization Tbilisi Pride’s planned July 5 Tbilisi “March for Dignity.” Tbilisi Pride subsequently cancelled the march on the day the march was to take place when approximately 3,000 violent individuals described as far-right actors, including some GOC priests, attacked journalists, destroyed Tbilisi Pride’s office, and attacked offices of sympathetic NGOs.

Representatives of the Public Defender’s Office’s Tolerance Center and minority religious groups continued to report what they termed a widespread societal belief that minority religious groups posed a threat to the GOC and to the country’s cultural values. On January 14, the Public Defender’s Council of Religions issued a statement expressing concerns over discrimination and hatred of people based on religious grounds. The statement cited violence against Islamic places of worship, the violence in Buknari, and a “wave of antisemitic speeches of the clergy.” The statement said, “Insults and discrimination on religious grounds against people or religious communities, as well as manifestations of persecution, are disturbing.”

Minority religious communities, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholics, and Protestants, continued to report resistance from local communities to their establishment of places of worship and religious schools. A Social Justice Center report on the January violence in Buknari said that since 2012, the Chokhatauri municipality had denied requests to build a mosque in Buknari after public opposition by the Orthodox community. As a result, the Muslim community purchased a private house to use as a prayer room in 2020.

During the year, the Media Development Foundation (MDF) documented 117 instances of religiously intolerant statements on television, online, and in print by media representatives, political parties, clergy, public organizations, and others, compared with 30 such incidents in 2020. Of these statements, it classified 89 as being directed against Muslims, while 28 were directed against various other religious groups. Ten statements were made by politicians from the Alliance of Patriots (three against Catholics and one praising the GOC), Georgian Dream (one against Muslims), and Georgian Idea (two against Baptists and three against Muslims) Parties, 73 by media representatives, 10 by various other organizations, two by religious representatives (including GOC Deacon Davit Isakadze, who criticized environmental activist Maka Suladze for choosing not to wear a cross), and 22 by members of the public. MDF attributed the increase in incidents in part to intolerant statements by television station Alt-Info, which began broadcasting during the year, and to reporting on the violence in Buknari.

In August, in an anti-COVID-19 vaccine video posted on Facebook, GOC Deacon Archil Mindiashvili stated the vaccines had not been tested on animals “because you, Judaists and Jews, are in a hurry to bring your Antichrist to the realm and conduct experiments on people.” TDI characterized the February 8 sermon of GOC Bishop Saba Gigiberia as antisemitic. In the sermon, Gigiberia linked COVID-19 vaccines to a conspiracy theory about Israel reconstructing the Second Temple in Jerusalem.

TDI reported that on January 4, GOC Archpriest Ilia Karkadze made antisemitic remarks in a sermon defending a 2020 sermon by Bishop Ioane Gamrekeli that was also antisemitic. In his sermon, Karkadze repeated common antisemitic tropes about Jewish control of banks and the media. He also cited 19th-century Russian monk Vasiliy Vasilyev, known as Monk Abel, who said Jews had “poisoned Russia.” On January 1, Bishop Ioane stated that TDI was seeking to damage Georgian-Jewish relations. On January 8, the GOC published a statement acknowledging that Archpriest Karkadze’s January 4 sermon was antisemitic, saying that it “represents completely groundless accusations against the Jewish people [and] individual representatives. It is not based on the teachings of the Church and is inspired by antisemitic pathos [i.e., sentiment].”

On January 13, Alt-Info anchor Shota Martineko said in a broadcast, “… if within your influence sphere you give space to the religion contrary to yours, then you give it the means to defeat you.”

The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with officials from the government, including the Prime Minister’s advisor on human rights, and members of parliament to encourage government efforts to increase tolerance of minority religions and to hold individuals accountable for discriminatory actions, particularly regarding the violence between Muslims and Christians in Buknari Village and antisemitic statements. They also continued to meet with the Public Defender’s Office and officials in its Tolerance Center to discuss discrimination against minority religious groups, hear members’ concerns about potential legislation, and stress the importance of interfaith dialogue. An embassy officer met with the head of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee to discuss concerns over religious freedom and potential legislation that could affect it.

Embassy staff continued to meet with NGOs, including the Center for Development and Democracy, the Social Justice Center, TDI, and the Council of Jewish Women of Georgia, to discuss interfaith relations, the integration of religious minorities into society, and the promotion of religious freedom for all.

Embassy representatives met with senior officials from the GOC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the wake of a number of antisemitic statements made by GOC clergy to raise concerns over the GOC’s inaction on curbing antisemitic comments and sermons. The Ambassador met with GOC Patriarch Ilia II and other senior GOC members on multiple occasions. In her meetings, she stressed the importance of religious diversity and tolerance.

The embassy continued to support Tolerance Center, Council of Ethnic Minorities, and Council of Religions programs that brought together leaders from different faith communities to monitor and advocate for religious freedom and raise public awareness about discrimination faced by religious and ethnic minorities. With embassy funding, the Council of Religions’ and the Council of Ethnic Minorities’ member organizations regularly met with regional and national government authorities to advocate for solutions to key issues, enhance the ability of government institutions to implement civil integration policies, and improve monitoring and management of ethnic and religious minority issues. The embassy funded the Council of Religions to study challenges facing religious minorities and formulate recommendations to protect religious freedom in the country. The embassy funded the Social Justice Center’s “Improving Human Rights Conditions for Marginalized Groups through Strategic Litigation” project, which files court cases to protect the rights of minority religious groups and engages in field work, advocacy, and awareness-raising with regard to problems such as religious and ethnic discrimination by the state and private persons, including hate crimes and unequal treatment in the recognition of property and construction rights.

The embassy promoted International Religious Freedom Day by holding a virtual event on social media on October 27, with the Ambassador, head of the Tolerance Center Beka Mindiashvili, and other embassy officials, who gave remarks and answered questions from high school and university students about religious freedom concepts and cases. The embassy’s American Corner cultural centers supported interfaith dialogues with students through a number of roundtable discussions on religious tolerance and diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 275.1 million (midyear 2021). According to the 2010 census, 87.2 percent of the population is Muslim, 7 percent Protestant, 2.9 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.7 percent Hindu. Those identifying with other religious groups, including Buddhism, traditional indigenous religions, Confucianism, Gafatar, other Christian denominations, and those who did not respond to the census question, comprise 1.3 percent of the population.

The Muslim population is overwhelmingly Sunni. An estimated one to five million Muslims are Shia. Many smaller Muslim groups exist; estimates put the total number of Ahmadi Muslims at 200,000 to 500,000.

Many religious groups incorporate elements of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, making it difficult to disaggregate the exact number of followers. An estimated 20 million persons, primarily in Java, Kalimantan, and Papua, practice various traditional belief systems, often referred to collectively as aliran kepercayaan. There are approximately 400 different aliran kepercayaan communities throughout the archipelago.

The Sikh population is estimated between 10,000 and 15,000, with approximately 5,000 in Medan and the rest in Jakarta. There are very small Jewish communities in Jakarta, Manado, Jayapura, and elsewhere, with the total number of Jews estimated at 200. The Baha’i Faith and Falun Dafa (or Falun Gong) communities report thousands of members, but independent estimates are not available. The number of atheists is also unknown, but the group Indonesian Atheists states it has more than 1,700 members.

The province of Bali is predominantly Hindu, and the provinces of Papua, West Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, and North Sulawesi are predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees the right to practice the religion of one’s choice and specifies that freedom of religion is a human right that may not be limited. The constitution states, “The nation is based upon belief in one supreme God,” but it guarantees all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief, saying the right to have a religion is a human right that shall not be discriminated against.

The constitution states citizens must accept restrictions established by law to protect the rights of others and to satisfy, as noted in the constitution, “just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.” The law restricts citizens from exercising these rights in a way that impinges on the rights of others, oversteps common moral standards and religious values, or jeopardizes security or public order.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) extends official recognition and support to six religious groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. The government maintains a longstanding practice of recognizing Sunni Islam as the official version of Islam of local Muslims, although the constitution has no such stipulation.

Blasphemy articles in the criminal code prohibit deliberate public statements or activities that insult or defame any of the six officially recognized religions or have the intent of preventing an individual from adhering to an official religion. These articles also stipulate that in any case of defamation of the six officially recognized religions, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the MORA, and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) must first warn the individual in question before bringing a defamation charge. The articles also forbid the dissemination of information designed to spread hatred or dissension among individuals and/or certain community groups based on ethnicity, religion, or race. Individuals may be subject to prosecution for blasphemous, atheistic, or heretical statements under either of these provisions or under the laws against defamation and may face a maximum prison sentence of five years. The Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) law forbids the electronic dissemination of the same types of information, with violations carrying a maximum six-year sentence.

The government defines a religion as having a prophet, holy book, and deity, as well as international recognition. The government deems the six officially recognized religions meet these requirements. Organizations representing one of the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law are not required to obtain a legal charter if they are established under a notary act and obtain approval from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Religious organizations other than the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law must obtain a legal charter as a civil society organization (CSO) from the MOHA. Both ministries consult with the MORA before granting legal status to religious organizations. The law requires all CSOs to uphold the national ideology of Pancasila, which encompasses the principles of belief in one God, justice, unity, democracy, and social justice, and they are prohibited from committing blasphemous acts or spreading religious hatred. By law, all religious groups must officially register with the government. Registration requirements for religious organizations include the following conditions: organizations may not contradict Pancasila and the constitution; they must be voluntary, social, independent, nonprofit, and democratic; and they must have notarized articles of association (bylaws) and a specifically defined purpose. The organization then registers with the MORA. After MORA approval, the organization is announced publicly through the state gazette. Violations of the law may result in a loss of legal status, dissolution of the organization, and arrest of members under the blasphemy articles of the criminal code or other applicable laws. Indigenous religious groups must register with the Ministry of Education and Culture as aliran kepercayaan to obtain official, legal status.

A joint ministerial decree by the MORA, MOHA, and AGO bans both proselytizing by the Ahmadi Muslim community and vigilantism against the group. Violations of the Ahmadi proselytizing ban carry a maximum five-year prison sentence on charges of blasphemy. According to the criminal code, vigilantism carries a maximum four-and-one-half-year prison sentence.

Another joint ministerial decree by the MORA, MOHA, and AGO bans the Fajar Nusantara Movement, known as Gafatar, from proselytizing, spreading its teachings publicly, or any other activities deemed to spread deviant interpretations of Islam. Violators of the ban may be charged with blasphemy and may receive a maximum five-year prison sentence on charges of blasphemy.

There is no joint ministerial decree that bans proselytizing by other groups. The MUI, however, has issued fatwas that ban proselytizing by what it calls deviant groups such as Inkar al-Sunnah, Ahmadiyya, Islam Jama’ah, the Lia Eden Community, and al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah. While the MUI has not labelled Shia Islam as deviant, it has issued fatwas and guidance cautioning against the spread of Shia teachings.

The government requires all officially registered religious groups to comply with directives from the MORA and other ministries on issues such as the construction of houses of worship, foreign aid to domestic religious institutions, and propagation of religion.

A 2006 joint ministerial decree issued by the MORA and the MOHA states that religious groups may not hold services in private residences, and those seeking to build a house of worship are required to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of the group and 60 persons of other religious groups in the community stating they support the construction. Local governments are responsible for implementing the decree, and local regulations, implementation, and enforcement vary widely. The decree also requires approval from the local interfaith council, the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB). Government-established FKUBs exist at the provincial and district/city level and comprise religious leaders from the six official groups. They are responsible for mediating interreligious conflicts.

The law requires religious instruction in public schools. Students have the right to request religious instruction in any one of the six official religions, but teachers are not always available to teach the requested religion classes. Under the law, students may not opt out of religious education requirements.

Under the terms of a 2005 peace agreement that ended a separatist conflict, Aceh Province has unique authority to implement sharia regulations. The law allows for provincial implementation and regulation of sharia and extends the jurisdiction of religious courts to economic transactions and criminal cases. The Aceh government states sharia in Aceh only applies to Muslim residents of the province, although nonresident Muslims and adherents to other faiths may accept sharia in lieu of punishment under the criminal code.

Aceh’s provincial sharia regulations criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct, adultery, gambling, consumption of alcohol, and proximity to members of the opposite sex outside of marriage for Muslim residents of the province. An Aceh governor’s decree forbids women from working in or visiting restaurants unaccompanied by their spouse or a male relative after 9 p.m. A Banda Aceh mayoral decree forbids women from working in coffee shops, internet cafes, or sports venues after 1 p.m. Sharia regulations prohibit female Muslim residents of Aceh from wearing tight clothes in public, and officials often recommended wearing headscarves. The regulation allows local officials to “remind” female Muslims of these regulations but does not allow women’s detention for violating them. One district in Aceh prohibits women from sitting astride motorcycles when riding as passengers. The maximum penalties for violations of sharia regulations include imprisonment and caning. There are regulations intended to limit the amount of force that authorities may exert during a caning.

Many local governments outside of Aceh have enacted regulations based on religious considerations; most of these are in majority-Muslim areas. Many of these regulations relate to matters such as religious education and only apply to a specific religious group. Some religiously inspired local regulations in effect apply to all citizens. For instance, some local regulations require restaurants to close during Ramadan fasting hours, ban alcohol, or mandate the collection of zakat (Islamic alms). At least 30 local regulations, including in the Sintang Regency, forbid or limit the religious activities of religious minorities, especially Shia and Ahmadi Muslims.

The law contains vague provisions regarding interfaith marriage, which are sometimes interpreted to forbid certain interfaith marriages, despite a 1986 Supreme Court decision specifically allowing interfaith marriages. The law requires that parties must perform the marriage ceremony according to the rituals and teachings of the religion(s) of both the bride and groom. Since some religious teachings forbid interfaith marriage, some groups and government officials have held that there cannot be interfaith marriages if one of the religions specifically forbids interfaith marriages. Religious leaders, human rights activists, and journalists state that interreligious marriage is difficult unless the groom or bride is willing to marry according to the religious rituals of only one of the two religions.

The law requires the leader of an aliran kepercayaan group to demonstrate group members live in at least three regencies, which are administrative designations one level below a province, before the leader may officiate legally at a wedding. This constraint effectively bars members of some smaller groups without such geographic presence from receiving official marriage services from a member of their faith, although groups may aid each other and facilitate marriages by a group with similar faith traditions and rituals.

A joint ministerial decree by the MORA and the MOHA requires domestic religious organizations to obtain approval from the MORA to receive funding from overseas donors and forbids dissemination of religious literature and pamphlets to members of other religious groups, as well as door-to-door proselytizing. Religious groups, except for Ahmadi Muslims and Gafatar, are not forbidden from spreading their interpretations and teachings to other members of their religion in their own places of worship.

Foreign religious workers must obtain religious worker visas, and foreign religious organizations must obtain permission from the MORA to provide any type of assistance (in-kind, personnel, or financial) to local religious groups.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On August 16, former leaders of FPI announced the creation of The Islamic Brotherhood Front, which has the same acronym as the now outlawed organization. FPI’s organization, symbols, and activities were officially banned in December 2020 after the government issued a proclamation declaring the FPI a “nonregistered” mass organization. Civil society and religious organizations long accused the FPI of being a hard-line Muslim group that engages in acts of violence, extortion, intimidation, and intolerance against other Muslims and religious and ethnic minority communities, and they said the renaming of the organization was an attempt to circumvent the government’s ban.

On January 8, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) released its report on the December 2020 police shootings of six FPI members on the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road in West Java Province. The commission found that police had lawfully killed two of the FPI members but had unlawfully killed four others while they were in police custody. Komnas HAM labelled these four killings a human rights violation. In April, a police spokesperson reported that three police officials from the Mobile Reserve unit of the Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Regional Police had been named as suspects and were being investigated, noting that one of the three had died in an accident in January. On October 18, media reported that the trial of the two living suspects, Yusmin Ohorella and Fikri Ramadhan, had started in the South Jakarta District Court.

On June 24, the East Jakarta District Court sentenced Rizieq Shihab, a Muslim cleric and FPI leader, to four years in prison for spreading false information regarding the results of his COVID-19 diagnosis that “purposely caused confusion for the public.” In late November 2020, Shihab posted a video on social media that was widely rebroadcast by local media claiming he tested negative for COVID-19 despite being in a hospital outside of Jakarta undergoing treatment for the virus. Prior to his social media announcement, Shihab and his supporters held several large gatherings, including his daughter’s wedding, attended by thousands, which the government said resulted in a surge of COVID-19 cases. On May 27, the same court sentenced Shihab and five other FPI leaders to eight months in prison for violating health protocols during those gatherings. The government released the five other FPI leaders on October 6 for time served against their eight-month sentence, while Shihab remained in prison. Former FPI members and some CSOs criticized the cases against Shihab as being largely political in nature due to his outspoken criticism of the government.

In Aceh, authorities continued to carry out public canings for sharia violations such as selling alcohol, gambling, and extramarital affairs. Canings continued to occur in public spaces despite the Aceh governor’s 2018 order that they should be executed only in prison facilities. Media outlets broadcast recordings of the punishments, and observers of the punishment frequently photographed or recorded the proceedings. Government and sharia officials stated non-Muslim residents of Aceh could choose punishment under either sharia or civil court procedures, but Muslim residents of Aceh must receive punishment under sharia. According to media reports and human rights activists, several non-Muslim residents of Aceh chose punishment under sharia, reportedly due to its expediency and to avoid the risks of prolonged and expensive trials and possible lengthy prison sentences.

On February 8, three non-Muslims convicted of illegal possession of alcohol in Banda Aceh requested punishment under sharia and each received 40 lashes. One of those punished publicly stated he did so to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On January 28, two men were caned 77 times each in Banda Aceh after being convicted of having sex with each other, violating restrictions on hom*osexual activities in the province. On August 25, a couple was caned 100 times each for sexual relations outside of marriage in Sabang. On August 20, a man was sentenced to four years in prison and 100 lashes for sexually abusing a child. On October 6, a 19-year-old woman fainted after being caned 100 times for sexual relations outside of marriage in Southwest Aceh Regency.

A September 9 Human Rights Watch report stated that more than 150 individuals, mostly from the nation’s religious minorities, had been convicted under the blasphemy law since its enactment in 2004, and that the law was most commonly used against people deemed to have criticized Islam, including Muslims who criticize their own religion. The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation reported 67 blasphemy cases in 2020, the most recent year available, with 43 of the cases related to statements made on social media. International Christian Concern, an international NGO that advocates for Christian communities it believes are persecuted, stated in a January press release that laws on blasphemy were applied disproportionately, with Christians frequently being prosecuted for “insulting Islam.”

In late 2020, the Bandung District Court sentenced Apollinaris Darmawan, a 68-year-old retired civil servant, to five years in prison for blasphemy under the ITE law for a series of tweets and videos posted on Twitter and Instagram that, among other things, stated Islam was not a religion and should be expelled from the country. Authorities previously sentenced him to prison for four years in 2017 but released him early in 2020.

On April 20, police named Joseph Paul Zhang as a blasphemy suspect for statements on his YouTube channel that he was the 26th prophet of Islam. On the same day, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies removed 20 videos uploaded by Zhang deemed to be potential blasphemy. According to media reports, Zhang, a Protestant pastor, had renounced his citizenship and had been living in Germany since 2018, prompting police to send a red notice request to Interpol, which would notify legal authorities worldwide that a person is wanted for extradition. As of the end of the year, Interpol had not publicly responded to the red notice request.

On May 31, police summoned Desak Made Darmawati, a professor at a college in Jakarta, for questioning as a blasphemy suspect under the ITE law. A coalition of Hindu organizations in Bali told police that Darmawati made statements in a widely shared online video that Hinduism had many deities and Hindu cremation rituals were strange. Although Darmawati, a convert to Islam from Hinduism, publicly apologized for her statements on April 17, media reported in September that police investigators called in five individuals for questioning related to the allegations.

On July 19, the Singaraja District Court in Bali sentenced Lars Christensen, a Danish citizen, to two years in prison for blasphemy for a 2019 incident in which he destroyed a Hindu shrine that was located in a house he had bought and was renovating. The incident was filmed by an ex-girlfriend, and the video was spread widely online. On September 21, the Denpasar High Court granted Christensen’s appeal and reduced his sentence to seven months.

On August 25, police arrested Muhammad Kece in Bali for blasphemy under the ITE law related to statements made in a YouTube video critical of the Islamic religious curriculum used in the country and insulting the Prophet Muhammad. Among the charges, the authorities said Kace had changed the word “Allah” in the Islamic profession of faith (the shahadah) to “Jesus.” Leaders of MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, as well as Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas, publicly stated their support for prosecuting Kece for blasphemy. Kece converted to Christianity from Islam in 2014. After his arrest, he was brought to a detention facility in Jakarta pending trial. On August 26, Kace filed a report stating that he had been beaten and covered with human excrement by fellow inmates in the Jakarta jail. Five individuals were named as suspects for this assault, including former police general Napoleon Bonaparte, who was serving a prison sentence for aiding the escape of a corruption suspect. In December, Kece’s trial for blasphemy began and was underway at year’s end.

On August 28, police arrested preacher Yahya Waloni in East Jakarta for blasphemy and hate speech under the ITE law for a sermon stating that the Bible was fiction and for statements made on social media that Jesus was a failed prophet and the Prophet Muhmmad did not instruct people to pray. A group named the Community for Society that Loves Pluralism originally reported him to police in April. Waloni converted to Islam from Christianity in 2006. On September 27, during a pretrial hearing at the South Jakarta District Court, Yahya apologized to the Christian community for his statements. During his December trial, Waloni admitted guilt to the charges of blasphemy and the prosecutor recommended a sentence of seven months. As of year’s end, Waloni had not been sentenced.

In December, Jakarta police arrested Joseph Suryadi, an employee of a property company, as a suspect for blasphemy and hate speech under the ITE law and criminal code. Suryadi had sent a message in a WhatsApp group reportedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad.

On August 22, Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas released a statement emphasizing that blasphemy remained a crime and that religious speech should focus on being educational and building national unity and religious tolerance. On August 26, Qoumas released a statement encouraging police to apply blasphemy laws equally and fairly against all offending parties regardless of their religion.

The MORA maintained its authority at the national and local levels to conduct the “development” of religious groups and believers, including efforts to convert minority religious groups to Sunni Islam. Beginning in 2014, Ahmadiyya communities in several West Java regencies reported that local governments were forcing or encouraging the conversion of Ahmadi Muslims, using a requirement that Ahmadis sign forms renouncing their beliefs in order to register their marriages or participate in the Hajj.

In November 2020, 274 Shia Muslims and their leader Tajul Muluk converted to Sunni Islam. Prior to the conversion, Muluk publicly stated that no one was forcing him and his followers to convert. Muluk’s community was displaced to the outskirts of Surabaya, East Java, in 2012 after anti-Shia groups used violence to force them from their homes in Sampang Regency, Madura. In January, after a member of Muluk’s community, Hatimah (one name only), died, the surrounding local Sunni communities refused to allow her burial in an Islamic cemetery due to their concerns that the former Shia Muslims had not fully converted. Local government officials mediated the dispute, leading to an agreement allowing for the burial of Hatimah in the local cemetery as long as the former Shia Muslims were mentored by Sunni clerics and attended religion classes.

On February 3, East Java Provincial Governor Khofifah Indar Parawansa appeared at a ceremony to give 230 land certificates to the former Shia Muslims who had converted with Muluk so they could gain permanent ownership of the land they had been living on since being driven out of Sampang Regency. In February, senior officials from the East Java Nahdlatul Ulama chapter visited the former Shia Muslim community to provide assistance packages including basic necessities, as well as to build the relationship with the community.

On July 30, nine Shia Muslims from the same displaced community, including their leader Mohammad Zaini, converted to Sunni Islam. Zaini publicly stated that the group had not been pressured to convert. On September 15, Presidential Chief of Staff Moeldoko (one name only) visited Sampang to convey his appreciation to the Sampang Regent Slamet Junaedi for resolving the religious-social conflict with Shia Muslims that had occurred in Sampang, including mention of the conversion of Muluk and his followers to Sunni Islam. On November 30, during a focus group discussion among community members on the resolution of the conflict, Junaedi stated that he was ready to work with the community so that they could return and live in Sampang.

The government responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing policies to prevent the spread of the virus through limiting public events, including religious gatherings. At the national level, government and religious leaders cooperated closely in developing these restrictions. On February 23, thousands of interfaith leaders came together at the National Istiqlal Mosque, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia, to receive COVID-19 vaccinations to demonstrate interfaith support to the country’s public health efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.

On July 30, the Indonesian Hinduism Society (PHDI) publicly revoked its recognition of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) as a form of Hinduism. This national declaration by PHDI followed the August 2020 declaration by its Bali chapter renouncing ISKCON. In April, the Customary Village Council in Denpasar, Bali, closed the Ashram Krishna Balaram, an ISKCON temple. The Bali Regional Assembly and the Bali Customary Village Assembly supported the decision, and the Indonesian chapter of ISKCON then filed a complaint with Komnas HAM against the Bali governor, Bali PHDI, Bali Customary Village Assembly, and several other local officials for violating ISKCON followers’ freedom of religion. On August 27, Komnas HAM sent a letter to Governor of Bali Wayan Koster, other local government officials, and the police recommending they guarantee the freedom of religion for ISKCON followers and their ability to practice their faith in peace. On September 6, the Bali Customary Village Assembly rejected the KOMNAS HAM recommendation, stating that ISKCON tenets were very different from Hindu tenets and that ISKCON was trying to replace Bali’s Hindu traditions.

According to religious groups and NGOs, government officials and police sometimes failed to prevent religious and religiously affiliated groups commonly labeled as “intolerant groups” from infringing on others’ religious freedom and committing other acts of intimidation, such as damaging or destroying houses of worship and homes. Groups often identified as intolerant included the Islamic Community Forum, Islamic Jihad Front, Indonesian Mujahideen Council, and the now banned FPI.

In February, the MORA and Komnas HAM announced the creation of a joint help desk to respond expeditiously to reports of religious intolerance. Beka Ulung Hapsara, one of the Komnas HAM commissioners, said the desk would handle complaints from all religious groups, including those from aliran kepercayaan and Ahmadi Muslims.

In March, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission released regulations that required all preachers appearing on television programs during the month of Ramadan to be “appropriate,” meaning conforming with standards established by MUI, including them being competent, credible, and not linked to organizations prohibited by the government.

In September, the legislature added the revision of the penal code to its Priority Legislation List, indicating the government’s desire to pass a bill revising the code during the year. The legislature shelved a previous version of this bill in 2019 following mass public protests. CSOs expressed concerns that the legislation might expand the blasphemy laws and other criminal sections that could be used to restrict religious freedom in the updated version of this bill. The legislature continued drafting the proposed legislation at year’s end.

In February, the Setara Institute, an NGO that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights, released the City Tolerance Index for 2020, which measures religious tolerance in 94 cities across the country. The index measures local government policies and actions, social regulations, and local religious demographics. The top five cities were Salatiga, Singkawang, Manado, Tomohon, and Kupang, while the bottom five cities were Pangkal Pinang, Makassar, Depok, Padang, and Banda Aceh. The index found an overall increase in tolerance across the country compared with the 2018 index.

In May, the Setara Institute released its annual report on the condition of freedom of religion in the country. According to the report, there were 424 actions infringing on freedom of religion in 2020, compared with 327 actions in 2019. State actors were responsible for 239 of these actions, including 71 cases of discrimination, 21 cases of arrest, and 16 cases of outlawing religious activities, with the remaining cases mostly related to use of blasphemy laws.

Across the country, minority religious groups, including Muslim groups in non-Muslim majority areas, continued to uphold the official requirement for 90 members of the religious community and 60 members of other religious communities in the area to support the building or renovating a house of worship was a barrier to construction. Members of the Jewish community stated that since their numbers nationwide were so few, it was impossible for them to build new synagogues.

NGOs reported that local governments did not issue permits for the construction of new places of worship even when congregations had the required number of members, since opponents of the construction sometimes pressured neighbors from other religious communities not to support the construction. In many cases, a few vocal opponents from the local majority religious affiliation were reportedly sufficient to stop construction approvals, giving majority religions a de facto veto over construction of houses of worship in some areas. State-recognized religious leaders in government-supported interfaith forums reportedly found ways to block aliran kepercayaan believers from constructing places of worship, largely through stringent permit requirements. Aliran kepercayaan adherents said they feared accusations of atheism if they contested such treatment in court. Christian leaders reported that local officials indefinitely delayed the approval of requests to build new churches because the officials feared construction would lead to protests. Ahmadi and Shia Muslims and Christians said they also faced problems when seeking approval to relocate to temporary facilities while a primary place of worship underwent renovation.

Local governments, police, and religious organizations reportedly tried to close religious minority groups’ houses of worship on the grounds of permit violations, often after protests from “intolerant groups,” even if the minority groups had been issued a proper permit.

Many congregations could not obtain the requisite number of nonmember signatures supporting construction of houses of worship and often faced protests from “intolerant groups” during the application process, making permits nearly impossible to obtain. Even when authorities issued permits, they halted construction on some houses of worship after facing legal challenges and public protests. Protestant and Catholic churches also reported that “intolerant groups” forced them to pay protection money if they continued operating without a permit. Some houses of worship established before the joint ministerial decree on house-of-worship construction came into effect in 2006 reportedly were still obligated to meet the requirements or face closure. Many houses of worship operated without permits in office buildings, malls, private homes, and shops.

Ahmadiyya congregations faced pressure from local officials to stop reconstruction and renovations on their houses of worship. On May 6, Garut Regent Rudy Guanwan issued a circular order forbidding Ahmadiyya activities in accordance with the Joint Ministerial on Ahmadiyya and halting the construction of an Ahmadi mosque in the West Java Regency. On May 8, a coalition of 42 CSOs sent an open letter to the regent criticizing the order as a violation of freedom of religion.

On September 3, a mob of more than 100 people vandalized the Ahmadi Muslim Miftahul Huda mosque in Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan, and burned down a building adjacent to it. Media reported that police stood by as the attack happened. The mosque had been in operation since 2004. Following the attack, Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas condemned the attack as unjustifiable and illegal. Prior to the attack, the local government issued a decree in April banning Ahmadiyya activities in the region. In August, government officials had sealed the Ahmadi mosque temporarily, following reported threats from a local anti-Ahmadi group, the Muslim Umma Alliance. On August 27, the local government issued a letter permanently closing the mosque. Police arrested 22 individuals in connection to the case, naming three of those arrested as potential masterminds of the attack. As of the end of the year, government officials were investigating the incident and the involvement of hard-line groups and the local government.

Following the attack on the mosque, the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board Chairman Said Aqil Siradj told press that he strongly condemned any violence used against the Ahmadiyya. Additionally, MORA officials told the press they would begin reviewing the 2008 joint ministerial decree that had criminalized Ahmadi activities. As of September 8, police had arrested 26 suspects related to the incident and an investigation was underway. A September 13 editorial in the Jakarta Post newspaper called for the revocation of the joint decree, saying that it “only works to legitimize violent acts against the Ahmadiyah.”

In February, lawyers for Puji Hartono, the head of a musala (a small prayer hall) in South Halmahera Regency, North Maluku Province, sent legal challenges to the local government requesting he be allowed to resume religious services and the construction at the musala. According to his lawyers, religious study had been held at the musala since 1982, but in February 2020, local government officials stopped him from hosting religious study classes there and halted renovations. Additionally, media reported that the local officials drove Hartono out of the village, leaving behind his wife and 11 children. Hartono’s lawyers stated that the closing of the musala and the expulsion of Hartono from the village were done illegally.

In April, a media account regarding a Batak Christian Protestant church in Jombang Regency, East Java, attracted national attention during the year. In March 2020, the church officially opened, but soon after the government closed it due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. However, when the church attempted to reopen in August 2020, the village government denied its request to reopen. Press reported that hostility from members of other faiths in the local community were the reason behind the government’s decision to refuse the church’s request to reopen. In November 2020, the village government officially issued an order closing the church for disturbing neighboring residents. During the church’s closure, members of the church rented another location in a nearby city for their religious activities and ceremonies.

On May 23, the Indonesian Baptist Church in the Tlogosari Kulon area of Semarang, Central Java, was officially opened. The city government initially granted permission to build the church in 1998, but construction of the church experienced a series of delays caused by local community protests against the construction, government actions to suspend construction, and the congregation’s lack of finances.

On June 13, Mayor Bima Arya of Bogor, West Java, provided a land grant to representatives of the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) Pengadilan for construction of a new church building by its affiliate church, GKI Yasmin. Arya stated that this action resolved a longstanding dispute related to the construction of a new church that GKI Yasmin had begun in 2006 but that was halted a year later, after the city withdrew the original building permit due to what the media described as pressure from local Muslim groups. Following the withdrawal of the permit, the GKI Yasmin congregation filed a lawsuit against the city, resulting in a 2020 Supreme Court decision ordering the Bogor government to reinstate the building permit for the original location. GKI Yasmin also disputed Arya’s June statement, saying the issue remained unsettled and that its congregation had not been involved in any plans for a proposed relocation, with the government instead negotiating with GKI Pengadilan, an affiliated church, and not directly with GKI Yasmin. GKI Yasmin members boycotted an August 8 event hosted by Mayor Arya to present the building permit for the new church. On September 10, Presidential Chief of Staff Moeldoko publicly congratulated Arya for successfully resolving the dispute while deputy chair of the Setara Institute Bonar Tigor Naipospos told press the case reflected a dominant trend in the country where “minority groups [are] forced to relent to satisfy the majority groups,” rather than the government ensuring legal protection for those minority groups.

On August 27, Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, after attending Friday prayers at the National Istiqlal Mosque, walked through the newly constructed “Tunnel of Brotherhood” that connected the mosque with the nearby Jakarta Catholic Cathedral. Amin stated that the tunnel was “not just a symbol, but it can create the inspiration to unite religious communities.” President Widodo had initially approved construction of the tunnel in February 2020.

In December 2020, the National Islamic Institute in Manado, North Sulawesi, a state-run Islamic college, built a “religious moderation house” on its campus as a place for discussion of religious tolerance and pluralistic society. Interfaith leaders from the local Muslim, Hindu, Catholic, Christian, Confucian, and Buddhist communities attended the inauguration of the building.

In July, the Paramadina Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy released a report finding that between 2015 and 2020 there were at least 122 cases of local communities resisting the construction of houses of worship by appealing to local governments under the auspices of the 2006 joint ministerial decree on houses of worship, with approximately 60 percent of cases involving churches, 28 percent involving mosques, and the remaining 12 percent involving Buddhist, Hindu, and Confucian temples.

Aliran kepercayaan followers continued to say teachers pressured them to send their children to religious education classes conducted by one of the six officially recognized religions. Minority religious groups not among the six recognized religions said that schools often allowed their children to spend religious education time in study hall, but that school officials required parents to sign documents stating their children received religious education. Ahmadi Muslim students reported religion classes on Islam focused only on Sunni teachings.

On February 3, the Ministers of Education and Culture, Home Affairs, and Religious Affairs issued a joint ministerial decree on the use of uniforms in schools, prohibiting most state-run schools from compelling female students to wear hijabs. The decree came after two non-Muslim students in West Sumatra refused to wear school-mandated hijabs. Parents of one of the students filmed their meeting with school officials who stated the student had to wear a hijab and posted the video on social media, prompting the national news media to report on the story. The school principal subsequently apologized, acknowledging that 23 non-Muslim students in the school had been required to wear the hijab. The decree ordered local governments and school principals to abandon regulations requiring the hijab but did not prohibit Muslim female students and teachers from choosing to wear the hijab at school.

In February, press reported that the National Commission on Violence Against Women identified 32 provinces and regencies in the country that required girls and women to wear hijabs in public schools, government buildings, and other public spaces. In some cases, young women had their hair cut, were expelled from schools, were penalized, or were fired from their jobs. In February, a Human Rights Watch researcher told the press that schools in more than 20 provinces made religious attire mandatory in their dress code.

On May 3, the Supreme Court annulled the joint ministerial decree on hijabs, declaring that the decree violated four laws, including the National Education System Law and Child Protection Law, and said that children under 18 had no right to choose their own clothes. Religious Affairs Minister Qoumas said he was disappointed with the ruling and would consult with his cabinet colleagues on what to do next.

In March, Human Rights Watch released a report on dress codes for women and girls, finding that “over the past two decades, women and girls in the country had faced unprecedented legal and social demands to wear clothing deemed Islamic as part of broader efforts to impose the rules of sharia in many parts of the country.” The report found that women and girls across the country were subject to local regulations, social pressure, bullying, and harassment to compel them to wear hijabs at schools, government offices, and in public spaces, causing psychological distress and violating their freedom of religion.

On March 1, Reverend Gomar Gultom, the chairman of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia, the largest Protestant Christian umbrella organization in the country, released a statement that said that the group had written to the Minister of Religious Affairs to work with the Ministry of Education and Culture and with book publishers to revise or drop Islamic textbooks that refer to the Bible. Gultom said that religious lessons “should be carried out in a private space, such as among families and in houses of worship – not in schools.” The letter cited criticisms of the Gospels in the Islamic textbooks.

On April 5, Minister Qoumas directed all MORA employees to give opportunities for prayers from religions other than Islam at all MORA events and activities.

According to media reports, in April, the Ahmadi Muslim community displaced from their village of Gereneng by communal violence in 2018 had moved near Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara. The local government of West Nusa Tenggara told press that it was exploring plans to build the infrastructure in this new location and cautioned against the return of the community to Gereneng village due to social hostility there. Local CSOs and academics criticized the government approach as giving in to local religious majority pressure rather than protecting religious minorities.

In Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, approximately 120 Ahmadi Muslims remained internally displaced in cramped apartments after a mob expelled them from their East Lombok village in 2006. According to media reports in May, the community continued to lack permanent residences. Media also reported in May that 16 other Ahmadi Muslims displaced by the same conflict were living in a former hospital in Praya, Central Lombok.

Although the government generally allowed citizens to leave the religion column blank on their identity cards (KTPs) and a 2017 Constitutional Court ruling allowed citizens to select indigenous faiths on their KTPs, individuals continued to report difficulties accessing government services if they chose either option. Faced with this problem, many religious minority members, including those following indigenous beliefs, reportedly chose to identify as a member of an officially recognized religion close to their beliefs or reflecting the locally dominant religion. According to researchers, this practice obscured the real numbers of adherents to religious groups in government statistics.

In June, the local government of Banyuwangi Regency, East Java, provided identity cards to close to 300 aliran kepercayaan adherents listing their correct religion. Previously adherents either did not have identity documents or had the documents with a blank in the column for religion. On June 2, Banyuwangi regent Ipuk Fietsiandani told press that the government would provide services to all community members without discrimination.

NGOs and religious advocacy groups continued to urge the government to remove the religion field from KTPs. Religious minorities reported they sometimes faced discrimination after others saw their religious affiliation on their KTPs. Members of the Jewish community said they felt uncomfortable stating their religion in public and often chose to state they were Christians or Muslims depending on the dominant religion where they lived, due to concern that local communities did not understand their religion.

Men and women of different religions who sought to marry reportedly had difficulties finding a religious official willing to perform a wedding ceremony. Some couples of different religions selected the same religion on their KTPs in order to marry legally. Many individuals reportedly preferred to go abroad for interreligious marriage, although this option was severely limited due to COVID-19 pandemic-related travel restrictions.

Minority Muslim groups, including Ahmadis, Shia, and Gafatar, continued to report resistance when they applied for KTPs as Muslims, effectively denying them access to public services if they could not secure KTPs.

Both the central and local governments included elected and appointed officials from minority religious groups. For example, Andrei Angouw won the December 2020 election for mayor of Manado, becoming the country’s first Confucian mayor. President Widodo’s 34-member cabinet included six members of minority faiths (four Protestants, one Catholic, and one Hindu), the same total number as during his previous administration.

Many individuals in the government, media, civil society, and general population were vocal and active in protecting and promoting tolerance and pluralism. On April 7, during the opening ceremony for the ninth National Conference for the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, President Widodo stated that exclusive religious practices had to be avoided and that religious groups had to respect each other’s beliefs in order to avoid creating divisions in society.

On September 13, Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas delivered a speech to the G20 Interfaith Conference highlighting what he stated was Indonesia’s commitment to religious pluralism and tolerance and the role of religion in fostering international peace.

On March 26, Minister Qoumas wished happy new year (Naw-Ruz) to followers of the Baha’i Faith in a video uploaded to YouTube where he discussed the importance of unity and religious moderation. The video began to be spread widely online in July, and hard-line groups began to criticize the Minister’s new year’s message. In response, Qoumas told press that while the government officially supports and protects the six official religions of Indonesia, that did not mean other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, or Taoism were illegal in the country or not protected by the constitution. Following Qouma’s statement, MUI chair Cholil Nafis publicly cautioned the MORA against providing support or recognition to the Baha’i religion.

In January, President Widodo nominated and the lower house of parliament unanimously approved General Listyo Sigit Prabowo, a Protestant, as the head of the Indonesian National Police. Prabowo was the first Christian to hold the position since the 1970s. He received the support of the NU and Muhammadiyah as well as leading Muslim organizations and clerics in Banten, the province bordering the capital known for what observers said was its religious conservatism, where he previously led the local police. However, the head of the MUI, expressing concern regarding Prabowo’s nomination, said that “even though Indonesia is a secular country, it would not be appropriate if the leader of the police had a non-Muslim background. It was natural for leaders of any country to have the same religion as that of the majority of the population.”

Foreign religious workers from numerous religious groups continued to state they found it relatively easy to obtain visas, and some groups reported little government interference with their religious activities. COVID-19 pandemic-related restrictions that severely restricted incoming travel for foreigners to Indonesia also impacted the ability of foreign religious workers entering the country.

Police provided special protection to some Catholic churches in major cities during Sunday services and Christian holidays. Police also provided special protection to Buddhist and Hindu temples during religious celebrations.

On September 27, religious leaders from different faiths attended the Dialogue of Religious Council Leaders in Jakarta, hosted by the Ministry of Religion, issuing the joint “Declaration of Religions for a Just and Peaceful Indonesia.” Representatives from the ministry, MUI, the Indonesian Association of Churches (PGI), the Indonesian [Catholic] Bishops’ Conference, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI), Representatives of Indonesian Buddhists (Walubi), and the Indonesian Confucian High Council (Matakin) all signed the document. The statement said all forms of discrimination, violence, hatred, and destruction of places of worship were contrary to religious teaching and reiterated the leaders’ support for the unity of the state and Pancasila.

According to press reporting, the government proposed the promotion of the ninth-century Mahayana Buddhist temple Borobudur, one of the world’s largest Buddhist structures, as a global tourism destination. The reports stated that the project would be aimed at attracting domestic and international visitors, with the goal of promoting a more moderate face for religion in the country. Minister for Religious Affairs Qoumas stated the government was studying how to promote Buddhist ceremonies at Borobudur “which can be attended by Buddhists [from] all over the world,” as part of efforts by the authorities to improve religious moderation in the country. Sudhamek Agoeng Waspodo Soenjoto, chairman of the Indonesian Buddhayana Council supervisory board, expressed his desire that Borobudur not be described as a “global Buddhist worship center,” since it could lead to “misunderstanding and misinterpretation,” and the term “Universal Center for Culture and Spirituality Study for Various Religions” be used instead.

On May 11, four Christian farmers in Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi, were killed by the East Indonesia Mujahedeen, designated by the Indonesian government as a terrorist group. The same group was accused of killing four residents of Sigi Regency, Central Sulawesi, in November 2020. According to the Voice of America, local police said the attackers were motivated by “terrorism and robbery.” A spokesperson for President Widodo condemned the incident, promising that the terrorists responsible for the attack would be caught. On September 18, security forces killed the group’s leader Ali Kalora in a firefight. At year’s end, security forces continued operations seeking to apprehend the remaining members of the group.

On March 28, two suicide bombers, later identified as a married couple, attacked the Catholic Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi Province, killing both assailants and injuring 20 bystanders. Police said the wounded included four guards and several churchgoers. The attack occurred during a Palm Sunday Mass. Police identified the two bombers as members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an organization designed by the Indonesian government as terrorist, that was previously responsible for the 2018 bombings of three churches in Surabaya, East Java. In a televised address, President Widodo called for calm and said “the state guarantees the safety of religious people to worship without fear.” Religious Affairs Minister Qoumas publicly called on police to improve security at houses of worship. In May, press reported that police had arrested 53 individuals in connection with the bombing.

On May 28, police arrested 11 suspected JAD members in Merauke, Papua, for an alleged plot to kill Catholic Archbishop of Merauke Petrus Canisius Mandagi and planning attacks at several Christian churches in easternmost Papua Province. Police told press that the suspected members were affiliated with those responsible for the March bombing in Makassar.

Shia and Ahmadi Muslims reported feeling under constant threat from “intolerant groups.” Anti-Shia and anti-Ahmadi rhetoric was common in online media outlets and on social media.

Individuals affiliated at the local level with the MUI used rhetoric considered intolerant by religious minorities, including fatwas declaring Shia and Ahmadis as deviant sects. The national MUI did not address or repudiate local MUI officials who called for such fatwas. In August, the National MUI Conference released a recommendation that the MORA should always consult with MUI prior to making decisions related to Ahmadi, Shia, and Baha’i issues. In March, the local MUI for Pandeglang Regency, Banten Province, declared the Hakekok Balatasutak, a local religious group, as deviant and stated that its members needed counseling to be brought back to the correct religious path. Following the destruction of an Ahmadi mosque in Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan, in September, the local MUI signed an agreement with the local FKUB to “embrace” the local Ahmadi community to ensure they returned to the correct teachings of Islam.

On August 12, Muhammad Roin, chair of the Wast Java chapter of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, stated that “Shi’ism” was not part of Islam and was a deviant sect. He called on the local government and police in West Java to stop any Shia plans to commemorate Ashura.

According to the Setara Institute’s annual report on freedom of religion in the country, nonstate actors conducted 185 actions infringing on freedom of religion in 2020, up from 168 actions in 2019. These actions included 62 cases of intolerance, 32 cases of reporting blasphemy, 17 cases of refusing the creation of a house of worship, and eight cases of forbidding worship.

On June 3, hundreds of Nahdlatul Ulama members in Banyuwangi Regency, East Java, demonstrated against the construction of a Muhammadiyah-affiliated mosque in their community. Soon afterwards, the local heads of Nahdlatual Ulama and Muhammadiyah met and publicly stated they were able to resolve the dispute. Several points from the Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah meeting included agreement that Muhammadiyah complete administrative requirements for mosque construction and that both parties encourage communication between their followers at the local level.

On September 20, the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board issued a letter to all institutions affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama to cease collaborative programs and projects with the two international organizations, the American Jewish Committee and the Institute for Global Engagement, as well as the Leimena Institute, a Christian think tank based in the country. No reasons were given in the letter for the decision. Activists reported their view that the letter undermined religious freedom and was spearheaded by certain factions in NU that viewed the actions of these minority religious organizations as “disruptive” to the country’s social fabric. As of the end of the year, the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board had not publicly provided a reason for why it issued the letter.

A conspiracy theory blaming Jews for the COVID-19 pandemic spread widely online, leading Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Mahfud MD to state that the COVID-19 pandemic was not the result of a Jewish conspiracy. Mahfud stated that even some academics and professors had reiterated this conspiracy theory and that he wanted to stop its spread since it distracted from efforts to combat the pandemic.

Christian news sites reported that approximately 12 elementary school children, ages nine to 12, vandalized a Christian cemetery in Solo (Surakarta), Central Java Province, on June 21. According to local authorities, the children attended a school near the cemetery.

On June 10, residents of Ponorogo Regency, East Java, rejected a plan to convert a house into a church in their neighborhood. Media reported that one of the local leaders had rejected the plan because the house owner had not asked for permission from majority Muslim local community before pursuing the plan. Yohanes Kasmin, who led the congregation asking for the conversion, said the dispute was a result of a misunderstanding and that since its creation the congregation had never had a permanent place of worship.

In April, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists joined with local Muslims in Blitar Regency, East Java, to help build a mosque. Members of the community told the press that the Hindu-majority community had a long history of interfaith cooperation.

According to a May survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, a public opinion pollster, 88 percent of Indonesians were aware of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, and of those respondents, 65 percent agreed that the conflict was between Judaism and Islam, 14 percent disagreed, and 22 percent said they did not know.

Many of the largest and most influential religious groups and NGOs, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, officially endorsed and advocated for tolerance, pluralism, and the protection of minority groups on numerous occasions. In July, the secretary general for the Supreme Council of Nahdlatul Ulama and the World Evangelical Alliance signed a statement of cooperation establishing a working relationship to promote intercultural solidarity and respect.

According to the “Who Cares about Free Speech” report by the Future of Free Speech, a collaborative project of NGOs and academic organizations, only 26 percent of citizens surveyed in February supported the freedom to express opinions offensive to religion, while the other 74 percent agreed that the government should be able to prevent people from saying things offensive to religion.

According to a September survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, 16 percent of respondents indicated their support of a government that operated based on the teachings of Islam, while 77 percent stated the government should not be based on any single religion.

The MORA’s Religious Harmony Index for 2020 found a decrease in religious harmony from 2019 to 2020. The index used a survey of 1,220 respondents in 34 provinces to measure harmony across three dimensions: tolerance, equality, and solidarity. The index was scored from 0 to 100, with 100 being the most harmonious. The national score for 2020 was 67.46, down from 73.83 in 2019. A MORA policy paper stated four likely reasons for this decrease: increased prejudice directed at different groups, especially against adherents of aliran kepercayaan, Ahmadi and Shia Muslims, and atheists; a decrease in the tolerance subindex, with 38 percent of respondents saying they would be bothered if a house of worship belonging to another faith was built near them; a decrease in the equality subindex, with 36 percent of respondents stating they would not support someone from a different faith becoming president; and a decrease in the solidarity index, with 36 percent of respondents saying they would not support other faiths in hosting religious events or celebrations. According to the survey, more than 50 percent of respondents reported never having direct contact with people from a different faith.

On December 20, the MORA announced results from the 2021 Religious Harmony Index, finding that overall religious harmony score had increased to 72.39.

The Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, embassy officers, and officers from the Consulate General in Surabaya and the Consulate in Medan regularly engaged with all levels of government on religious freedom issues. Issues discussed included actions against religious minorities, closures of places of worship, access for foreign religious organizations, convictions for blasphemy, and defamation of religion. They also discussed the undue influence of “intolerant groups,” the importance of the rule of law, the application of sharia to non-Muslims, the importance of education and interfaith dialogue in promoting tolerance, the equal protection of all citizens regardless of their religion or belief, and promotion of tolerance in international forums.

On February 22, the Charge d’Affaires delivered remarks highlighting religious freedom and tolerance at an event for the 43rd anniversary of the National Istiqlal Mosque, which included participation from the Vice President, ministers, and senior government officials.

On April 9, an official from the Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom provided remarks focused on religious freedom and pluralism at an MUI seminar entitled “Reading the Direction of U.S. President Joe Biden’s Policy regarding Muslims and the Islamic World,” appearing along senior Muslim scholars.

On December 15, the Ambassador delivered remarks on the importance of religious freedom and tolerance, as well as calling for the cessation of violence against Ahmadi and Shia Muslims, during an MUI event entitled “International Webinar on Human Rights in Various Perspectives and the Launching of MUI Human Rights School.” Other speakers at the event included Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas, Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Bambang Soesatyo, and Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights Edward Hiariej.

In February, the embassy began working with the National Istiqlal Mosque’s Voice of Istiqlal initiative, which seeks to encourage tolerance and diversity, interfaith dialogue, and gender equality in Indonesia and internationally. The embassy provided language and technical training to Voice of Istiqlal’s staff. Soon after this training began, Voice of Istiqlal hosted and broadcast online an interfaith dialogue with Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucianist leaders in September to discuss the importance of interfaith cooperation in helping deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. The event included speeches by Vice President Amin, Cardinal Ignatius Suharyo Hardjoatmodjo, chairman of the Council of Churches in Indonesia Gomar Gultom, and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar.

In March, the embassy completed a project with the Yogyakarta-based Srikandi Lintas Iman to promote religious pluralism through early childhood education and utilizing social media among women. The project provided training to 57 teachers from Yogyakarta schools and 59 women religious leaders. Content promoting religious freedom and tolerance created as part of the social media component of the project reached more than 130,000 persons.

On September 30, the embassy completed its $11.5 million project with the Asia Foundation engaging legal aid organizations to defend human rights and religious freedom in six provinces, including all provinces in Java except Banten and Papua. The embassy supported these partners in developing advocacy papers for outreach on regulations that discriminate against religious minorities, improving their capacity to represent minority religious groups in legal cases, undertaking strategic public campaigns to build wider civil society engagement in challenging intolerance, and publishing periodic reports on abuses of religious freedom. The project was estimated to have helped provide legal assistance to 240,000 persons from marginalized communities.

The embassy continued a $24.33 million project aimed at developing more effective tools and systems to bolster religious tolerance. The project partnered with national and local-level government officials, CSOs, universities, research institutions, and grassroots movements that focus on promoting religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy continued a $3.3 million activity to promote religious tolerance and pluralism among high school students. Through partnerships with the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Education and Culture, the project aimed to design and implement innovative arts and cultural curricula in select districts to advance community resilience to religious intolerance.

During Ramadan, the embassy and consulates conducted extensive outreach campaigns in print and electronic media and in social media to highlight religious tolerance, reaching an estimated 100 million Indonesians. The Charge d’Affaires appeared on Amanah Wali 5, one of the highest-rated serialized dramas in the country, where she visited a fictional market to learn about Indonesian customs and discuss tolerance and diversity. Embassy officials appeared on television, radio, and online shows, as well as in press interviews, to share their experiences of celebrating Ramadan in the country and the U.S. approach to religious pluralism and freedom. The embassy hosted a series of online events and assisted in press placements, showcasing Indonesians who had lived in the United States and could discuss their experiences of religious freedom and pluralism there.

The Ambassador and Charge d’Affaires met periodically with leaders of the country’s two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, to discuss religious tolerance and pluralism and to further develop areas of cooperation.

Embassy officials met regularly with counterparts from other embassies to discuss support for freedom of religion and belief and to exchange information on areas of concern, programs being implemented, and possible areas of cooperation.

The embassy sponsored four Indonesians to join a virtual program on religious freedom and pluralism. During the five-week program, participants met U.S. religious leaders of different faiths to discuss the role religious officials play in their own societies and develop ideas for how they can work with leaders of similar or different faiths on shared goals for their societies.

On May 7, the embassy hosted a discussion on “Community Building in Islam,” which featured speakers from Indonesia and the United States, including Grand Imam of the National Istiqlal Mosque Nasaruddin Umar, discussing how religious leaders could help build communities across religious divides.

On August 25, the embassy hosted a virtual talk show entitled “Fostering Diversity and Tolerance among Youth” that showcased alumni of U.S. exchange programs. Discussion at the event focused on how young Indonesians perceived pluralism and how they had experienced discrimination based on religious, ethnic, and racial groupings, as well as ways they had sought to overcome these divides.

The embassy posted translated speeches and commentary on religious freedom by the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and other high-level government officials on its website. The embassy also developed graphics for social media and sent information to local journalists to encourage them to cover these issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 54.7 million (midyear 2021). The government estimates that as of 2019, approximately 85.5 percent of the total population is Christian and 11 percent Muslim. Groups constituting less than 2 percent of the population include Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, and those adhering to various traditional religious beliefs. Nonevangelical Protestants account for 33 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 21 percent, and other Christian denominations, including evangelical Protestants, African Instituted Churches (churches started in Africa independently by Africans rather than chiefly by missionaries from another continent), and Orthodox churches, 32 percent.

Most of the Muslim population lives in the northeast and coastal regions, with significant Muslim communities in several areas of Nairobi. Religion and ethnicity are often linked, with most members of many ethnic groups adhering to the same religious beliefs. For example, ethnic Somalis and Swahilis living in the coastal region account for the majority of the Muslim population. The five largest ethnic groups (the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba) are predominately Christian. There are more than 230,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the Dadaab refugee camps near the Somali border, mostly ethnic Somali Muslims. The Kakuma refugee camp in the northwestern part of the country has more than 177,000 refugees, including Somalis, South Sudanese, and Ethiopians, who practice a variety of religions.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there shall be no state religion and prohibits religious discrimination. The constitution provides for freedom of religion and belief individually or in communities, including the freedom to manifest any religion through worship, practice, teaching, or observance, and to debate religious questions. The constitution also states individuals shall not be compelled to act or engage in any act contrary to their belief or religion. These rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.”

The constitution requires parliament to enact legislation recognizing a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. The constitution also specifically provides for qadi courts to adjudicate certain types of civil cases based on Islamic law, including questions relating to personal status, marriage, divorce, or inheritance in cases in which “all the parties profess the Muslim religion.” The secular High Court has jurisdiction over civil and criminal proceedings, including those in the qadi courts, and accepts appeals of any qadi court decision.

Although there is no penal law referring to blasphemy, a section of the penal code states that destroying, damaging, or defiling any place of worship or object held sacred with the intention of insulting the religion of any class of persons is a misdemeanor. This offense carries a penalty of a fine or up to two years in prison but is reportedly rarely prosecuted under this law. Crimes against the property of religious groups or places of worship are more likely to be treated as malicious destruction of property, which is also a misdemeanor.

According to the law, new religious groups, institutions or places of worship, and faith-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must register with the Registrar of Societies, which in turn reports to the Attorney General’s Office. Indigenous and traditional religious groups are not required to register, and many do not. To register, applicants must have valid national identification documents, pay a fee, and undergo security screening. Registered religious institutions and places of worship may apply for tax-exempt status, including exemption from duty on imported goods. The law also requires that organizations dedicated to advocacy, public benefit, the promotion of charity, or research register with the NGO Coordination Board.

All public schools have religious education classes taught by government-funded teachers. These classes focus on either Christian, Muslim, or Hindu teachings and on the basic content of the religious texts of the religion being taught, as well as ethics. The Ministry of Education allows local communities and schools to decide which course to offer. The course selected usually depends on the dominant local religion and the sponsor of the school, which is often a religious group. The national curriculum mandates religious classes for primary school students, and students may not opt out. Some public schools offer religious education options, usually Christian or Islamic studies, but are not required to offer more than one.

The law establishes fees for multiple steps in the marriage process that apply to all marriages, religious or secular. All officiants are required to purchase an annual license, and all public marriage venues must be registered. Officiants must be appointed by a registered religious group to conduct marriages and to purchase the license.

The Ministry of Information, Communications, and Technology must approve regional radio and television broadcast licenses, including for religious organizations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Human rights groups and prominent Muslim leaders and religious organizations continued to state the government’s antiterrorism activities disproportionately affected Muslims, especially ethnic Somalis and particularly in areas along the border with Somalia. The government continued to deny directing such actions, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention.

In November, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims called for weekly protests to demand government accountability regarding alleged enforced abductions. According to the council, security forces had killed or disappeared 133 individuals during the year. The governmental Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA), established to provide civilian oversight of the work of police, and human rights organizations reported numerous complaints from predominantly Muslim communities, particularly in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi and coastal regions, regarding intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and extortion by police. Some complainants stated police accused them of being members of al-Shabaab.

In October, Muslim leaders from various religious and human rights organizations issued a joint statement criticizing the government for not protecting the rights of Muslim citizens. The leaders stated security forces abducted more than 40 Muslims through October, only 10 of whom had returned to their homes. They highlighted the case of a Muslim employee of Lamu County whom they stated was abducted in June by individuals in a government vehicle and whose whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.

In October, unknown persons allegedly abducted a Muslim male after he left a mosque in Mombasa. Activists accused police of targeting Muslim youths and accusing them of having ties to terrorism without providing evidence. Police denied involvement and were reportedly investigating the matter.

In February, the government evicted approximately 3,500 members of the Muslim Nubian community in Kisumu County, whose homes were allegedly built on land belonging to the state-owned Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC). In August, the Environment and Land Court ruled the KRC violated the Nubians’ rights by conducting an illegal eviction. Activists said that homes and other structures belonging to non-Muslims were even closer to the railway line than the Nubians’ homes but were left alone. They described this incident as a case of religious discrimination. This ruling laid the groundwork for an additional lawsuit against KRC to claim damages, but it was unclear at year’s end whether residents had done so.

The government continued to take steps, described by human rights organizations as limited and uneven, to address cases of alleged abuses by security force members. IPOA continued to refer cases of police misconduct to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution. Public prosecutors, however, experienced lengthy delays in moving cases to trial and conviction. IPOA investigations led to five convictions of police officers during the year.

The Registrar of Societies, which has not registered any religious organizations since 2014, continued not to register any new religious organizations pending completion of revised Religious Societies Rules. Religious leaders criticized the government’s inaction, which had led to a backlog of thousands of unapproved religious group applications. Some religious leaders called on the government to resume registrations, stating the suspension interfered with freedom of worship, including by making it more difficult to purchase property and conduct operations.

At the start of the pandemic, the government appointed an Inter-faith Council on the National Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic to develop guidelines for the phased reopening of places of worship, which closed in late March 2020 to stem the spread of COVID-19, and the holding of religious ceremonies. The council continued to advise the government and adjust its guidelines based on evolving COVID-19 conditions.

In October, the council raised its recommended limit on attendance of in-person worship services to two-thirds of a house of worship’s seating capacity, if religious leaders implemented masking and social distancing guidelines. Council members and religious leaders familiar with the council’s work said government officials largely adopted the council’s recommendations. Religious leaders reported local officials at times attempted to harass religious groups for failing to follow COVID-19 guidelines but said national government officials intervened to help resolve these issues.

Many religious leaders criticized politicians for holding political gatherings that did not adhere to the government’s restrictions on public gatherings and for politicizing funerals and other religious gatherings.

Some predominately Muslim ethnic groups, including Kenyan Somalis and Nubians, reported difficulties obtaining government identification cards. These communities stated government officials at times requested supporting documents not required by law and implemented vetting processes in a biased manner. In June, the NGO Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) said it helped nearly 200 young individuals obtain national identification cards, which are required to obtain government services or register to vote. These individuals, the majority of whom were Muslim, lived in Lamu County near the border with Somalia. The government reportedly halted issuance of identification cards in this region due to concern that al-Shabaab terrorists from Somalia could pose as Kenyan nationals to fraudulently obtain government-issued identification cards. MUHURI and other human rights organizations stated the government was unfairly profiling Muslims.

There were reports that, in general, non-Muslims continued to harass or treat with suspicion persons of Somali ethnicity, who are predominantly Muslim. Police officers typically do not serve in their home regions, and therefore officers in some Muslim-majority areas are largely non-Muslim. NGOs stated this often led to misunderstandings between police officers and the communities they are assigned to serve.

Religious leaders representing interfaith groups, including the Anglican, Catholic, evangelical Protestant, Muslim, and Hindu communities, continued to engage with political parties and government bodies in the national reconciliation process initiated after violent 2017 presidential elections. The interfaith Dialogue Reference Group, composed of prominent Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups, continued to hold national and county forums to promote national reconciliation. The Dialogue Reference Group also regularly issued statements calling for national unity and urging the government to take necessary steps to conduct a peaceful and credible general election in August 2022.

The Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab again carried out attacks in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu Counties in the northeastern part of the country, sometimes targeting non-Muslims because of their faith. In January, the international Christian advocacy organization Open Doors noted what it described as a rise in violence against Christians, especially in the northeast where al-Shabaab was responsible for many threats and attacks. In June, al-Shabaab terrorists attacked two buses traveling through Mandera County near the Kenyan border with Somalia, killing three individuals. Media outlets reported the attackers were targeting non-Muslims.

According to NGO sources, some Muslims and their families believed they were threatened with violence or death, especially individuals who had converted from Islam to Christianity and those of Somali ethnic origin.

Some interreligious NGOs and faith leaders, citing extensive interfaith efforts to build peace between communities, promote peaceful elections, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, said relations between religious groups continued to improve. For example, the national interfaith umbrella group the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) partnered with the governmental National Cohesion and Integration Commission to call on politicians to avoid inciting violence by adhering to an elections code of conduct in advance of the country’s general election in August 2022. It also encouraged members of its religious communities to register to vote and educate themselves about the electoral process. The interfaith Dialogue Reference Group, composed of prominent Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups, continued to hold national and county forums to promote national reconciliation. The Dialogue Reference Group also regularly issued statements calling for national unity and urging the government to take necessary steps to conduct peaceful and credible elections.

IRCK also partnered with other NGOs such as the Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) to increase religious tolerance and reduce opportunities for radicalization related to religion, particularly in Nairobi and the coastal region. KECOSCE and IRCK hosted interfaith dialogues and joint community activities to encourage peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding. IRCK and religious leaders reported that close collaboration among different faiths continued to inform and improve the country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Leaders collaborated on several initiatives at the national and county level to disseminate accurate information, protect public health, and address the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19.

Embassy officials emphasized the importance of respecting religious freedom in meetings with government officials, including senior police officials and local governments in the coastal region, where they especially stressed the role of interfaith dialogue in stemming religious intolerance, countering religiously based violent extremism, and addressing the grievances of marginalized religious and ethnic groups. Embassy staff continued to engage senior officials to underscore the importance of addressing human rights abuses by security forces, including abuses limiting the ability of minority religious groups to function freely in society, and supported several programs to improve police accountability.

The Charge d’Affaires and embassy staff met frequently with religious leaders and groups, including the IRCK, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, Hindu Council of Kenya, National Muslim Leaders Forum, Alliance of Registered Churches & Ministries Founders, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, and National Council of Churches of Kenya. Topics of discussion continued to include the importance of religious groups in countering religiously based extremism, promoting peaceful elections, and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the value of sharing guidance from religious leaders on human rights issues.

The Charge d’Affaires hosted or participated in several interfaith roundtables during the year to discuss issues and problems facing various faith communities. Participants, including representatives of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups, discussed building tolerance between and among faiths, encouraging the critical role religious leaders play in peacebuilding efforts, promoting government accountability, and combating corruption. For example, the Charge d’Affaires hosted a meeting of the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics in Mombasa to discuss relations between ethnic and religious groups as the nation prepares for the August 2022 general election. Throughout the year, the Charge d’Affaires participated in similar meetings hosted by foreign diplomatic missions in the country that featured leaders from various religious communities.

Embassy officials met individually with religious and civic leaders to urge them to continue to work across sectarian lines to reaffirm the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and diversity. The embassy highlighted these engagements, where appropriate, on its website and social media accounts. During official visits to various parts of the country, including regions heavily populated by Muslims and other minority groups, the Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials encouraged faith communities and other societal figures to regard religious diversity as a national strength. They accomplished this through media interviews and other public and private engagements with religious leaders and NGOs that work to advance religious freedom.

The embassy supported civil society organizations that protect the legal and human rights of marginalized groups, including religious minorities, through direct grants, and by nominating community leaders to participate in U.S. government-sponsored programs. The embassy also supported efforts to strengthen understanding, respect, and acceptance among religious groups, including within multifaith communities in Nairobi and Mombasa Counties and the IRCK’s “Building Interfaith Bridges” initiative. The embassy partnered with interfaith groups to improve accountable governance and strengthen communities’ relationships with law enforcement by sponsoring a visiting speaker series. It also advocated for the inclusion of marginalized groups and building resilience against conflict and violent extremism related to religion through assistance programs.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 20.1 million (midyear 2021). According to the MARCC, Muslims constitute an estimated 95 percent of the population. Nearly all Muslims are Sunni, and most follow Sufism; however, one prominent Shia imam stated that as many as 10 percent of Muslims are Shia. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Christians, of whom approximately two-thirds are Catholic and one-third Protestant; groups with indigenous religious beliefs; and those with no religious affiliation. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ) estimated its membership at approximately 100 individuals. Groups adhering to indigenous religious beliefs reside throughout the country, mostly in rural areas. Many Muslims and Christians also adhere to some aspects of indigenous beliefs. The MARCC estimates fewer than 1,000 individuals in Bamako and an unknown number outside of the capital are associated with the Dawa al-Tablig, a subgroup of Sunni Islam.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state, prohibits discrimination based on religion, and provides for freedom of religion in conformity with the law. Following the August 2020 coup d’etat, in September 2020, the transition government adopted the Transition Charter, which recognized the continued validity of the 1992 constitution’s definition of the country as secular and prohibited religious discrimination under the law. Following the May 24 consolidation of military power, the subsequent transition government also upheld the validity of these founding documents.

According to the penal code, any act of discrimination based on religion or any act impeding the freedom of religious observance or worship is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment or 10 years’ banishment (prohibition from residing in the country). The penal code also states any religiously motivated persecution of a group of persons constitutes a crime against humanity. There is no statute of limitations for prosecuting such crimes.

The law requires registration of all public associations, including religious groups, except for groups practicing indigenous religious beliefs; however, registration confers no tax preferences or other legal benefits, and there is no penalty for not registering. To register, applicants must submit copies of a declaration of intent to create an association, notarized copies of bylaws, copies of policies and regulations, notarized copies of a report of the first meeting of the association’s general assembly, and lists of the leaders of the association, with signature samples of three of the leaders. Upon review, if approved, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD) grants the certificate of registration.

The MARCC is responsible for administering the national strategy for countering violent extremism, promoting religious tolerance, and coordinating national religious activities such as pilgrimages and religious holidays for followers of all religions.

The constitution prohibits public schools from offering religious instruction, but it permits private schools to do so. Privately funded madrassahs teach the standard government curriculum, as well as Islam. Non-Muslim students in these schools are not required to attend Islamic religious classes. Private Catholic schools teach the standard government curriculum and Catholic religious classes. Non-Catholic students in these schools are not required to attend Catholic religious classes. Informal schools, known locally as Quranic schools and which some students attend in lieu of public schools, do not follow a government curriculum and offer religious instruction exclusively.

The law defines marriage as secular. Couples who seek legal recognition must have a civil ceremony, which they may follow with a religious ceremony. A man may choose between a monogamous or polygamous marriage. The religious customs of the deceased determine inheritance rights, and civil courts consider these customs when they adjudicate such cases; however, many cases are settled informally.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to numerous civil society organizations and UN reports, the transition government and security forces struggled to tamp down violence generated by the spread of groups they described as violent extremist organizations in the northern and central regions of the country, including terrorist groups and ethnically aligned militias. They stated that the presence of terrorist organizations and armed groups in the northern and central regions limited the transition government’s capacity to govern and to bring perpetrators of abuses to justice, especially outside major cities.

In October 2020, the National Secretariat for the Prevention and the Fight Against Violent Extremism within the MARCC, with the assistance of the UN Development Program, launched a study of factors influencing extremism related to religion. In July, using the results from the 2020 study, the transition government finalized a 2021-25 national action plan on countering and preventing violent extremism and terrorism that includes interfaith efforts and promotion of religious tolerance.

The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission held its third and fourth public hearings on April 3 and September 18, respectively, covering cases relating to arbitrary arrest, forced disappearance, torture, and killings. All public hearings were broadcast on national television. As of December 8, the commission had heard the testimony of a total of 23,988 individuals since its launch in 2014, including cases involving religious freedom violations. Political events in the country, the COVID-19 pandemic, growing security concerns in the central and northern regions, a lack of transportation for victims, and the lack of access in camps for displaced persons limited the collection of testimony.

The transition government proposed a draft law on religious freedom and the exercise of worship. The draft law was adopted by the Council of Ministers on December 15, and the request for full adoption and implementation of the law was pending with the transition government at the end of the year. Once fully implemented, it would streamline the process of registering religious associations with the MARCC directly, rather than through the MATD.

In July, Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maiga and Minister of Religious Affairs, Worship, and Customs Mamadou Kone visited mosques as well as Catholic and Protestant churches in Bamako to pray for peace in the country, a successful transition period, and a fruitful rainy season. The MARCC, in coordination with Archbishop of Bamako Cardinal Jean Zerbo, organized the annual Catholic pilgrimage to Kita, which took place November 20-21. Cardinal Zerbo and Prime Minister Maiga took part in the pilgrimage, as did the Union of Young Malian Muslims (UJMA). As part of the pilgrimage, a UJMA representative marched from Kayes to Kita (approximately 250 miles) to demonstrate UJMA’s support for interfaith dialogue. In September, the transition government funded the pilgrimage of at least 20 Protestants to Jerusalem. As of mid-December, the transition government had not resumed funding travel to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj pilgrimage due to limitations related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Caritas representatives and some Protestant leaders stated that although there were far fewer Christians than Muslims in the country, they did not experience unequal treatment by the transition government, and the government was adhering to the constitutional requirement to treat all religions equally. Transition government officials from the MARCC continued to emphasize and cite that the constitution and government practices provide for the freedom to worship and practice any religion, including the freedom to not engage in religious practices. For example, in a speech during the Catholic pilgrimage to Kita, Prime Minister Maiga said all religions are essential to maintain social harmony, resolve conflict, and aid in the country’s economic development.

Caritas expressed concern regarding what it termed the growing influence of Muslim religious leaders in the political field and in the transition government. For example, Caritas criticized the nomination of Imam Oumarou Diarra as deputy minister to the Minister of Social Development in Charge of Humanitarian Action, Solidarity, Refugees, and IDPs while retaining his title of imam. Caritas and the prosecutor for Bamako’s Commune IV court criticized Diarra for attending a demonstration in August in his role as imam at the Bamako Camp I gendarmerie advocating for the release of imams who had been detained following a complaint.

The 121-member National Transition Council, the country’s transition legislative body formed by the transition government in 2020, included three seats reserved for representatives of religious associations. One seat is filled by a Catholic, one by a Muslim, and one by a Protestant.

Throughout the year, mostly in the central and northern regions, domestic and transnational terrorist groups (including al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates Ansar al-Din, Macina Liberation Front, and al-Mourabitoune), united under the umbrella group JNIM, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), both U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, continued attacks on domestic and international security forces, UN peacekeepers, civilians, and others they reportedly perceived as not adhering to their interpretation of Islam. Both JNIM and ISIS-GS controlled significant territory in the northern and central regions. According to NGOs and security experts, armed groups in some instances coopted preexisting intercommunal and ethnic tensions to further sow instability and violence, and it was not possible to attribute some incidents entirely to religious motives. Several of JNIM’s public messages repeated an intent to govern the country according to sharia.

In the center of the country, JNIM continued to attack multiple towns in the Mopti Region and to threaten Christian, Muslim, and traditional religious communities. According to the August report of MINUSMA HRPD, from April to June, terrorist and other armed groups required women in the region of Segou to wear veils. According to the report, in N’Doukala, in the Segou Region, members of these groups publicly beat two women and a 16-year-old girl because they refused to wear veils.

Unidentified armed individuals continued to abduct individuals, including religious leaders of all faiths and beliefs, throughout the country. On June 21, unidentified armed individuals believed to be terrorists abducted Abbot Leon Dougnon, the priest of the Catholic Church of Segue in the Bandiagara region, along with four other Christians travelling from Bandiagara to Sevare in the Mopti Region. The four other individuals were released on June 23, while the abbot was held until July 13. On September 20, unidentified armed individuals believed to be terrorists abducted Pastor Emmanuel Goita near Koury in the Koutiala Region and released him on October 10. In March the remains of a Swiss Christian missionary, Beatrice Stoeckli, were identified. Stoeckli was abducted and had been held by JNIM since 2016. On October 9, JNIM released Colombian nun Sister Gloria Cecilia Argoti, held captive since February 2017.

Several influential imams and former government officials cautioned against divisive language that conflated certain ethnic groups, such as Fulani populations, with extremists. For example, following a terrorist attack on December 3 in the Bandiagara region that killed at least 32 persons, Dan Na Ambassagou, a Dogon self-defense militia operating in the central part of the country, issued a message demanding retaliation and calling for violence to be directed against the Fulani community. In response, Imam Mahmoud Dicko and Ousmane Bocoum (a Quranic teacher, civil society leader, and businessman from Mopti described as having a broad social media reach) condemned the attack and called for calm, tolerance, and peace.

According to the priest of Barapreli Church in the Bandiagara region, terrorist and other armed groups continued to ban Catholicism and instead teach Islam, impose sharia on Catholics, and force the local Christian community in Didja near the church to learn the Quran and perform prayers as prescribed by Islam. However, according to Caritas, most Catholic churches in the country remained open.

Islamist armed groups targeted and closed government schools that taught any curriculum not based on Islam. According to Caritas, the schools that closed in prior years due to threats or conflict did not reopen, and more schools closed throughout the year, especially in the Mopti Region. According to a June report from the UN Secretary-General, as of June 1, the conflict had caused the closure of at least 1,595 schools in the north and central regions of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, Mopti, and Segou.

According to Caritas, the Cadre for Action, Monitoring, Mediation, and Negotiation of Religious Denominations and Civil Society, which was formed as a mediation and negotiation network in 2020 in response to violent antigovernment protests, strengthened its ability during the year to operate effectively. The organization, composed of Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and civil society leaders, issued a joint statement on May 24 urging the transition government to work towards stability and peace following the consolidation of military power. The network routinely called for peaceful elections.

Some Christian missionaries again expressed concern regarding the increased influence in remote areas of organizations they characterized as violent and extremist, which the missionaries said could affect their ability to continue working in the country over the long term. Representatives of the Church of Jesus Christ said that their ability to travel throughout the country had grown severely limited due to reports of terrorist attacks. Caritas representatives reported that terrorist and other armed groups targeted persons throughout the country regardless of religious affiliation. They said, however, that priests in terrorist-controlled Minta in the region of Mopti remained able to carry out their normal functions without interference or threat. Protestant leaders noted the case of a Christian teacher who fled his home after being threatened by terrorists and members of armed groups in Mandiakoy village in Segou Region.

Caritas leaders expressed concern about the terrorist groups taking control of the subdistricts of Koro, Bankass, Bandiagara, and Douentza following agreements signed with the local population. These agreements afford decision-making and territorial authority to terrorist and other armed groups in exchange for not attacking the local population and allowing their freedom of movement throughout the territory. These leaders said they feared that terrorists would impose Islamic practices on those populations in the future. Caritas cited a ban on alcohol and pork in some parts of the region of Mopti as signs of the growing influence of Islam in these parts of the country, and which they viewed as a threat to the Christian community. MINUSMA HRPD and Caritas reported that terrorist and other armed groups imposed Islamic practices such as forcing women to wear veils and collecting zakat (religious taxes) to pay for local services in the north and central regions.

Ousmane Bocoum continued spreading messages of tolerance. He held conferences with religious leaders and women as a way of countering what were termed radical ideologies most prevalent in the center of the country in an effort to bring peace to his community. With MINUSMA’s support, Bocoum organized an awareness-building campaign for women religious leaders in Mopti on preventing violent extremism. In November, Bocoum concluded training on preventing violent extremism and radicalization for religious leaders, community workers, and radio announcers, also in Mopti.

While media reporting highlighted religious leaders’ increasingly important role in politics, media reports also noted that religious activism was not a new phenomenon and, in many cases, they saw this activism as a sign of the country’s tolerance for a plurality of religions.

According to a member of the UJMA, local Shia often faced discrimination from followers of different schools of Islam that perceive Shia practices to be incorrect.

Members of religious groups commonly attended the religious ceremonies of other religious groups, especially baptisms, weddings, and funerals.

The embassy continued to encourage the government to promote interfaith dialogue and to maintain a tradition of religious tolerance. The embassy also continued to highlight the importance of countering violent extremism related to religion, including through working with the MARCC to support programs with this goal. Embassy officials worked with vulnerable communities to build their ability to address conflict, radicalization, and religious violent extremism. For example, a civic engagement program held 15 capacity-building sessions on conflict management for more than 500 participants. These workshops allowed participants to improve their knowledge of mediation and conflict-resolution techniques.

The Ambassador and embassy officers spoke with a wide range of religious leaders and human rights organizations to promote religious tolerance and freedom, including Imam Mahmoud Dicko, members of the High Islamic Council and other imams, the Association of Muslim Women, Caritas, Protestant leadership, and missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ. They urged religious leaders to advocate for tolerance and peace among various social and religious groups.

In August, in honor of Eid al-Adha, the U.S. Secretary of State held a virtual roundtable discussion with Muslim healthcare professionals working with marginalized communities during the COVID-19 pandemic, including Malian social worker Hawa Diallo. After a brief discussion between the Ambassador and Diallo, the embassy posted photographs and a statement on its Facebook page.

In April, to commemorate the beginning of Ramadan, the Ambassador met with influential imams in Bamako, highlighting the role of religious leaders in confronting challenges such as insecurity fueled by religious intolerance and in the promotion of peace through increased civic education.

The embassy highlighted the importance of tolerance and respect for religious diversity on its social media platforms throughout the year. In April, following a meeting with religious leaders, the Ambassador said in a written statement that religious leaders played an important role in creating a stronger, more democratic, and more stable country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 30.4 million (midyear 2021). According to the 2011 census, the most recent, Hindus constitute 81.3 percent of the population, Buddhists 9 percent, Muslims (the vast majority of whom are Sunni) 4.4 percent, and Christians (of whom a large majority are Protestant and a minority Roman Catholic) 1.4 percent. Other groups, which together constitute less than 5 percent of the population, include Kirats (an indigenous religion with Hindu influence), animists, adherents of Bon (a Tibetan religious tradition), Jains, Baha’is, and Sikhs. According to some Muslim leaders, Muslims constitute at least 5.5 percent of the population, mostly concentrated in the south. According to some Christian groups, Christians constitute 3 to 5 percent of the population. Many individuals adhere to a syncretic faith encompassing elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, and traditional folk practices, according to scholars.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares the country to be a secular state but defines secularism as “religious, cultural freedoms, including protection of religion, culture handed down from the time immemorial.” The constitution stipulates every person has the right to profess, practice, and protect his or her religion. While exercising this right, the constitution bans individuals from engaging in any acts “contrary to public health, decency, and morality” or that “disturb the public law and order situation.” It also prohibits converting “another person from one religion to another or any act or conduct that may jeopardize others’ religion,” and states that violations are punishable by law.

The criminal code sets five years’ imprisonment as the punishment for converting, or encouraging the conversion of, another person via coercion or inducement (which officials commonly refer to as “forced conversion”) or for engaging in any act, including the propagating of religion, that undermines the religion, faith, or belief of any caste or ethnic group. It stipulates a fine of up to 50,000 Nepali rupees ($420) and subjects foreign nationals convicted of these crimes to deportation. The criminal code also imposes punishments of up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 20,000 rupees ($170) for “harming the religious sentiment” of any caste, ethnic community, or class, either in speech or in writing.

The law does not provide for registration or official recognition of religious organizations as religious institutions, except for Buddhist monasteries. It is not mandatory for Buddhist monasteries to register with the government, although doing so is a prerequisite for receiving government funding for maintenance of facilities, skills training for monks, and study tours. A monastery development committee under the Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Civil Aviation oversees the registration process. Requirements for registration include providing a recommendation from a local government body, information on the members of the monastery’s management committee, a land ownership certificate, and photographs of the premises.

Except for Buddhist monasteries, all religious groups must register as NGOs or nonprofit organizations to own land or other property, operate legally as institutions, or gain eligibility for public service-related government grants and partnerships. Religious organizations follow the same registration process as other NGOs and nonprofit organizations, including preparing a constitution and furnishing information on the organization’s objectives as well as details on its executive committee members. To renew the registration, which must be completed annually, organizations must submit annual financial audits and activity progress reports.

The law prohibits the killing or harming of cattle. Violators are subject to a maximum sentence of three years in prison for killing cattle and six months’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 50,000 rupees ($420) for harming cattle.

The law requires the government to provide protection for religious groups carrying out funeral rites in the exercise of their constitutional right to practice their religion, but it also states the government is not obligated to provide land grants for this purpose. There is no law specifically addressing the funeral practices of religious groups.

The constitution establishes the government’s authority to “make laws to operate and protect a religious place or religious trust and to manage trust property and regulate land management.”

The law does not require religiously affiliated schools to register, but public/community Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic religious schools must register as religious educational institutions with local district education offices (under the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology) and supply information about their funding sources to receive funding at the same levels as nonreligious public/community schools. Religious public/community schools follow the same registration procedure as nonreligious public/community schools. Catholic and Protestant groups must register as NGOs to operate private schools. The law does not allow Christian schools to register as public/community schools, and they are not eligible for government funding. Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim groups may also register as NGOs to operate private schools, but they also are not eligible to receive government funding.

The law criminalizes acts of caste-based discrimination in places of worship. Penalties for violations are three months’ to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 to 200,000 rupees ($420-$1,700).

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Government Practices

According to civil society sources, police arrested four Christians, including two Catholic nuns, on September 14 in Pokhara, Kaski District, for religious conversion. They were held in detention until November 18, when they were released on 100,000 rupees ($840) bail by the Kaski District Court. The court kept their passports and was collecting witness testimony at the end of the year. Their next court appearance was scheduled for January 18, 2022. Three local staff members working in a tutoring center run by the nuns were also arrested on September 13 for religious conversion but released on September 15.

On November 30, the Dolpa District Court sentenced Christian preacher Keshav Raj Acharya to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 rupees ($170) for proselytizing. Acharya’s lawyers appealed his conviction to the High Court, and on December 19, the court ordered him released on bail pending a review of the district court’s decision. Police arrested Acharya, from the Abundant Harvest Church, in March 2020 for spreading misinformation about COVID-19. He was released after paying a fine but rearrested in May 2020 and charged with religious conversion and offending religious sensibilities. After being released on bail for the latter charges, he was immediately arrested a third time and transported to a neighboring district to face additional charges of conversion. He was released in June 2020 after paying another fine.

According to a religious leader, the rural municipality of Jhapa paid 50,000 rupees ($420) to cover the cost of funeral expenses and a government committee recommended the government pay one million rupees ($8,400) compensation to the family of Rasikul Alam, who was shot by police during an August 2020 confrontation with the Muslim community after two persons were arrested for cow slaughter. According to local civil society organizations, as of October 1, the family had only received 500,000 rupees ($4,200), half of the recommended compensation, and the police officer involved in the shooting had not been held accountable.

In January, a group of international and Nepalese Christian organizations submitted a stakeholder’s report to the UN Human Rights Committee, detailing allegations of persecution of Christians in the country, documenting cases of arrests over several years, and criticizing sections of the law they said unfairly favored Hindus or discriminated against non-Hindus. The report stated there was growing hostility against Christians and increasing challenges to faith-based operations in the country. On July 7, the NGO Christian Solidarity Worldwide expressed regret that Nepal only noted, instead of supported, the Universal Periodic Review recommendation by the Netherlands to amend Article 26 of the constitution to include the right to choose or change one’s religion or belief, in accordance with Article 18 of the ICCPR.

According to civil society representatives, the government deported one Ukrainian and two South Korean families for proselytizing.

Cases against six of seven Jehovah’s Witnesses arrested in 2020 remained pending, although none were in custody. On March 16, the Kaski District Court found four who were arrested in Pokhara for proselytizing in February 2020 not guilty, but on September 20, the government attorney appealed this decision to a provincial-level high court where it remained pending as of the end of the year. The hearing for two others – U.S. citizens – who were arrested in March 2020 for proselytizing was delayed several times while the court collected witness statements. The last hearing was scheduled for December 27 in Kaski District Court, after hearings in October and November were postponed, but it did not take place before the end of the year. The seventh case involved a Nepali who was arrested together with the U.S. citizens. He was fined 5,200 rupees ($44) for indecent behavior by the Kaski District Administrative Office and released.

On January 21, the Surkhet District Administration office acquitted two pastors arrested in March 2020 for holding worship services in contravention of COVID-19 restrictions.

Minority religious organizations stated that COVID-19 restrictions were not uniformly enforced across religious groups and the government allowed Hindu temples to open on days considered auspicious to Hindus, while minority groups feared reprisals and waited for the Ministry of Health and Population to lift restrictions on all gatherings before resuming religious services.

According to the Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples, police arrested 39 Muslim, Dalit, and indigenous persons for cow slaughter in nine separate incidents during the year. The Society for Humanism Nepal reported three additional incidents in which 17 individuals were arrested as of October. On September 19, police in Makwanpur arrested 10 persons who were sharing beef from a recently killed cow. Police opened criminal cases for cow slaughter against these individuals. As of December 31, they were released on bail and awaiting trial.

During the year, police surveillance of Tibetans remained high and, in some cases, the number of security personnel monitoring and the scrutiny of Tibetan cultural and religious celebrations increased, despite Tibetans’ compliance with government-imposed COVID-19 restrictions. The government maintained its restrictions on Tibetans’ ability to publicly celebrate the Dalai Lama’s birthday on July 6, stating the religious celebrations represented “anti-China” activities. For the first time, police blocked all entrances to the Boudhanath Stupa (shrine) complex, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and popular tourist destination, and asked all shops in the area to remain closed for the day to prevent any spontaneous gatherings of Tibetans. As in 2020, Tibetans could conduct other ceremonies with cultural and religious significance, such as Losar (Tibetan New Year) and World Peace Day, which commemorates the Dalai Lama receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, but only in small official ceremonies or in private.

As in prior years, human rights and minority religious groups expressed concern that the constitution and criminal code’s ban on conversions made religious minorities subject to legal prosecution for actions carried out in the normal course of their religious practices, and vulnerable to prosecution for preaching, public displays of faith, and distribution of religious materials in contravention of constitutional assurances of freedom of speech and expression.

These groups also continued to express concern that a provision in the criminal code prohibiting speech or writing harmful to others’ religious sentiments could be misused to settle personal scores or target religious minorities arbitrarily. According to numerous civil society and international community legal experts, some provisions in the law restricting conversion could be invoked against a wide range of expressions of religion or belief, including the charitable activities of religious groups or merely speaking about one’s faith. Political and academic analysts continued to state that discussions on prohibiting conversion had entered political spheres in the country and that those seeking to capitalize on populist sentiments for political advantage manipulated the issue.

According to legal experts and leaders of religious minority groups, the constitutional language on protecting the religion “handed down from the time immemorial” and the prohibition on conversion were intended by the drafters to mandate the protection of Hinduism. Christian religious leaders continued to state that the emphasis of politicians in the RPP on reestablishing the country as a Hindu state continued to negatively affect public perception of Christians and Christianity. The RPP held one seat in parliament during the year, and civil society sources stated that it used anti-Christian sentiment to garner populist support.

Leaders of the RPP outside of parliament continued their calls for the reestablishment of Hindu statehood, which was constitutionally abolished in 2007 in favor of a secular democracy, and advocated strong legal action against those accused of killing cows. Civil society leaders said influence from India’s ruling party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and other Hindu groups in India continued to pressure politicians in Nepal, particularly from the RPP, to support reversion to a Hindu state.

Civil society leaders said what they characterized as right-wing religious groups associated with the BJP in India continued to provide money to influential politicians of all parties to advocate for Hindu statehood. According to NGOs and Christian leaders, small numbers of Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) supporters were endeavoring to create an unfriendly environment for Christians on social media and at small political rallies and encouraging “upper-caste” Hindus to enforce caste-based discrimination.

Muslim groups said that at the local government level several municipalities prioritized funding for temples rather than other development needs of the community. They stated that local authorities often looked the other way when Hindu neighbors encroached on minority properties, including Muslim graveyards.

Religious leaders said the requirement for NGOs to register annually with local government authorities placed their organizations at political risk. Civil society organizations reported that religiously affiliated organizations, including several with long histories of work in the country, had difficulty renewing their registrations. During the first six months of the year, multiple religiously affiliated organizations reported lengthy delays, onerous requests for changes beyond those necessary to meet the requirements of law, and lack of transparency when renewing or registering their organizations.

On December 24, the government declared Christmas a public holiday. The government allowed Christians and Muslims time off from work to celebrate major holidays, recognized Eid al-Adha as a public holiday, and continued to recognize Buddha’s birthday as a public holiday.

Christian groups reported that the government-funded Pashupati Area Development Trust continued to prevent Christian burials in a communal cemetery behind the Pashupati Hindu Temple in Kathmandu while allowing burials of individuals from other non-Hindu indigenous faiths. Protestant churches continued to note difficulties gaining access to land they bought several years prior for burials in the Kathmandu Valley under the names of individual church members. According to the churches, local communities continued to oppose burial by groups perceived to be outsiders but were more open to burials conducted by Christian members of their own communities. Many Christian communities outside the Kathmandu Valley said they continued to be able to buy land for cemeteries, conduct burials in public forests, or use land belonging to indigenous communities for burials. They also said they continued to be able to use public land for this purpose.

Some religious organizations criticized the government’s handling of the bodies of COVID-19 victims. They reported challenges related to burials and death rituals during a second wave of the pandemic, which peaked in May. One civil society organization called the army’s cremation of those who died from COVID-19 disrespectful, while another said it was implemented across all religions equally and was necessary to deal with the surge of COVID-19 cases.

The government continued to permit Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim groups to establish and operate their own schools. The government provided the same level of funding for both registered religious schools and public schools, but Christian organizations stated the law prohibiting private Christian schools from registering as public schools was discriminatory. Although religious education is not part of the curriculum in public schools, some public schools displayed a statue of Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of learning, on their grounds.

According to the Center for Education and Human Resource Development (previously the Department of Education), which is under the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology, the number of gumbas (Buddhist centers of learning) registered remained the same at 114. There were 105 gurukhuls (Hindu centers of learning) registered during the year, compared with 104 in 2020.

According to the Center for Education and Human Resource Development, the number of madrassahs registered with district education offices remained unchanged at 911. Some Muslim leaders stated that as many as 2,500 to 3,000 full-time madrassahs continued to be unregistered. According to religious leaders, many madrassahs, as well as full-time Buddhist and Hindu schools, continued to operate as unregistered entities because school operators hoped to avoid government audits and having to use the Center for Education and Human Resource Development’s established curriculum. They said some schools also wished to avoid the registration process, which they characterized as cumbersome.

Many foreign Christian organizations had direct ties to local churches and continued to sponsor clergy for religious training abroad, albeit in smaller numbers than past years due to COVID-19 travel restrictions.

According to NGOs, Hindu priests and “high-caste” residents continued to discriminate against Dalits, as members of a “lower” caste. On October 14, Bhim Bahadur Bishwakarma was beaten to death for trying to enter a temple that barred Dalits. The attack took place during the Dashain holiday in the city of Bharatpur, Chitwan District, Bagmati Province. According to media reports, individuals beat Bishwakarma with a pipe after he questioned neighbors about Dalits not being allowed to enter the temple. Police arrested two persons and, after a December hearing, they remained in custody pending trial at year’s end.

A police investigation found that the August 2020 shooting of a Hindu priest on the premises of Hanuman Temple, located in Rautahat District, was the result of a financial dispute. The World Hindu Council continued to state the case was religiously motivated. At year’s end, two of seven accused individuals remained in police custody, one was released on bail, and four suspects remained at large.

Hindu nationalist groups including Vishwa Hindu Parishad Nepal, Bishwo Hindu Mahasangh, and Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (the Nepalese arm of India’s Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or RSS) demonstrated against a draft provincial bill regulating madrassahs. The protests occurred on September 25 in Birgunj, a city near the India border. The groups compared the Muslim Chief Minister of Province Two to the Taliban and said the Nepali Muslim community was trying to make Nepal like Afghanistan. Muslim leaders said they interpreted the rally as an attempt to incite violence and a continuation of efforts to reestablish the country as Hindu state.

Muslim civil society representatives said religious minorities and advocates for greater religious inclusion continued to be under threat and faced ongoing pressure from both government officials and members of the community to stop their advocacy.

Religious minority groups continued to state that some converts to other religions, including Hindus who had converted to Christianity, tried to conceal their faith from their families and local communities, mainly in areas outside Kathmandu, fearing discrimination. Some Muslim leaders continued not to accept converts to Islam, saying it would violate the law according to their interpretation. Instead, they recommended that individuals who sought to convert travel to India to do so.

Christian religious leaders stated their outreach efforts during the year focused largely on COVID-19 relief; they did not report large, public, anti-Christian disturbances in rural areas where Christianity is spreading. They noted, however, that due to COVID-19 restrictions, there were very few public activities that could have triggered disturbances during the year. Multiple Christian sources again said that inflammatory material appeared on social media, and several Catholic and Protestant sources also noted a rise in what they termed anti-Christian propaganda, misinformation, and discriminatory and divisive religious content on traditional media. For example, on April 6, a press release purportedly from two prominent Christian organizations detailing a fictional strategy to divide Hindu practitioners of different castes into two separate religions became a trending social media topic. Both organizations denounced the document as a fake that was designed to stir anti-Christian sentiment. Local media again published reports of alleged harmful practices by religious minorities that were disputed by local authorities, witnesses, and other media.

The Ambassador and visiting U.S. government representatives expressed concerns to political leaders and senior government officials from multiple ministries about restrictions on the country’s Tibetan community. Embassy officers met with civil society groups and government officials to discuss challenges registering and reregistering religiously affiliated NGOs and other NGOs. They also met with representatives from minority religious groups within and outside of Kathmandu to discuss concerns about arrests, the prohibition against “forced or induced” conversion, discriminatory laws, societal discrimination, attacks on social media, inflammatory rhetoric from Hindu fundamentalist groups, COVID-19’s impact on the ability to worship, and access to burial grounds. Embassy officers continued to highlight how anti-proselytism and conversion laws could be used to arbitrarily restrict the right to the freedoms of religion and expression and worked to ensure the safety and fair treatment of U.S. citizens accused of religion-related crimes. They repeatedly emphasized to government officials the importance of bringing legislation and practice into concordance with the country’s constitutional and international obligations.

The Charge d’Affaires hosted a Tibetan Losar celebration in February with representatives of the diplomatic and Tibetan communities to promote the protection of Tibet’s unique culture and religion, as well as basic human rights of Tibetans, including religious freedom. Embassy officers also visited minority religious houses of worship and met with local religious leaders to discuss religious freedom challenges outside of Kathmandu.

The embassy used traditional media and virtual platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to communicate religious freedom messages on Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and other holidays, to highlight the country’s religious diversity, and to promote respect and tolerance. The embassy continued using social media to highlight engagements on religious freedom issues by the Ambassador and other U.S. officials.

The embassy worked closely with the Diplomatic Security Service, the Nepal Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Dallas Museum of Art to facilitate the return of a stolen statue of Laxmi-Narayana, a Hindu deity. The 12th century artifact was worshipped in the city of Patan until it disappeared in 1984. After its return, Hindu priests reconsecrated the temple and individuals from the Guthi (trust) that oversees the temple for worship expressed their joy at its return. Hindu religious leaders and cultural and heritage activists also praised the return, which they said they hoped would increase understanding of their faith and pave the way for future repatriations.

The embassy continued to provide financial assistance for the preservation and restoration of religious sites, including Buddhist stupas (shrines) and monasteries as well as several Hindu temples, and continued to promote religious tolerance in a program for underprivileged youth, including Muslims and refugees, in Kathmandu.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 23.6 million (midyear 2021). According to the Ministry of Interior, more than 98 percent of the population is Muslim. Of the Muslim population, the great majority is Sunni. Roman Catholics, Protestants, and other religious groups account for less than 2 percent of the population. There are several hundred Baha’is, who reside primarily in Niamey and in communities west of the Niger River. A small percentage of the population adheres primarily to indigenous religious beliefs. Some Muslims intermingle animist practices with their practice of Islam, although observers note this has become less common over the past decade.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, specifies separation of religion and state as an unalterable principle, and stipulates equality under the law for all, regardless of religion. It provides for freedom of conscience, religion, worship, and expression of faith consistent with public order, social peace, and national unity. The constitution also states no “religion or faith” shall claim political power or interfere in state affairs and bans political parties based on religious affiliation.

The law on the organization and practice of religion, passed and ratified in 2019, reaffirms existing laws on freedom of religion, provided religion is exercised respecting “public order and moral good.” It provides for government regulation and approval of the construction of places of worship and oversight of financial contributions for the construction of religious venues.

Religious groups are treated the same as other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and must register with the Ministry of Interior’s Customary and Religious Affairs Office. Registration approval is based on submission of required legal documents, including the group’s charter, minutes of the group’s board of directors, annual action plan, and list of the organization’s founders. Only registered organizations are legally recognized entities. Nonregistered groups are not permitted to operate, although some unregistered religious organizations reportedly operate without authorization in remote areas. The Ministry of Interior requires clerics speaking to a large national gathering either to belong to a registered religious organization or to obtain a special permit.

Registered religious groups wishing to obtain permanent legal status must undergo a three-year review and probationary period before the Ministry of Interior’s Customary and Religious Affairs Office may grant a change in legal status from probationary to permanent.

The constitution specifies the President, Prime Minister, and President of the National Assembly must take an oath when assuming office on the holy book of his or her religion. By law, other senior government officials are also required to take religious oaths upon entering office.

The government prohibits full-face veils in the Diffa Region under state of emergency provisions, with the stated purpose of preventing concealment of bombs and weapons.

The government prohibits open air, public proselytization events by all religious groups due to expressed national security concerns. There is no legal restriction on private, peaceful proselytization or conversion of an individual from one religious faith to another as long as the group sponsoring the conversion is registered with the government.

The establishment of any private school by a religious association must receive the concurrence of both the Ministry of Interior and the relevant department of the Ministry of Education (primary, secondary, superior, or vocational). According to the Ministry of Interior, private Quranic schools, established solely to teach the Quran without providing other education, are unregulated. They are officially considered to be denominational schools falling under the Ministry of the Interior, not benefiting from public subsidies. They depend on lay teachers with unstable and often low incomes. Sources state they are educational structures of variable quality, normally tending to impart formal learning of Quranic recitation and a number of doctrinal and social elements of Islam. Most public schools do not include religious education. The government funds a small number of special primary schools (called “French and Arabic schools”) that include Islamic religious study as part of the curriculum.

There are no restrictions on the issuance of visas for visiting religious representatives; however, the long-term residency of foreign religious representatives must be approved by the Ministry of Interior.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government provided guidance on sermons and banned some religious leaders from preaching for violating the guidelines, including Cheikh Assoumana Mahamadou from the Dan Gao neighborhood in Niamey, who was jailed in July 2020 and banned from preaching. The government also instructed the state-run media to boycott Cheikh Mahamadou.

On March 12, criminal police arrested Cheikh Amadou Ali Tcharmay of the Goudel Friday Mosque in Niamey following his Friday sermon in which he reportedly mentioned the recent presidential election and the name of the opposition candidate Mahamane Ousmane. The government deployed army tanks in Goudel, a neighborhood considered an opposition party stronghold. The imam was later released, but authorities compelled him to sign a commitment letter banning him from “talking politics” in his preaching.

In April, the High Islamic Council issued a statement, as it had the previous year, urging Muslims to abide by government COVID-19 measures banning large public gatherings, including group prayers, during Ramadan. The council also urged Muslim leaders and preachers to conduct COVID-19 awareness campaigns. Large numbers of Muslims reportedly prayed at mosques the next day.

Following the implementation of COVID-19 prevention measures that discouraged collective prayer gatherings of more than 50 persons, protesters rioted in several locations, burning tires and damaging property. In April, there were reports of dozens of angry protesters in Maradi Region setting fire to more than 40 schools, the local gendarmerie office, and administrative vehicles. In all five communes of Niamey, there were reports of protesters setting fire to tires, erecting barricades, and throwing rocks and projectiles at antiriot units. Police used tear gas to disperse a protest in the Goudel commune before Friday afternoon prayers.

During the year, the government faced challenges including COVID-19 restrictions that shut down the airport and curbed tourism, civil unrest, and the runoff to a presidential election that concluded in March. Sources stated it did not make progress in implementing the 2019 National Worship Strategy. The strategy’s six goals were to design and implement a plan for the location of places of worship, promote quality religious training, encourage educational and tolerant religious public discourse, ensure “adequate supervision” of religious practice, strengthen intra- and interreligious dialogue, and discourage violent religious extremism. This strategy grants the government the power to regulate and oversee the construction, financing, and use of places of worship and other religious facilities and was perceived by some observers as a potential way to encroach on religious freedom.

According to the government, media, and religious groups, the country had become a focal point for Islamist armed groups. Following rapid growth of Wahhabism in the country, the government in recent years sought to standardize Islamic practices through the creation of an Islamic forum of more than 50 national Islamic organizations. The government established the Islamic Forum in 2017 to standardize the practice of Islam and prevent the spread of Islamic extremism. As part of its effort to stop the spread of Wahhabism, the government used provisions of the 2019 law to investigate and control the sources of funding of religious denominations.

Government officials continued to express concern regarding funding from foreign government sources for the construction of mosques and the training of imams, but according to observers, the government had insufficient resources to track the extent of the funding and fully understand its consequences.

The government stated that it continued to face a series of persistent and growing security threats from the group alternatively known as “the Islamic State in West Africa,” or “the Islamic State’s West Africa Province,” formerly known as Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad, as well as from Boko Haram, a jihadist terrorist organization active in the region. Armed terrorist groups, including Boko Haram and groups affiliated with al-Qaida, ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), attacked and killed hundreds of civilians and security forces, according to media. Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continued regular attacks in Diffa Region in the Lake Chad Basin, while ISIS-GS and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) increased attacks in the border areas with Mali and Burkina Faso. Armed groups also reportedly conducted targeted campaigns of killing and threats against what they called “informants,” including local government officials, traditional leaders, and security forces. ISIS-GS and JNIM affiliates in northern Tillaberi Region reportedly continued charging local villagers Islamic taxes (zakat), while members of terrorist organizations in western Tillaberi Region reportedly burned government-funded schools, telling villagers their children should not attend secular schools and forcing many villagers to flee their homes.

According to Africanews.com, terrorists killed five persons and seriously injured two others during an attack on the town of Fantio, in Tillaberi Region. The attack occurred during an Eid al-Fitr celebration.

According to Catholic aid organization Aid to the Church in Need, a terrorist attack occurred in the towns of Fantio and Dolbel in Tillaberi Region in which the perpetrators set fire to a Catholic church and killed men who were trying to escape.

Christian groups active in the country included missions, associations, movements, and NGOs. Many associations and missions provided humanitarian assistance as well as built schools and churches. NGOs also provided services to communities, including water points and other humanitarian assistance.

The Interfaith Dialogue Organization, with both Muslim and Christian members, continued to meet in committees in all eight regions of the country and in local committees in 140 communes of the country.

According to representatives of both Christian and Muslim groups, there were generally good relations between Muslims and Christians; however, according to some religious leaders, a minority of Muslims rejected closer ties between Muslims and Christians as a corruption of the true faith and therefore resented an interreligious forum. Public events generally begin with an Islamic prayer. Some gatherings, however, began adding a Christian prayer to their opening blessing.

The Ambassador and other embassy representatives advocated for religious freedom and tolerance through meetings with government and religious leaders. The Ambassador raised religious freedom with the Interior Minister and the Foreign Minister, encouraging broad engagement with Muslim associations in the government’s efforts to promote religious tolerance and counter extremist messages.

The Ambassador also had regular meetings with Catholic Archbishop of Niamey Laurent Lompo, who is the country’s first Nigerien Archbishop and has held his position since 2015. They discussed trends in religious observance in the Muslim community (Lompo cited a strong influence from Arab countries) and the role that Lompo stated that inequity contributed to recruitment for violent extremist organizations, noting that economic incentives were encouraging volunteers. Other topics included girls’ lack of access to education and the ramifications of child, early, and forced marriage.

The Ambassador and embassy representatives met with representatives of Muslim and Christian groups to support intra- and interfaith dialogues intended to promote tolerance and understanding and to jointly tackle societal issues where religious leadership and tradition were seen as driving factors, such as education for all and reducing early marriage. The Ambassador met with the president of the Islamic Association, who is also the imam of the Grand Mosque of Niamey, on the eve of Eid al-Adha to discuss the role of faith in society and how it could help defeat extremism related to religion.

The embassy continued to sponsor programs with religious leaders nationwide focused on countering violent extremism related to religion and amplifying voices of religious tolerance. For example, embassy assistance given to the design of new education programming, in consultation with traditional and religious leaders, included scrutinizing school curricula and texts for content contrary to the principles of religious freedom and tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 238.2 million (midyear 2021). According to the results of the most recent national census conducted in 2017, 96 percent of the population is Sunni or Shia Muslim. According to government figures, the remaining 4 percent includes Ahmadi Muslims; Hindus; Christians, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and Protestants, among others; Parsis/Zoroastrians; Baha’is; Sikhs; Buddhists; Kalash; Kihals; and Jains.

Sources vary on the precise breakdown of the Muslim population between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Sunnis are generally believed to be 80-85 percent of the Muslim population, and Shia Muslims, including ethnic Hazara, Ismaili, and Bohra (a branch of Ismaili), are generally believed to make up 15-20 percent. Unofficial estimates vary widely with regard to the size of minority religious groups. Religious community representatives estimate religious groups not identifying as Sunni, Shia, or Ahmadi Muslim constitute 3 to 5 percent of the population.

According to the 2017 census results, the population is 1.6 percent Hindu, 1.6 percent Christian, 0.2 percent Ahmadi Muslim, and 0.3 percent others, to include Baha’is, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians. Taking into account the Ahmadi boycott of the official census, however, community sources put the number of Ahmadi Muslims at approximately 500,000 to 600,000. Estimates of the Zikri Muslim community, located in Balochistan, range between 500,000 and 800,000 individuals. Several minority rights advocacy groups dispute the results of the 2017 census and say the numbers underrepresent their true population and their political influence, because minority seat allocation in the national and provincial parliaments is based on census figures.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Islam as the state religion but states, “Subject to law, public order, and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion.” According to the constitution, every citizen has the right to freedom of speech, subject to “reasonable restrictions in the interest of the glory of Islam,” as stipulated in the penal code. According to the penal code, the punishments for persons convicted of blasphemy include the death penalty for “defiling the Prophet Mohammed,” life imprisonment for “defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Quran,” and up to 10 years of imprisonment for “insulting another’s religious feelings.” Speech or action intended to incite religious hatred is punishable by up to seven years of imprisonment. Under the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony is responsible for reviewing internet traffic and reporting blasphemous or offensive content to the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority for possible removal or to the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) for possible criminal prosecution.

The constitution defines “Muslim” as a person who “believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Mohammed… the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet after Mohammed.” It also states that “a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis), or a Baha’i, and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes” is a “non-Muslim.”

According to the constitution and the penal code, Ahmadis may not call themselves Muslims or assert they are adherents of Islam. The penal code bans them from “posing as Muslims,” using Islamic terms, carrying out Islamic customs, preaching or propagating their religious beliefs, proselytizing, or “insulting the religious feelings of Muslims.” The punishment for violating these provisions is imprisonment for up to three years and a fine, the amount of which is at the discretion of the sentencing judge.

The penal code does not explicitly criminalize apostasy, but renouncing Islam is widely considered by clerics to be a form of blasphemy, which may carry the death penalty.

The government may use the antiterrorism courts, established as a parallel legal structure under the 1997 Antiterrorism Act, to try cases involving violent crimes, terrorist activities, and acts or speech deemed by the government to foment religious hatred, including blasphemy.

The constitution states no person shall be required to take part in any religious ceremony or attend religious worship relating to a religion other than the person’s own.

The constitution provides for “freedom to manage religious institutions.” It states every religious denomination shall have the right to establish and maintain its own institutions. The constitution states no person shall be compelled to pay any special tax for the propagation or maintenance of a religion other than the person’s own. The government collects a mandatory, automatic 2.5 percent zakat (tax) from Sunni Muslims who hold savings accounts in banks. It distributes the funds through a government-run charity as stipends for poor families and students, payment for medical treatment, and support to Sunni mosques and madrassahs registered with the government. Sunni Muslims who want to distribute zakat themselves may request an exemption, and Shia Muslims are exempted by filling out a declaration of faith form. Shia and Ahmadi Muslim communities run their own charity programs.

The constitution mandates that the government take steps to enable Muslims, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to promote the observance of Islamic moral standards. It directs the state to endeavor to secure the proper organization of Islamic tithes, religious foundations, and places of worship.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony is responsible for organizing participation in the Hajj and other Islamic religious pilgrimages. Authorities also consult the ministry on matters such as blasphemy and Islamic education. The ministry’s budget covers assistance to indigent minorities, repair of minority places of worship, establishment of minority-run small development projects, celebration of minority religious festivals, and provision of scholarships for religious minority students.

The law prohibits publishing any criticism of Islam or its prophets or insults to others’ religious beliefs. The law bans the sale of Ahmadiyya religious literature.

The provincial and federal governments have legal responsibility for certain minority religious properties abandoned during the 1947 partition of British India.

The constitution states that no person attending any educational institution shall be required to attend religious instruction or take part in any religious ceremony relating to a religion other than the person’s own. It also states that no religious denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of its denomination in an educational institution maintained by the denomination.

The constitution states the government shall make Islamic studies compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools. Although students of other religious groups are not legally required to study Islam, schools do not always offer parallel studies in their own religious beliefs. In some schools, however, non-Muslim students may study ethics. Parents may send children to private schools, including religious schools, at the family’s expense. In Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces, private schools are also required to teach Islamic studies and the Quran to Muslim students.

By law, madrassahs are prohibited from teaching or encouraging sectarian or religious hatred or violence. Wafaqs (independent academic boards) register seminaries, regulate curricula, and issue degrees. The five wafaqs each represent major streams of Islamic thought in the country: Barelvi, Deobandi, Shia, Ahle Hadith, and the Jamaat-i-Islami, which is considered ultraconservative. The wafaqs operate through an umbrella group, Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris Pakistan, to represent their interests to the government. The government requires all madrassahs to register with the Ministry of Education in addition to registration with one of the five wafaqs.

The constitution states, “All existing laws shall be brought into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah [Islam’s body of traditional social and legal custom and practice].” It further states no law shall be enacted that is “repugnant” to Islam. The constitution states this requirement shall not affect the “personal laws of non-Muslim citizens” or their status as citizens. Some personal laws regulating marriage, divorce, and inheritance for minority communities date from prepartition British legislation.

The constitution establishes a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) composed of Muslim judges to examine and decide whether any law or provision is “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.” The constitution gives the FSC the power to examine a law of its own accord or at the request of the government or a private citizen. The constitution requires the government to amend the law as directed by the court. The constitution also grants the FSC “revisional jurisdiction” (the power to review of its own accord) over criminal cases in the lower courts relating to certain crimes under the Hudood Ordinance, including rape and those linked to Islamic morality, such as extramarital sex, alcohol use, and gambling. The court may suspend or increase the sentence given by a criminal court in these cases. The FSC’s review power applies whether the cases involve Muslims or non-Muslims. Non-Muslims may not appear before the FSC. If represented by a Muslim lawyer, however, non-Muslims may consult the FSC in other matters, such as questions of sharia or Islamic practice that affect them or violate their rights. By law, decisions of the FSC may be appealed to the Supreme Court’s Shariat Appellate Bench. A full bench of the Supreme Court may grant a further appeal.

The constitution establishes a Council of Islamic Ideology to make recommendations, at the request of the parliament and provincial assemblies, as to “the ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam.” The constitution further empowers the council to advise the legislative and executive branches when they choose to refer a question to the council as to whether a proposed law is or is not “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.”

There is no specific language in the law authorizing civil or common law marriage; religious authorities sign marriage certificates, which are registered with the local marriage registrar. The provincial-level Sindh Hindu Marriage Act and the national-level Hindu Marriage Act (applying to federal territory and all other provinces) codify legal mechanisms to formally register and prove the legitimacy of Hindu marriages. In addition to addressing a legal gap by providing documentation needed for identity registration, divorce, and inheritance, the Hindu Marriage Acts allow marriages to be voided when consent “was obtained by force, coercion, or by fraud.” The acts allow for the termination of the marriage upon the conversion of one party to a religion other than Hinduism. The Sindh provincial government has legislation allowing couples to seek divorce and granting Hindu women the right to remarry six months after a divorce or a spouse’s death. The Sindh Hindu Marriage Act also applies to Sikh marriages. The Punjab Sikh Anand Karaj Marriage Act allows local government officials in that province to register marriages between a Sikh man and Sikh woman solemnized by a Sikh Anand Karaj marriage registrar.

Some court judgments have considered the marriage of a non-Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man dissolved if she converts to Islam, although the marriage of a non-Muslim man who converts remains recognized.

The constitution directs the state to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities,” to secure the well-being of the people irrespective of creed, and to discourage sectarian prejudices. It forbids discrimination against any religious community in the taxation of religious institutions. The National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR), an independent government-funded agency that reports to parliament, is required to receive petitions, conduct investigations, and request remediation of human rights abuses. The NCHR is also mandated to monitor the government’s implementation of human rights laws and review and propose legislation. It has quasi-judicial powers and may refer cases for prosecution but does not have arrest authority. A constitutional amendment devolves responsibility for minorities’ affairs, including religious minorities, to the provinces.

According to the constitution, there shall be no discrimination on the basis of religion in appointing individuals to government service, provided they are otherwise qualified. There is a 5 percent minimum quota for hiring religious minorities (primarily Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Kalash, and Parsis but excluding Shia and Ahmadi Muslims) at the federal and provincial levels of government.

The constitution prohibits discriminatory admission based on religious affiliation to any governmental educational institution. According to regulations, the only factors affecting admission to government schools are students’ grades and home provinces, although students must declare their religious affiliation on application forms. This declaration is also required for private educational institutions, including universities. Students who identify themselves as Muslims must declare in writing they believe Mohammed is the final prophet. Non-Muslims are required to have the head of their local religious communities verify their religious affiliation. There is no provision in the law for atheists.

The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) designates religious affiliation on passports and requires religious information on national identity card and passport applications. Those wishing to be listed as Muslims must swear they believe Mohammed is the final prophet and must denounce the Ahmadiyya movement’s founder as a false prophet and his followers as non-Muslim. There is no option to state “no religion.” National identity cards are required for all citizens upon reaching the age of 18. Identification cards are used for voting, pension disbursem*nt, social and financial inclusion programs, and other services.

The constitution requires the President and Prime Minister to be Muslim. All senior officials, including members of parliament, must swear an oath to protect the country’s Islamic identity. The law requires elected Muslim officials to swear an oath affirming their belief that the Prophet Mohammed is the final prophet of Islam. This requirement prohibits Ahmadi Muslims from holding elected office, as they recognize a prophet subsequent to the Prophet Mohammed.

The constitution reserves seats for non-Muslim members in the national and provincial assemblies. The 342-member National Assembly has 10 reserved seats for non-Muslims. The 104-member Senate has four reserved seats for non-Muslims, one from each province. In the provincial assemblies, there are three such reserved seats in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; eight in Punjab; nine in Sindh; and three in Balochistan. Political parties elected by the general electorate choose the minority individuals who hold these seats; they are not elected directly by the minority constituencies they represent.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and maintains two reservations: first, that ICCPR Article 3 regarding equal rights of men and women would be “applied as to be in conformity with Personal Law of the citizens and Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (Law of Evidence),” under which the in-court testimony of men in certain civil matters pertaining to contracts and financial obligations is given greater weight than that of women; and second, that ICCPR Article 25, on the equal right for citizens to take part in public service, would be subject to articles of the constitution mandating that the President and Prime Minister be Muslims.

Government Practices

According to NGOs, police failed to protect religious minorities and those accused of blasphemy, including a member of the Hindu religious minority, Dodo Bheel, who was physically abused and killed on June 30 by security guards at the Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company where he worked. Authorities arrested the two guards involved, who were not Hindu, on July 14 and charged them with murder. Dodo Bheel’s family filed murder charges against the mining firm’s security contractor. In August, a fact-finding mission led by the Ministry of Human Rights recommended charges against police in Sindh Province for mismanaging the case, according to media reports. A Sindh High Court judge directed district authorities to produce a report on the incident and members of the ministry’s fact-finding mission said Dodo Bheel’s postmortem report showed 19 injuries inflicted with a blunt object. The investigation also revealed that security guards kept some of his Hindu coworkers in illegal detention for 14 days and physically abused them prior to handing them over to police. The police allegedly asked their families not to disclose what had happened to the injured men. On July 1, members of the local Hindu community blocked the mine access road and carried Bheel’s body in protest. Protests spread to other cities in Sindh after authorities arrested 150 members of the Hindu community on terrorism charges for protesting, although the protests were reportedly peaceful. On November 22, media reported Bheel’s brother appeared in court to withdraw murder charges against the mining firm’s security company. Media reported that his family sought to reach an out of court settlement with the mining company. At year’s end, the government had brought no charges against police, despite the recommendations of the fact-finding mission.

The NGO Center for Social Justice (CSJ) reported authorities charged and imprisoned 84 individuals in 2021 for blasphemy, compared with the 199 CSJ reported in 2020, when NGOs reported an uptick in blasphemy cases lodged against Shia Muslims due to heightened Sunni-Shia tension. Of these 84 individuals, Sunni and Shia Muslims made up 54 percent (CSJ did not include separate Sunni and Shia figures), Ahmadi Muslims 30 percent, Hindus 8 percent, and Christians 8 percent. At least 16 persons accused of blasphemy around the country during the year received death sentences, but none were carried out. The Ahmadiyya community reported that two of the blasphemy cases against Ahmadis in 2021 were registered under section 295-C of the penal code, which carries the death penalty. They reported that the cumulative number of Ahmadis charged under Pakistan’s blasphemy laws since 2019 was 61. Leaders from other NGOs agreed the actual number of blasphemy cases involving Ahmadis was likely higher, but uneven reporting and lack of media coverage in many areas made it difficult to identify an exact number. The government has never executed anyone specifically for blasphemy. According to civil society reports, 81 percent of cases registered during the year against individuals accused of blasphemy were in Punjab.

In January, media reported that the Anti-Terrorism Court in Islamabad sentenced three men to death for sharing “blasphemous content on social media,” and a fourth man to 10 year’s imprisonment in a case that began in 2017. According to security officials, two of the men – Rana Nouman Rafaqat and Abdul Waheed – operated fake profiles and disseminated blasphemous material on social media, while a third man – Nasir Ahmad – uploaded blasphemous videos to a YouTube channel. The fourth man – Professor Anwaar Ahmed – was charged with voicing blasphemous views during a lecture at the Islamabad Model College where he was an Urdu teacher. Police took Ahmed into custody and fined him 100,000 rupees ($560), but the other three were in hiding at year’s end.

Other blasphemy cases continued without resolution. Several individuals were accused of spreading blasphemous content through social media under PECA. In November, a group of Ahmadi Muslim citizens charged under PECA and facing blasphemy charges in 2019 for publishing copies of the Quran appeared before the Lahore High Court. The petition against them was filed by Muhammad Hassan Muawiyah, brother of Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Religious Affairs and the Middle East Tahir Ashrafi. Muawiyah said that the Ahmadi community and non-Muslims were not authorized to publish copies of the Quran. The judge ordered police authorities to submit a report stating why they had not implemented the 2019 verdict to ensure that only “authorized entities” published the Quran and acted against the accused and those publishing “unauthentic” copies of the Quran. The hearing was postponed on November 30, the case remained ongoing at year’s end with the accused free on bail.

The trial of the killers of Tahir Naseem, a U.S. citizen Ahmadi Muslim killed in a courtroom in August 2020 while on trial for blasphemy, was ongoing before the Anti-Terrorism Court in Peshawar at year’s end.

On September 27, a court in Lahore fined and sentenced Ahmadi Salma Tanveer, a former school principal, to death for blasphemy under section 295-C of the penal code for distributing writings denying the “finality of the Prophet” in 2013. The court said, “It is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Salma Tanveer wrote and distributed the writings which are derogatory in respect of Holy Prophet Mohammed.” Police registered a blasphemy case against Tanveer for allegedly using derogatory remarks against Islam, based on the complaint of Qari Iftikhar Ahmad Raza, a prayer leader of a local mosque. Tanveer remained in prison in Lahore at year’s end, where she had been since 2013.

According to NGOs and media reports, individuals convicted and sentenced to death in well-publicized blasphemy cases dating as far back as 2014 – including Nadeem James; Taimoor Raza; Junaid Hafeez; Mubasher, Ghulam, and Ehsan Ahmed; and Stephen Masih – remained in prison awaiting action on their appeals. In all these cases, judges repeatedly delayed hearings, adjourned hearings without hearing arguments, or sent appeals to other judicial benches. Civil society and legal sources said judges were generally hesitant to decide blasphemy cases due to fear of violent retribution.

In February, the courts granted Ahmadi Muslim Ramzan Bibi bail on her charge of blasphemy, 10 months after her arrest. In April 2020, Bibi donated money for a ceremony being held in a Sunni mosque in her village in Punjab, but the mosque returned the money because Ahmadis are barred by law from “engaging in Moslem practices” such as giving to mosques. She asked a non-Ahmadi relative why the money was returned, but the conversation turned into a dispute resulting in a verbal and physical altercation. Clerics of the village informed the District Police Officer that Bibi had committed blasphemy. Police arrested and charged her under Section 295-C of the penal code, which carries the death penalty. Her trial remained pending at year’s end.

In March, a prominent Sufi cleric from rural Sindh and his followers threatened the life of Sindhi fiction writer Amar Jaleel, accusing him of committing blasphemy during a 2017 literature festival after a video clip of Jaleel reading one of his short stories during that festival appeared on social media on March 28. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) political party figures led the public campaign against Jaleel, supported by right-wing newspaper Daily Ummat. On April 3, Sufi cleric Pir Umar Jan Sarhandi called for Jaleel’s death and offered money to anyone who carried out an assassination. Social media users demanded Sindh authorities arrest Sarhandi, but they took no action. The Sindh government promised that provincial authorities would not file blasphemy charges against Jaleel. National media reported, however, that the FIA launched an investigation of Jaleel using cybercrime laws at the request of the TLP.

On April 9, police filed blasphemy cases against two Christian nurses of the District Headquarters Hospital. Protesting hospital employees alleged that the two committed blasphemy by removing a sticker with a sacred Islamic inscription from a cupboard in the hospital. According to media reports, the police locked one of the nurses inside a police van to keep her safe from the protesters. In a similar incident, on January 28, police filed a blasphemy case against another Christian nurse, Tabitha Gill, at a maternity hospital in Karachi for “defiling the Prophet Mohammed” after she reportedly said she would pray for someone in the hospital. Coworkers at the hospital accused Gill of blasphemy after an argument and were seen slapping and beating her in a video that went viral on social media, but none of those seen in the video striking her were arrested or charged. An initial police investigation cleared Gill of any wrongdoing, but authorities subsequently registered a blasphemy case against her when a mob gathered outside the local police station demanding that she be recharged under blasphemy laws.

On August 7, police arrested Qaiser Zada, a transgender person, and her two brothers on charges of desecrating the Quran in Havelian, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Media reports say a witness saw Zada refuse sexual advances from a local Islamic scholar and was arrested along with her brothers after local residents accused them of burning a copy of the Quran. According to media reports, the residents beat Zada before handing her over to police. She and her brothers remained in custody at year’s end.

NGOs, legal observers, and religious minority representatives continued to raise concerns regarding the failure of lower courts to adhere to basic evidentiary standards in blasphemy cases. They also raised concerns about the slow pace of adjudicating these cases, which led to some suspects remaining in detention for years as they waited for their initial trial or appeals, and some convicted persons spending years in prison before higher courts overturned their convictions and freed them for lack of evidence. According to legal advocacy groups, some lower courts continued to conduct proceedings with spectators from groups supportive of harsh punishment for blasphemy, such as the TLP, who often threatened the defendants’ attorneys, family members, and supporters. At other times, advocacy groups reported that for security reasons, blasphemy trials were held inside jails, resulting in a loss of transparency. These observers said the general refusal of lower courts to hold timely hearings or acquit those accused of blasphemy persisted due to fear of reprisal and vigilantism. Legal observers also reported judges and magistrates often delayed or continued trials indefinitely to avoid confrontation with, or violence from, groups provoking protests.

NGOs and legal observers continued to say that the law requiring a senior police official to investigate any blasphemy charge before a complaint may be filed contributed to an objective investigation and the dismissal of many blasphemy cases. Some NGOs noted, however, that police did not uniformly follow this procedure. In some cases, the court remanded the accused to police custody for 14 days before they had been charged formally so a senior officer might carry out an investigation. In other cases, lower ranking police filed blasphemy charges without waiting for the required investigation by a senior police official. NGOs and legal observers again stated police often did not file charges against individuals who made false blasphemy accusations.

During the year, courts overturned some blasphemy convictions upon appeal and acquitted others after the accused had spent years in prison. On June 3, the Lahore High Court (LHC) acquitted and released a Christian couple, Shafqat Emmanuel and Shagufta Masih, from Punjab’s Toba Tek Singh District. Authorities arrested them in 2013 for sending text messages to the complainants that the complainants said were blasphemous. In April 2014, a lower court had sentenced the couple to death and fined them 100,000 rupees ($560) each.

There were reported cases of government intervention and assistance from courts and law enforcement in situations of attempted kidnapping and forced conversion. Enforcement action against alleged perpetrators was rare, however. Multiple cases of forced marriage and conversion of Christian women and girls were reported in Punjab. On February 16, a court in Faisalabad ordered the release of a 13-year-old Christian girl who, according to media reports, had been abducted at the age of 12, forcibly converted to Islam, and married against her will to a 45-year-old Muslim man in June 2020. Police rescued her in December 2020 and later moved her to a government-run shelter. A court in Faisalabad later allowed her to rejoin her family. Media reported that police dropped the investigation of the three Muslim men accused of abducting her and keeping her in chains for five months in 2020.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported forced conversions of young women of minority faiths, often lower-caste Hindu girls from rural Sindh, continued to occur along with multiple cases of forced marriages, child marriages, and forced conversions. In March, the Hindu community in Tangwani protested what they said was the abduction and forced conversion to Islam of a 13-year-old girl. A video of the girl went viral on social media in which she was seen sitting among men, who were shooting videos and taking photographs of her with their mobile phones. The girl’s father filed a case with local police and reported that her abductors and their influential supporters from a local mosque had set his house on fire after he refused to withdraw the case against them. On March 16, police rescued the girl and presented her before a court, which ordered that she be placed in a shelter. Police issued no charges on the arson allegation.

On July 26, a court in Badin, Sindh ordered police to reunite a young Hindu girl with her parents after her abduction, forced marriage, and forced conversion to Islam. Police had earlier rescued the girl from the illegal custody of a Muslim man after she posted a video widely seen on social media in which she was crying and pleading to be reunited with her parents. Following the court’s order, police arrested her purported husband, Qasim Khaskheli, and his two brothers, and charged them for their alleged aiding and abetting the rape, kidnapping, torture, and intimidation of the girl. She also declared that she had not converted to Islam and stated false documents were prepared by her purported husband. Police returned the girl to her parents in July and later released those arrested in the case.

Religious minorities and several organizations protested the government’s response to alleged cases of forced marriage and forced conversion, noting such incidents continue to happen regularly in all provinces. On May 21, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Religious Affairs and the Middle East Tahir Ashrafi stated that incidents of forced conversions and marriages had been rarely reported during the previous seven months. Several NGOs tracking forced conversions criticized Ashrafi’s statement, noting that forced conversions and marriages remained prevalent and demanded the government do more to protect victims of forced marriage and conversion.

On October 13, a parliamentary committee to protect religious minorities from forced conversions rejected a draft bill proposing an anti-forced conversion law after the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Inter-faith Harmony opposed it. Lawmakers from religious minority communities protested the decision and requested the government review it. During a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee to Protect Minorities from Forced Conversions, Minister of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony Noor-ul-Haq Qadri said the “environment is unfavorable” for formulating a law against forced conversions and warned that approval of the draft could disrupt peace in the country and “make minorities more vulnerable.” Qadri also urged the Prime Minister to “take other steps” to stop the conversions but did not suggest what those steps should be. Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Ali Muhammad Khan said setting a minimum age for marriage in the forced conversion bill “goes against Islam and the Constitution of Pakistan.”

The Ministry of Interior maintained multitier schedules of religiously oriented groups it judged to be extremist or terrorist that were either banned or had their activities monitored and curtailed (Schedule 1) and individuals whose activities in the public sphere could also be curtailed, including during religious holidays such as Ashura (Schedule 4). On August 11, the Sindh provincial government barred 309 “firebrand” speakers and religious scholars from leaving their home districts for 60 days to avoid violent disturbances during Shia commemorations in the month of Muharram, more than double the number barred in 2020. These 309 individuals included both Shia and Sunni clerics who in the past had made controversial statements that the ministry said led to sectarian tensions. The Rawalpindi district administration banned 39 Islamic Ulema religious figures belonging to different sects from entering the district during Muharram, stating this was in order to maintain peace and interfaith harmony during the commemorations and related processions held there during Muharram.

According to media reports and law enforcement sources, in the weeks leading up to and during Muharram, authorities at the federal level also restricted the movement and activities of clerics on the Ministry of Interior’s Schedule 4 listing to keep the peace. Shia community representatives, however, accused authorities of bias by restricting their religious ceremonies and arresting community members. In October, Shia leaders said Karachi police beat and harassed mourners participating in a religious procession during the Shia Chehlum holiday.

According to Ahmadiyya community leaders, authorities continued to target and harass Ahmadi Muslims for blasphemy, violations of “anti-Ahmadi laws,” and other crimes. Ahmadiyya leaders stated the ambiguous wording of the legal provision forbidding Ahmadis from directly or indirectly identifying themselves as Muslims enabled officials to bring charges against members of the community for using the standard Islamic greeting or for naming their children Mohammed. Ahmadi leaders said that during elections, their community members were more exposed to threats and physical intimidation, because authorities maintained the names of voters who registered as Ahmadi on separate voter lists. Many Ahmadis therefore continued their longstanding practice of boycotting elections, according to the leaders. Ahmadiyya community representatives continued to say that NADRA required Ahmadis to declare in an affidavit that they were non-Muslims to obtain a national identification card.

Ahmadiyya Muslim community representatives continued to state that Ahmadi families were unable to register their marriages with local administrative bodies, known as union councils, since those councils considered Ahmadis to be outside the authority of the Muslim Family Law of 1961.

On October 26, the Punjab Assembly passed a resolution requiring a declaration that Mohammed was the final prophet of Islam, which runs counter to Ahmadi beliefs, be included on government documents to register an Islamic marriage with the state.

In June, according to reports from the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, police who arrived at the scene of a fight between Sunnis and Ahmadis in Sheikupura District, Punjab, took no action to break it up. The fight erupted when a group of Sunni Muslims attacked and blocked the funeral procession of an Ahmadi woman on its way to the cemetery. The attackers, comprised of local villagers and led by clerics, opposed the woman’s burial, arguing the cemetery belonged to “Muslims” only. According to bystanders, many suffered injuries in the fight. Eventually, the Ahmadiyya Muslim community was able to bury the woman in that cemetery.

Community representatives reported Christians continued to face difficulties in registering marriages with Islamabad union councils because the councils claimed they had no authority to deal with unions recorded by Christian marriage registrars (usually church authorities). Members of parliament, church leaders, and advocates continued to debate the text of a 2019 draft law to govern Christian marriages nationwide, because the existing regulation dated from 1872. Members of parliament and officials of the Ministry of Human Rights and the Ministry of Law and Justice continued to consult with church leaders from prominent Christian denominations and with NGO representatives, but the denominations, church leaders, and NGO representatives had not agreed on elements of the draft law pertaining to divorce and interfaith marriage by year’s end.

Although the Sindh Hindu Marriage Act covers registration of Sikh marriages in that province, members of the Sikh community reportedly continued to seek a separate Sikh law so as not to be considered as Hindus for the purposes of the law. In 2020, the Sindh provincial government began to implement the act, and NADRA began registering Hindu marriages in Sindh, according to Hindu community activists. Some Hindu activists reported implementation of the law remained slow and officials who could solemnize Hindu marriages were not being registered with the government.

The government continued to prohibit citizens, regardless of religious affiliation, from traveling to Israel by marking Pakistani passports as “valid in all countries, except for Israel.” Representatives of the Baha’i community said this policy particularly affected them because the Baha’i World Center – the spiritual and administrative center of the community – is in Haifa, Israel. Christian advocates also called on the government to allow Christians to travel to Israel.

In March, hundreds of pilgrims clashed with police while trying to enter a shrine closed by the Sindh provincial government due to COVID-19 restrictions. Police said the pilgrims broke open the main gate of the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, a 13th-century mystic Sufi saint, located in the town of Sehwan, Sindh. The crowds attacked police and threw stones, police officer Mohammad Mushtaq said. Several police suffered minor injuries. Investigations were ongoing at year’s end.

Some religious minority leaders continued to state the system of selecting minority parliamentarians through the internal deliberations of mainstream parties resulted in the appointment of party stalwarts or those who could afford to “buy the seats,” rather than legislators who genuinely represented minority communities. Others said parliamentarians occupying reserved seats had little influence in their parties and in the National Assembly because they did not have a voting constituency. Women from religious minority communities criticized political parties for only nominating men to seats reserved for religious minorities in all legislative bodies and demanded amendments to the Election Act to make mandatory the appointment of religious minority women to these seats.

The government continued to permit limited non-Muslim foreign missionary activity and to allow missionaries to preach as long as they did not preach against Islam and they acknowledged they were not Muslim. According to the government’s immigration website, the Ministry of Interior could grant visas to foreign missionaries invited by organizations registered in the country. The visas were valid for one year and allowed one reentry into the country per year, although it was understood by missionary sources that only “replacement” visas for those taking the place of departing missionaries were available for long-term missionaries seeking to enter the country for the first time. The website further stated the government could grant extensions for two years with two reentries per year, excluding applicants from India.

The government continued its warnings against blasphemy and other illegal content on social media through periodic print advertisem*nts and text messages sent by the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA). The text messages stated, “Sharing of blasphemy, p*rnography, terrorism, and other unlawful content on social media and the internet is illegal.” Users were advised to report such content to a government website for action under PECA 16 (the 2016 PECA act).

In June, the PTA reported that uploading of content related to blasphemy and hate speech continued on social networking sites. A report prepared by the FIA’s cybercrime wing revealed that in 2020, the state blocked 111 accounts for containing blasphemous material, 47 for featuring hate speech, and nine for spreading sectarian hatred. From January through June 2021, the FIA cybercrime wing and the PTA removed 110 accounts, blocked 86 accounts for containing blasphemous content, 15 for hate speech, and nine for uploading sectarian material.

In November, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) reprimanded an FIA official for failing to identify and arrest individuals who allegedly uploaded blasphemous content on social media. The FIA informed the court it blocked some of those links, and the IHC directed it to strictly enforce regulations mandating the removal of blasphemous content.

In early January, the PTA asked social media platforms to take down the trailer of the movie, “Lady of Heaven” for sacrilegious content. In late January, the PTA told the IHC that it blocked 452 links that month to the trailer of a movie on the video-streaming platform Netflix on grounds that it contained sacrilegious material.

On January 22, the PTA blocked a U.S.-based website, “trueislam.com,” administrated by members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community-USA, from being viewed in Pakistan on charges that the website propagated blasphemous content.

On June 28, the Sindh High Court ordered the nationwide suspension of access to the video-sharing social media platform TikTok until July 8. The court issued the order in response to a petition filed by a citizen aggrieved by the “immorality and obscenity” spread by content on the platform. On July 20, the PTA again blocked access to TikTok “due to the continuous presence of inappropriate content on the platform and its failure to take such content down.” Reactions to the PTA’s measure were mixed, with many social media users praising the decision, but others expressing concerns that the government could similarly ban religious minorities. In November, the PTA lifted the ban on TikTok and released a statement saying it “will continue to monitor the platform in order to ensure that unlawful content contrary to Pakistan’s law and societal values is not disseminated.”

In April, a lawmaker from the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party introduced a resolution in parliament calling for expulsion of the French Ambassador over the republication of caricatures depicting Islam in a French magazine in 2020, which PTI said were blasphemous. On April 21, the Sindh Provincial Assembly passed a unanimous resolution to condemn the publication of these sketches in France and demanded a federal movement against practices which “harm religious harmony throughout the world.” Lawmakers in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly passed a resolution on September 17 requiring official documents to include the Khatan-un-Nabiyeen, or “finality of the Prophet” along with the Prophet Mohammed’s name.

According to representatives of some minority religious groups, the government continued to allow most organized religious groups to establish places of worship and train members of the clergy. The government also announced that a collaboration between the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB), provincial governments, and Sikh and Hindu community members would renovate several Hindu temples and Sikh gurdwaras during the year. As of September, the government’s Survey of Pakistan mapping agency had surveyed, geotagged, and digitized 93 percent of the properties to be renovated.

Media reported that in November, the Islamabad Capital Development Authority gave permission for construction to resume on a boundary wall at the site of the first Hindu temple to be built in the capital. In 2020, Islamist political parties opposed to the project filed a petition in the IHC to stop construction, and vandals destroyed part of the wall.

On February 5, a judicial commission led by police and justice sector reform specialist Dr. Shoaib Suddle submitted a report to the Supreme Court attesting that the ETPB failed to maintain most of the ancient and holy sites of the country’s Hindu minority community. According to the report, out of 365 Hindu temples, only 13 were being managed by the ETPB, leaving caretaking responsibilities of 65 temples with the Hindu community, with 287 left untended. In January (latest figures available), out of a total of 1,830 temples and gurdwaras across the country, only 31 were operating.

On June 11, the Supreme Court blocked plans to demolish the historic 716-square-yard Dharam Shala, a Hindu community center in Karachi, and ordered the Karachi commissioner to take possession of its land to protect the center from demolition. The court issued the verdict after Hindu community representatives told the court that the ETPB had leased the property to private individuals who started demolishing the Dharam Shala to construct a new building.

Although there continued to be no official restriction on the construction of Ahmadiyya places of worship, Ahmadiyya Muslim community leaders stated local authorities regularly denied requisite construction permits, and forbid Ahmadis from calling them mosques.

Authorities provided enhanced security for Shia Muslim, Christian, and Hindu places of worship at various times throughout the year, including around particular religious holidays or in response to specific threats. In July, a judicial commission on religious minorities established a special national police unit to protect religious minorities and their places of worship, a move welcomed by most religious minority communities. In mid-November, police in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province reported the government there had established a new special security unit to protect religious sites and religious minority communities throughout the province. Ahmadiyya community representatives, however, noted their religious sites and cemeteries continued to lack police protection nationwide. In April, Lahore police provided security to the Christian community for Easter celebrations. The provincial government increased the number of police personnel and security forces near churches. The district police also directed its response units and special forces teams to patrol throughout the city. In August and September, the state provided increased security throughout the country for the Shia community’s Muharram processions. Police authorities said 19,000 police and paramilitary force personnel deployed in the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi to secure the processions. Ahead of Christmas, police deployed officers to protect churches nationwide. Police also deployed snipers and used closed-circuit television cameras and metal detectors to ensure the security of churches and Christmas markets. In Sindh, police provided enhanced security at churches and Hindu temples, especially in Karachi, on the eves of festivals such as Christmas and Diwali.

In July, the Lahore High Court Bar Association (LHCBA) demanded that the federal interior ministry prevent the Ahmadi community from sacrificing animals on Eid al-Adha. In a letter written to the Chief Secretary of the government of Punjab, the LHCBA urged police to enforce blasphemy laws against Ahmadi community members taking part in religious rites during the holiday. Anti-Ahmadi groups used extensive online social media campaigns urging other non-Muslims to deny Ahmadis’ right to sacrifice animals during Eid al-Adha. The government reported no investigations or arrests.

The Ministry of Human Rights and the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training held consultations with minority faith representatives during the year to review textbooks for derogatory material.

On August 16, Prime Minister Khan launched a new nationwide Single National Curriculum (SNC) for grades 1-5 that standardized primary school instruction across the country’s three types of educational institutions – private, public, and religious. Religious minority groups criticized the SNC’s emphasis on Islamic teachings across educational subjects and argued it violated constitutional restrictions on “compulsory religious instruction” as well as the constitution’s 18th amendment, which delegates most authority for education to provincial governments.

In July, a judicial commission for the protection of religious minorities led by Dr. Suddle expressed concern to the Supreme Court that Islamic religious content was included in compulsory education courses under the SNC, including in Urdu and English language courses, thereby compelling religious minority students to receive Islamic religious instruction. The commission recommended all Islamic content from the SNC be placed in Islamic studies textbooks, because that subject was compulsory only for Muslim students. Islamist groups opposed this suggestion.

While the law requires schools to teach Islamic studies and the Quran to Muslim students, sources continued to report many non-Muslim students had to participate in these courses because their schools did not offer parallel courses in their own religious beliefs or ethics. The government did not permit Ahmadi Muslims to teach Islamic studies in public schools.

Civil society groups continued to report that some madrassahs, particularly those that were unregistered, taught doctrine they considered to promote violent extremism and intolerance toward religious minorities. These groups also noted the government sought to curb this practice through madrassah registration and curriculum reform.

Legal experts and NGOs reported that the full legal framework for minority rights remained unclear. While the Ministry of Law and Justice was officially responsible for protecting the legal rights of all citizens, in practice the Ministry for Human Rights continued to assume primary responsibility for the protection of the rights of religious minorities. The NCHR was also mandated to conduct investigations of allegations of human rights abuses, but legal sources said the commission had little power to enforce its requests for information and recommendations.

Members of religious minority communities said there continued to be an inconsistent application of laws safeguarding minority rights and enforcement of protections of religious minorities at both the federal and provincial levels by the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Human Rights. Religious minority community members also stated the government was inconsistent in safeguarding against societal discrimination and neglect, and that official discrimination against Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Ahmadi Muslims persisted to varying degrees, with Ahmadi Muslims experiencing the worst treatment.

As of year’s end, the National Commission for Minorities continued to function without legislative authority and without power to resolve problems. In September, the commission requested the President approve a draft bill to empower it under a legal framework, and recommended the chairperson be a member of a religious minority group; the government took no action on the request by year’s end. Religious freedom activists and civil society groups raised concerns regarding the limited powers of the commission and the decision to exclude Ahmadi Muslims from being represented on the commission when it was first formed. Ahmadi Muslim leaders said they had never been approached about participating in the commission and would not join a body that required them to identify as non-Muslims.

Minority religious leaders said members of their communities continued to experience discrimination in admission to colleges and universities. For example, Christians reported incidents of what they perceived as discrimination in which otherwise qualified Christian students were passed over for scholarships solely because they were Christian. In another instance, a university admitted an Ahmadi Muslim student in Multan as part of a quota set aside for religious minorities. The university later cancelled the student’s admission without disclosing the reason. The Lahore High Court ordered the university to reverse its decision and uphold its original offer of admission to the Ahmadi student. Ahmadi representatives said the wording of the government-required declaration students had to sign on their applications for admission to universities continued to prevent Ahmadis from declaring themselves as Muslims. Students’ refusal to sign the statement automatically disqualified them from fulfilling admissions requirements. The government said Ahmadis could qualify for admission if they did not claim to be Muslims.

In July, some students and religious groups protested the inclusion of a question related to the founder of the Ahmadiyya community in the test for doctorate admissions at the University of Sindh in Jamshoro. The protestors threatened to file a blasphemy case against administrators of the university. After negotiations, the university agreed to remove Ahmadi-related content from the admissions test.

Members of religious minorities, particularly lower-caste Hindus and Christians, reported cases of forceful evictions from their homes and villages by government officials assisting individuals desiring their land. On September 20, Christians living in the Landi Kotal area of the Khyber tribal district held a press conference to protest government orders to demolish their houses located adjacent to the town. They said local authorities ordered them to vacate their homes to expand a nearby jail. The affected families reported their ancestors had lived in the area since 1914 and they had no other place to live. On August 24, as part of an infrastructure project to improve the city’s stormwater drains, the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) demolished a small church along a major stream and forcibly evicted some church members who lived nearby. KMC and the Sindh government took the action in spite of activists protesting on-site a day earlier and organizing a nationwide online campaign against the demolition using the #SaveStJosephChurch hashtag.

Residents of some lower-class Muslim communities also complained of discrimination by upper-class Muslims. On September 9, gravediggers unearthed the remains of 13 members of the Mallah community originally buried in Sann, Sindh and dumped them outside the graveyard. They said that Syed Zafar Hyder Shah, an influential person from an upper caste family ordered them to remove the graves. The incident sparked criticism from civil society representatives who termed the act “a notorious caste-based prejudice” that did not allow lower-caste individuals to be buried in the graveyard of Muslims. Police filed an investigation into the case against Syed Zafar and those who assisted him but made no arrests by year’s end.

Most minority religious groups said they continued to face discrimination in government hiring. The Punjab government, under pressure from a group of Sunni clerics, transferred two Ahmadi local government officials out of Chakwal District on September 3. Dr. Waseem, a health department official, and Ayesha Kanwal, a shelter home official, were given three days to transfer and find work in other districts. According to religious minority activists, provincial governments also often failed to meet quotas for hiring religious minorities into the civil service. On September 28, the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the government’s failure to implement a 5 percent job quota for religious minorities at both the provincial and federal levels. In September, media reported that more than 30,000 government jobs reserved for minorities were vacant across the country.

Minority rights activists said most government employment advertisem*nts for janitorial staff continued to list being non-Muslim as a requirement. Minority rights activists criticized these advertisem*nts as discriminatory and insulting. For example, the Lahore Waste Management Company continued to employ mainly street sweepers who were Christians, which HRCP criticized as the result of employment advertisem*nts continuing to specify that religious minorities should apply. HRCP stated such advertisem*nts infringed on human dignity and violated the constitutional guarantee of equality of all citizens.

In July, the Punjab Public Service Commission published an advertisem*nt for 12 vacant positions in different departments. The advertisem*nt stated, “According to clause (5) of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance 1979, no person may be appointed an officer unless he is a Muslim.” Religious minority groups said the advertisem*nt was discriminatory because it singled out Muslims as the only persons eligible to be appointed to positions of leadership at the commission.

Representatives of religious minorities said a “glass ceiling” continued to prevent their promotion to senior government positions, but one NGO also stated that due to insufficient higher education opportunities compared to the majority religious community, few religious minorities met the qualifications to apply for these positions. There were no official obstacles to the advancement of minority religious group members in the military, and an NGO said a few Christian officers had become generals. Ahmadiyya officers, however, rarely rose above the rank of colonel and were not assigned to senior positions.

On September 7, all daily Urdu-language newspapers again published reports and articles to mark the 1974 amendment to the constitution that declared Ahmadis as non-Muslim, and to pay homage to the politicians and clerics who helped enact the amendment.

Government officials and politicians attended and spoke at multiple Khatm-e-Nabuwat (Finality of Prophethood) conferences held in major cities and at religious sites around the country. The groups that organized the conferences stated they were defending the teaching that Prophet Mohammed is the final prophet. Both secular and Ahmadi critics said the conferences were venues for hate speech against Ahmadi Muslims.

On September 7, the Jamiat-Ulema-I-Islami-Fazl (JUI-F) party held a large Khatm-e-Nabuwat conference in Peshawar, with party leaders and national and provincial parliamentarians in attendance. On October 14, Sufi Barelvi Mufti Muneeb ur Rehman hosted a larger conference in Peshawar that included political party leaders, national parliamentarians, and provincial lawmakers from multiple political parties. At the conference, JUI-F national leader Fazl ur Rehman and other JUI-F members attacked Pakistan’s national leaders for what they said was un-Islamic legislation on issues such as protecting Ahmadis and preventing forced conversion, and they vowed to resist international pressure to abolish blasphemy laws.

Human rights advocates and Ahmadiyya Muslim community members reported authorities took no action to prevent attacks on Ahmadi mosques or punish assailants who demolished, damaged, forcibly occupied, or set fire to Ahmadi mosques. In several instances, they said police participated in the attacks. Local authorities did not allow the repair or unsealing of Ahmadi mosques damaged or demolished by rioters in previous years.

On January 15, police in Nankana, Punjab Province constructed a boundary wall abutting the minarets of an Ahmadi mosque, damaging them in the process. Police then blocked access to part of the mosque, informing Ahmadi officials they were acting at the request of several local officials. On January 26, in Toba Tek Sing, Punjab, two police officers, including the local commanding officer and several local citizens, broke multiple gravestones in an Ahmadiyya cemetery. The group then moved to the mosque, where they ordered the Ahmadis present to remove the name of Allah from public display. When the Ahmadis refused, one of the local citizens forcibly removed the plaques featuring Allah’s name. On April 11, in Muzaffargarh District, Punjab, police officers and local citizens toppled the minarets of an Ahmadiyya mosque and removed Islamic scriptures from Ahmadi tombstones. The same police officers arrested five Ahmadis at the mosque on blasphemy charges. They were later released, but their cases remained pending at year’s end. Also in April, the Ahmadiyya community noted that unknown assailants removed sacred religious words posted on the outside of nine Ahmadi homes in a district in Punjab. On July 31, the Ahmadiyya community reported local police desecrated and demolished the minarets of an Ahmadi place of worship in a rural settlement near Faisalabad, Punjab. It was the third such incident in the district; Ahmadi places of worship were also vandalized on June 17 and 24. The Ahmadiyya Muslim community also reported the desecration of 15 Ahmadiyya places of worship and 100 graves during the year in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

In April, the Ahmadiyya community and witnesses at the scene reported a group of individuals aided by police destroyed the minarets and dome of an Ahmadi mosque located in Muzaffargarh District, Punjab because by law, members of the Ahmadiyya community may not call their houses of worship mosques or have identifying features of mosques on their houses of worship. Police did not arrest members of the crowd for damaging the building, but instead arrested two Ahmadi men who were worshipers at the mosque. The police did not register cases against the two men and released them shortly after. There was no further information available on this case at year’s end.

Community leaders continued to state the government did not take adequate action to protect its poorest citizens, including religious minorities, such as Christian and Hindu Dalits, from bonded labor practices. Hindu Dalits remained vulnerable to human rights violations and pressure by perpetrators to withdraw police cases.

Throughout the year, unidentified individuals assaulted and killed Christians, Ahmadis, Sikhs, Sunnis, Shia, and Hindus in attacks sources believed to be religiously motivated. The attackers’ relationship to organized terrorist groups was often unknown.

In an incident that drew significant international outcry, a mob of several hundred Muslim workers from a sportswear factory in Sialkot, Punjab attacked Priantha Kumara, a Sri Lankan and Christian manager of the factory on December 3. Media reported that the mob beat, stoned, and kicked him to death, then dragged his corpse to the street and set it on fire. In widely seen videos on social media, Kumara was seen pleading for his life before he was killed. Witnesses reported that while the mob’s actions were fueled by accusations of blasphemy, the incident began because of personal animosity between some factory employees and Kumara. The aggrieved factory workers allegedly incited the mob by accusing him of desecrating posters that contained written Islamic prayers. Police were called during the incident, but the small number who responded were far outnumbered by the crowd and media reported that police did not intervene. Punjab Inspector General of Police Rao Sardar Ali Khan told reporters a case would be submitted to an anti-terrorism court as soon as possible to bring the killers to justice. Prime Minister Khan said the attack was “horrific” and ordered a high-level inquiry. Media reported that police arrested more than 100 individuals after the attack. There were no further developments on this case before year’s end.

On February 11, a teenager shot and killed an Ahmadi homeopathic doctor, Abdul Qadir, in his clinic in Peshawar. Ahmadiyya community members stated Qadir was killed because of his faith. According to media reports, local residents overpowered the assailant at the scene and handed him over to the police, who opened an investigation. At year’s end, he remained in detention and his trial was underway in a court in Peshawar.

On September 2, four unidentified assailants shot and killed a British-Pakistani man retired from the Pakistani army, Maqsood Ahmad, who was an Ahmadiyya community member in Nankana Sahib, Punjab. Family members said he was shot as he was irrigating his farmland in Dharowal. The police launched a murder investigation, but as of year’s end, the victim’s killers had not been found.

On September 30, unknown attackers gunned down a Sikh man, Satnam Singh, in Peshawar. The police said the attackers escaped from the scene but lodged a case against the “unknown assailants.” ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack.

On March 25, six Sunni Muslims died and seven were injured when assailants opened fire on a passenger vehicle traveling from Gilgit to Naltar. The vehicle was traveling through a Shia-majority area. Police said the attack on the passenger van was retaliation for an earlier incident when Shia youth passing through Naltar Bala were ambushed and killed 18 months prior.

On August 19, three persons died, and 59 others were injured in a grenade attack on a Shia procession in Bahawalnagar, Punjab. It was the third sectarian strike in the area to occur in two months, including an attack on August 6 against a Shia worship site.

On March 24, media reported an unknown man attacked and killed Taqi Shah, a religious scholar from the Shia community in Jhang, Punjab over blasphemy allegations. The scholar had faced similar blasphemy charges in 2019. In March, police arrested a suspect, who subsequently confessed to killing Shah. There was no further information available on this case at year’s end.

On January 3, ISIS-K militants claimed responsibility for killing 11 coal miners belonging to the Hazara Shia community in Mach, Balochistan. Members of the Hazara Shia community in Quetta staged a protest against the government’s failure to protect the community in Balochistan. Human rights organizations criticized the Prime Minister for saying the Hazara protestors were “blackmailing” him by demanding he visit them in Balochistan to ensure justice for the victims. On January 6, Prime Minister Khan released a statement on social media against sectarian violence, stating the government was “taking steps to prevent such attacks in the future,” and traveled to Machh on January 9 to meet with families who lost loved ones in the attack.

The Hindu community in Sindh and Balochistan remained vulnerable to targeted killings and kidnappings for ransom. On May 31, unidentified assailants killed Ashok Kumar, a Hindu trader in Khuzdar, Balochistan after he reportedly refused to pay extortion money to criminals. This was the second Hindu trader since July 2020 to have been killed in Wadh for the same reason. Following the killing of Ashok Kumar, Baloch social media users urged the government to take steps to ensure security of religious minorities in Balochistan. In June, unidentified individuals distributed intimidating pamphlets outside of shops owned by Hindu traders in Khuzdar telling them not to allow female customers into their shops, or face consequences.

On February 25, unknown assailants killed Mahesh Kumar, a Hindu youth, and set his corpse on fire in Jacobabad, Sindh. The Hindu community protested and demanded police arrest the suspects. They reported police were slow to respond to the killing, while media failed to give appropriate coverage to the incident.

Civil society organizations and media said that armed sectarian groups connected to organizations banned by the government, including the TTP, and the once-banned anti-Shia group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, continued to perpetrate violence and other abuses against religious minorities. Groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United States and other governments, such as ISIS, also committed violent acts. Among the targets of these attacks were Shia Muslims, particularly the predominantly Shia Hazara community.

According to the SATP, there were five sectarian attacks by armed groups during 2021, compared with 10 sectarian attacks reported in 2020. Data on sectarian attacks varied because no standardized definition existed of what constituted a sectarian attack among reporting organizations. According to journalists, when reporting on attacks with a suspected sectarian motive, media often refrained from reporting the victim’s sectarian identity in an effort to avoid stoking tension among sectarian groups.

Sunni Muslim citizens levied multiple charges of blasphemy against members of the Shia community throughout the year. On August 19, police fired teargas shells and live rounds into the air in Hyderabad, Sindh to disperse a mob protesting because they believed a Shia man had committed blasphemy. The community pressured police to file a blasphemy case against the man. In another instance, on May 6, a group of Sunni religious leaders filed a blasphemy case against Shia scholar Allama Amjad Jauhari in Karachi for remarks they said insulted the companions of the Prophet Mohammed. The complainants said that Jauhari used derogatory language during one of his sermons at a Shia gathering; they requested the police take action against him. The next day police opened an investigation into Jauhari for alleged blasphemy. The investigation was ongoing at year’s end.

In its 2022 World Watch List report, which covered events in 2021, the international NGO Open Doors said that “Christians are considered second-class citizens and are discriminated against in every aspect of life” in the country. The report highlighted allegations that COVID-19 assistance was leveraged to try and get Christians to convert to Islam, that blasphemy laws continued to be used to target Christians with false allegations, and that Christian women and girls were targeted for kidnapping, forced marriage, and conversion to Islam.

Civil society activists and media reported young Christian and Hindu women being abducted and raped by Muslim men. Victims said their attackers singled them out as vulnerable due to their religious minority identity. According to the NGOs Center for Legal Aid, Assistance, and Settlement (CLAAS) and the Pakistan Center for Law and Justice, there were also reports of religious minority women being physically attacked by men.

Christian activists stated young women from their communities were also vulnerable to forced conversions. According to online Christian media sources, in June, a 30-year-old man was accused of kidnapping, forcibly converting to Islam, and forcibly marrying a Christian girl in Gujranwala District, Punjab. The media reports stated that while the girl’s parents told police and the courts that she was 13 years old, the girl herself told the court that she was 19. According to the police, two of the suspects were taken into custody, but the girl later appeared before a local court where she said that she left her house, converted to Islam, and married her husband willingly. Consequently, the court allowed the girl to go with her husband and ordered the police to drop the case. The girl’s father protested, stating his daughter was a minor, and that the court should not have accepted her statement declaring she willingly converted and married. On July 1, the Lahore High Court upheld the lower court’s ruling, allowing the girl to remain with her husband.

In September, media reported that a Muslim man kidnapped, raped, and attempted to kill an eight-year-old Christian girl by hitting her with a stone, and leaving her unconscious on the ground. Police later arrested the accused under anti-rape and domestic violence laws. There was no additional information available on this case at year’s end.

Members of civil society reported that converts from Islam lived in varying degrees of secrecy for fear of violent retribution from family members or society at large.

Representatives of the Kalash, an indigenous group in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, continued to report their youth were under pressure from Muslim schoolteachers and others to convert from their traditional beliefs.

Throughout the year, Islamic organizations with various political affiliations held conferences and rallies to support the doctrine of Khatm-e-Nabuwat. English and local-language media often covered the events that featured anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric which Ahmadiyya community representatives said could incite violence against Ahmadis. In addition to the large JUI-F conference and rallies, the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami held a large event in September in Peshawar; both parties criticized the national government for failing to enforce Islamic law. The TLP, banned under the National Counterterrorism Authority’s Schedule-I list until it was removed in November, also held smaller rallies.

On September 8, Aalmi Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm Nabuwwat, a Muslim missionary organization, organized a conference at Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore where speakers urged the government to “check un-Islamic and unconstitutional” activities of Ahmadis, ban them from proselytizing, and remove them from key official posts.

On October 8, JUI-F held Khatm-e-Nabuwat conferences in Multan where speakers, including JUI-F party chief Moulana Fazl ur Rehman, vowed to stop Ahmadis’ entry into high government posts.

Members of religious minority communities continued to report cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, and illegal confinement due to their faith. In September, media reported a group of Muslim landlords physically abused and held hostage a family from a Hindu community in Rahim Yar Khan, Punjab for obtaining water from a mosque tap and therefore “violating the sanctity” of the place of worship. According to media reports, Alam Ram Bheel, a farm worker, and his family were fetching drinking water after work when a group of local landlords and accomplices beat them and held them until Muslim neighbors negotiated their release.

On July 26, a video went viral showing a Muslim man forcing a Hindu laborer to mock Hindu deities in Mithi, Sindh. In the video, the individual was seen swearing at the Hindu man and forcing him to say “Allahu Akbar.” Police arrested the Muslim man and registered a blasphemy case against him on behalf of the state. The Hindu man and his family pardoned the Muslim man, and the case was dropped. The Muslim man publicly apologized for his act. Religious minority activists criticized this case, stating that persons charged with blasphemy were rarely pardoned.

In September, several religious groups from the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of Sunni Islam organized a series of rallies in Karachi to denounce Shia “defamation” of revered Sunni religious figures.

Ahmadis continued to report widespread societal harassment and discrimination against community members, including physical attacks, destruction of homes and personal property, and threats intended to force Ahmadis to abandon their jobs or towns.

There were also media reports of attacks on religious minorities’ holy places, cemeteries, and religious symbols. On August 17, police in Lahore arrested a member of the TLP for vandalizing a statue of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Sikh warrior who ruled over Punjab in the 19th century; the statute had been vandalized numerous times since its unveiling in 2019. In a video of the incident posted on social media, the TLP member shouted party slogans while pulling the statue apart, and onlookers immediately detained him. Both the Lahore police and Punjab Chief Minister Usman Buzdar called for the individual to be prosecuted. Following the TLP member’s arrest, a magisterial court in Lahore granted him bail, and his case was pending at year’s end.

During a January 5 Supreme Court hearing, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa officials reported the suspension of more than 90 police officers from duty and more than 109 arrests related to a December 2020 incident in which a group of villagers destroyed a historic Hindu temple. The court directed a local cleric responsible for inciting the protestors and those who assisted him to contribute money to assist in the temple’s restoration. The temple was rebuilt and on November 8, Supreme Court Chief Justice Gulzar Ahmed inaugurated it during the Hindu community’s Diwali celebration.

On July 24, a Muslim cleric in the village of Bhong, Punjab, filed blasphemy charges against an eight-year-old Hindu boy, claiming the boy had involuntarily urinated in a local mosque. In response, on August 4, hundreds of protestors vandalized a local Hindu temple, partially burning the building, destroying Hindu idols, and blocking a nearby highway for three hours. On August 7, Chief Justice Ahmed directed the Punjab police to arrest all involved in vandalizing and looting the temple. Police arrested 95 individuals, later freeing 10 while holding 85 in custody to face trial in anti-terrorism courts. The 85 were in custody at year’s end.

In May, a group of 200 Muslims attacked a Catholic church and 15 houses belonging to Christians in the village of Chak 5 in Punjab Province after a Muslim man accused boys cleaning the church of throwing dust on him. At least eight Christian community members suffered serious injury.

Christian religious freedom activists continued to report widespread discrimination against Christians in private employment. They said Christians continued to have difficulty finding jobs other than those involving menial labor, with some advertisem*nts for menial jobs specifying they were open only to Christian applicants.

Observers reported that English-language media continued to cover issues facing religious minorities in an objective manner, but vernacular print and broadcast media outlets continued to publish and broadcast anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Ahmadiyya Muslim community representatives stated that the Urdu-language press frequently printed hate speech in news stories and editorials, some of which could be considered as inciting anti-Ahmadi violence. Inflammatory anti-Ahmadi rhetoric continued to exist on social media and was at times spread by senior members of mainstream political parties. Community members stated clerics routinely delivered anti-Ahmadi sermons in mosques.

On September 7, all daily Urdu newspapers again published reports and articles to mark the 1974 amendment to the constitution which declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Leading Urdu newspapers also published editorials and articles paying homage to the politicians and clerics who helped enact the amendment.

Human rights and religious freedom activists and members of minority religious groups continued to report that they exercised caution and, occasionally, self-censorship when speaking in favor of religious tolerance because of a societal climate of intolerance and fear. Some activists reported receiving death threats because of their work.

The Charge d’Affaires, consuls general, other embassy officers, and visiting congressional delegations and senior U.S. officials, including the Deputy Secretary of State, engaged government officials and senior advisors to the Prime Minister, including officials from the Ministry of Law and Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, and Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony to discuss blasphemy law reform, laws concerning Ahmadi Muslims, the need to better protect members of religious minority communities, sectarian relations, and religious respect.

Embassy officers met with civil society leaders, experts, and journalists to collect information on religious freedom abuses not covered in the media, stress the need to protect the rights of religious minorities, and continue to support measures that decrease sectarian violence. They also met with representatives of other embassies, leaders of religious communities, NGOs, and legal experts working on religious freedom issues to discuss ways to increase respect among religious groups and enhance dialogue. The embassy and consulates highlighted the principles of religious freedom and examples of interfaith dialogue in the United States on their social media platforms throughout the year. On July 5, the American Muslim and Multifaith Women’s Empowerment Council, in collaboration with local interfaith leaders, convened U.S. and Pakistani faith leaders from the Hindu, Sikh, Parsi, Baha’i, Christian, and transgender communities in Karachi. In his opening remarks, the Consul General in Karachi expressed the U.S. commitment to support religious minority rights as a bulwark against intolerance and emphasized that religious freedom is integral to a vibrant democratic society.

The embassy and consulate general sponsored outreach activities such as speakers and workshops to promote peacebuilding among religious and community leaders. The embassy and consulates general in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar held several events to promote religious freedom. On October 28, the consulate general in Lahore arranged a webinar featuring a prominent scholar from the International Islamic University in Islamabad to promote tolerance and religious harmony. The consulate general also collaborated with Michigan State University to fund an exchange program for female Ulema religious scholars to deepen understanding and appreciation of diverse interfaith traditions.

An embassy-supported activity aimed at community resilience continued to implement small grants programs to engage diverse stakeholders including community and religious leaders, government officials, university administrators, youth, and women to identify and remove hateful materials and promote peace, tolerance, and acceptance among diverse communities in Karachi, northern Sindh, and southern Punjab. The embassy supported multiple activities engaging provincial ministers from Punjab and legislators from Punjab and Sindh Provinces to promote tolerance and diversity and mitigate religious intolerance. An embassy-supported project focused on increasing the individual capacity of religious leaders, elders, and youth from different religious backgrounds to promote interfaith peace and cohesion in their communities. These efforts aimed to address religious divisions by enhancing mutual understanding, integration, and collaboration among communities representing different religious schools and religious groups.

On November 15, the Secretary of State redesignated Pakistan as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended, for having engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom and issued a waiver of the sanctions that accompany the designation in the national interests of the United States.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12.1 million (midyear 2021). Other sources, including the Federal Government of Somalia, estimate the population to be at least 15.7 million. According to the Federal Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, more than 99 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. According to the World Atlas, members of other religious groups combined constitute less than 1 percent of the population and include a small Christian community of approximately 1,000, a small Sufi Muslim community, and an unknown number of Shia Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and those not affiliated with any religion.

The Somali Bantu population, the majority of whom are Muslim, largely inhabits the southern and central regions of the country near the Shabelle and Jubba Rivers. Some Somali Bantu also maintain traditional animist beliefs.

Legal Framework

The PFC provides for the right of individuals to practice their religion but prohibits the propagation of any religion other than Islam. It states all citizens, regardless of religion, have equal rights and duties before the law but establishes Islam as the state religion and requires laws to comply with sharia principles. While the PFC does not explicitly prohibit Muslims from converting to other religions, sharia has been interpreted to forbid conversion from Islam. No exemptions from application of sharia legal principles exist for non-Muslims under the law.

Somaliland’s constitution makes Islam the state religion, prohibits Muslims from converting, prohibits the propagation of any religion other than Islam, and stipulates all laws must comply with the general principles of sharia. Other administrations, including Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and South West State, have constitutions identifying Islam as the official religion. These constitutions stipulate all laws must comply with the general principles of sharia. Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West State do not have laws directly addressing religious freedom.

The national penal code generally remains valid in all regions of the country. It does not prohibit conversion from Islam to another religion, but it criminalizes blasphemy and “defamation of Islam,” which carry penalties of up to two years in prison. Given sharia’s role as the ostensible basis for national laws and the prohibition under Islamic jurisprudence for Muslims’ conversion to other religions, the relationship among sharia, the PFC, and the penal code remains unclear.

The PFC requires the President, but not other office holders, to be Muslim. The Somaliland constitution requires Somaliland’s President and candidates for Vice President and the House of Representatives to be Muslim.

The judiciary in most areas relies on xeer (traditional and customary law), sharia, and the penal code. Xeer is believed to predate Islamic and colonial traditions, and in many areas, elders will look to local precedents of xeer before examining relevant sharia references. Each area individually regulates and enforces religious expression, often inconsistently. In areas controlled by al-Shabaab, sharia is the only formally recognized legal system, although reports indicate that xeer is applied in some cases. The PFC recognizes xeer as a mechanism for dispute resolution. In 2017, the federal government adopted a traditional dispute resolution policy that mainstreams the application of xeer but limits its application to mediating “nonserious” crimes. The application of xeer to criminal matters is not standardized.

The Somaliland constitution prohibits the formation of political parties based on a particular religious group, religious beliefs, or interpretation of religious doctrine, while the PFC and the constitutions of other FMS administrations do not contain this prohibition.

The Federal Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs has legal authority to register religious groups. Guidance on how to register or what is required is inconsistent. The ministry has no ability to enforce such requirements outside of Mogadishu. Somaliland has no mechanism to register religious organizations and no specific requirements to register Islamic groups. Other FMS administrations have no mechanism to register religious organizations.

In Somaliland, religious schools and formal places of worship must obtain permission to operate from the Somaliland Ministry of Religion. Somaliland law does not articulate consequences for operating without permission. Other FMS administrations require formal places of worship and religious schools to obtain permission to operate from local authorities.

The Federal Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs is responsible for monitoring religious affairs and promoting religious tolerance between practitioners of Islam and members of minority religious groups. Specific responsibilities of the ministry include arranging affairs for Somali Hajj pilgrims and developing messaging to counter al-Shabaab ideology. It also has the mandate to regulate religious instruction throughout the country. The law requires Islamic instruction in all schools, public or private. Private schools have more flexibility in determining their curricula. These schools must request approval from the Federal Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education; however, requests are infrequent. Non-Muslim students attending public schools may request an exemption from Islamic instruction, but according to federal and FMS authorities, there have been no such requests.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

Government Practices

The federal government continued to confront multiple challenges, including a persistent threat from al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization that promotes extreme interpretations of Islamic doctrine, including through violence, a stalemate in relations with the FMS governments, and attempts by external actors to increase influence at the subnational level. Despite the government’s reported attempts to strengthen governance, reform key security institutions, and carry out operations to combat al-Shabaab, the terrorist group continued to carry out attacks regularly in the capital and to control areas throughout the southern part of the country.

Federal and FMS governments maintained bans on the propagation of religions other than Islam. The federal government reportedly continued not to strictly enforce the registration requirement for religious groups opening schools for lay or religious instruction.

According to several Christian advocacy groups working in the region, on January 25, Somaliland police in Hargeisa arrested six local residents on charges of offenses against the state religion (Islam) and inciting others to disobey laws relating to public order. Three of them were also charged with apostasy and with spreading and teaching Christianity. These groups stated that Somaliland authorities denied their lawyers access to their clients ahead of the trial. On August 5, a Hargeisa court dismissed all charges against the group and released them immediately.

The Federal Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education continued to implement its national curriculum framework, declaring that a secular education with a focus on Islamic values and instruction in Somali was important in order to counter efforts by the terrorist group al-Shabaab to impose a strict version of Islamic law. In February, parliament adopted the Education Act which harmonized the structure of the education system, including religious education. This includes Somali as the language of instruction for primary school, Islamic religious instruction at all levels, and Arabic-language Islamic religion courses beginning at the primary level. Muslim clerics approved the new materials and trained teachers in Islamic ethics, according to ministry representatives.

Al-Shabaab continued to use insurgency tactics against the government and its foreign partners, striking civilian and military targets repeatedly. On January 31, al-Shabaab carried out a car bomb attack on Mogadishu’s Afrik Hotel, killing five persons, including former defense minister General Mohamed Nur Galaal. On February 23, a suspected al-Shabaab member threw what was reported to be a suicide vest near a police station in Mogadishu’s Hamarweyne district, injuring three persons, including a police station commander. On July 21, the terrorist group targeted the international airport in Mogadishu with mortars, resulting in injuries to two UN contractors. On November 11, an al-Shabaab suicide bomber targeted an AMISOM convoy in Mogadishu, killing at least three civilians and wounding several others. On November 20, the group killed Abdiaziz Mohamud Guled, known professionally as “Afrika”, a journalist and director of state-owned Radio Mogadishu, and wounded Sharmarke Mohamed Warsame, director of state-owned Somali National Television, and a driver in a targeted attack.

The army, security forces, and AMISOM peacekeepers held most urban centers in the country, while al-Shabaab maintained control or influence over land areas. While the group’s territorial control was fluid, the United Nations said that during the year, the group retained its ability to conduct attacks in Mogadishu and recovered areas where the group had previously faced pressure from government-aligned forces, including in the Lower Shabelle region and in Galmudug. The group’s stated objective remained the imposition of a strict version of Islamic law in “greater Somalia.” Al-Shabaab continued to impose its own interpretation of Islamic practices and sharia on other Muslims and non-Muslims. According to UN reporting, as of July 31, the terrorist group publicly executed 19 civilians, including a woman, after self-appointed “courts” accused 18 of them of spying for foreign forces and one of murdering two civilians. On May 22, al-Shabaab amputated the right hand of a male civilian for theft in Middle Shabelle region.

Al-Shabaab forces targeted and killed federal and local government officials and their allies. Many attacks involved the use of improvised explosive devices against government-linked forces and buildings, as well as soft targets such as popular hotels and restaurants frequented by noncombatants in areas under government control. Throughout the year, the group continued its practice of conducting public executions of persons whom the group suspected of committing crimes, including witchcraft and spying on behalf of foreign powers.

Al-Shabaab extorted zakat (an Islamic annual compulsory giving of a set amount, typically 2.5 percent of one’s wealth, to benefit the poor) and sadaqa (a normally voluntary charitable contribution paid by Muslims) from persons throughout central and southern areas of the country. According to multiple sources, al-Shabaab’s collection of zakat, sadaqa, and other extortion generated tens of millions in revenue.

Al-Shabaab continued to threaten parents, teachers, and communities who failed to adhere to al-Shabaab’s precepts.

Al-Shabaab continued its campaign to characterize the AMISOM peacekeeping forces as “Christian crusaders” intent on invading and occupying the country.

According to humanitarian groups, al-Shabaab continued threatening to execute anyone suspected of converting to Christianity. In the areas it controlled, the group continued to ban cinemas, television, music, the internet, and watching sporting events. It prohibited the sale of khat (a popular stimulant plant), smoking, and other behavior it characterized as un-Islamic, such as shaving beards. It also enforced a requirement that women wear full veils. According to nongovernmental organizations and security experts, al-Shabaab continued to exploit federal government and FMS political infighting and ethnic clan rivalries for its own purposes, at times being seen as the only group that provided “justice,” however harsh, in places underserved or neglected by the government.

According to humanitarian groups, al-Shabaab continued to harass secular and faith-based humanitarian aid organizations, threatening the lives of their personnel and accusing them of seeking to convert individuals to Christianity. Compared with the same period in 2020, violence against aid workers decreased. From January to October, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Access Unit recorded at least 194 security incidents that directly affected humanitarian operations, including two aid workers killed, eight injured, 11 detained, and one abducted.

In areas under its control, al-Shabaab continued to mandate that schools teach a militant form of jihad emphasizing that students should wage war on those it deemed infidels, including in nearby countries, and against the federal government and AMISOM. In the Afgoye District of Lower Shabelle, al-Shabaab reportedly maintained boarding schools to indoctrinate youth from distinct clans and forced those clans to provide funding for the institutes dedicated to their youth.

ISIS Somalia functioned as a hub for funding, strategic guidance, and liaising among regional ISIS networks, according to terrorism experts. A small faction of Puntland-based ISIS fighters continued to carry out terrorist attacks with the objective of establishing an ISIS caliphate in the country. The UN Panel of Experts estimated the group’s strength was 340 in 2019 but had decreased since that time. The group had relatively free movement and recruited individuals from towns surrounding the Golis Mountains.

There reportedly continued to be strong societal pressure to adhere to Sunni Islamic traditions.

Conversion from Islam to another religion remained illegal in some areas and continued to be socially unacceptable in all, while individuals suspected of conversion and their families were reportedly subject to harassment from members of their local communities.

Christians and members of other non-Muslim religious groups continued to report an inability to practice their religion openly due to fear of societal harassment across most of the country. The small Christian community continued to keep a low profile with regard to religious beliefs and practices. Other non-Islamic groups likely also refrained from openly practicing their religion.

There continued to be no public places of worship for non-Muslims other than in the international airport compound.

The only Catholic church in Somaliland remained closed, and observers stated that its reopening would be controversial. The church was briefly reopened in 2017 but was closed again by authorities, under public pressure.

Private schools continued to be the main source of primary education. The majority offered religious instruction in Islam. Quranic schools remained key sources of early education for most children. The education system also includes Islamic institutes that run parallel to general primary education and general secondary education and that result in an Islamic education certificate. Externally funded madrassahs throughout the country provided inexpensive basic education, and many taught Salafist ideology, especially in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, according to observers.

Although reliable data was hard to obtain, especially in the rural areas, the majority of young children appeared to be enrolled in Quranic schools, which fell under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs and were typically managed by community-level organizations. According to government documents, parents remained the primary source of funding of all schooling in the country, but many Quranic schools received funding from external sources. The Federal Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education stated it was beginning to develop a preprimary curriculum, but general implementation, and particularly acceptance by Quranic schools, was unclear.

Travel by U.S. government officials remained limited to select areas in Mogadishu when security conditions permitted. U.S. government engagement to promote religious freedom focused on supporting the efforts of the government to bring stability and reestablish rule of law, in addition to advocating for freedom of speech and assembly. The embassy engaged with officials and opposition figures to dissuade the use of religion to threaten those with differing political or religious perspectives.

Embassy programs targeted socially marginalized individuals in areas where al-Shabaab maintained territorial control and continued to exert influence. They also focused on creating alternatives to al-Shabaab-administered sharia courts and justice systems.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 62.1 million (midyear 2021). A 2020 Pew Forum survey estimates approximately 63 percent of the population identifies as Christian, 34 percent as Muslim, and 5 percent practice other religions. According to the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Christians are approximately evenly divided between Roman Catholics and Protestant denominations. Other local observers believe that Roman Catholics constitute the majority of Christians, with Lutherans as the second largest denomination. Additional Christian groups include Anglicans, Pentecostal Christian groups, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The majority of Muslims are Sunni, although significant minority communities exist, including Ismaili, Twelver Shia, Ahmadi, and Ibadi Muslims. On the mainland, large Muslim communities are concentrated in coastal areas, with some Muslim minorities located inland in urban areas. Other groups include Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, animists, and those who did not express a religious preference. A separate 2010 Pew Forum report estimates more than half the population practices elements of African traditional religions.

Zanzibar’s 1.3 million residents are 99 percent Muslim, according to a U.S. government estimate. According to a 2012 Pew Forum report, two-thirds are Sunni. The remainder consists of several Shia groups, mostly of Asian descent.

Legal Framework

The constitutions of the union government (United Republic of Tanzania) and of the semiautonomous government in Zanzibar both provide for equality regardless of religion, prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, and stipulate freedom of conscience or faith and choice in matters of religion, including the freedom to change one’s faith. The union government constitution allows these rights to be limited by law for purposes such as protecting the rights of others; promoting the national interest; and safeguarding defense, safety, peace, morality, and health. The Zanzibar constitution allows rights to be limited by law if such a limitation is “necessary and agreeable in the democratic system” and does not limit the “foundation” of a constitutional right or bring “more harm” to society.

Since independence and by tradition, the country has been governed by alternating Christian and Muslim Presidents who have, by tradition, appointed a Prime Minister from the other religious group with the endorsem*nt of parliament.

The law prohibits religious groups from registering as political parties. To register as a political party, a group may not use religion as a basis for approving membership, nor may it follow a policy of promoting a religion.

The law prohibits a person from taking any action or making any statement with the intent of insulting the religious beliefs of another person. Anyone committing such an offense may be punished with a year’s imprisonment.

On the mainland, secular laws govern Christians and Muslims in both criminal and civil cases. In family-related cases involving inheritance, marriage, divorce, and the adoption of minors, the law also recognizes customary practices, which could include religious practices. In such cases, some Muslims choose to consult religious leaders in lieu of bringing a court case.

Zanzibar, while also subject to the union constitution, has its own President, court system, and legislature. Muslims in Zanzibar have the option of bringing cases to a civil or qadi (Islamic court or judge) court for matters of divorce, child custody, inheritance, and other issues covered by Islamic law. All cases tried in Zanzibar courts, except those involving Zanzibari constitutional matters and sharia, may be appealed to the Union Court of Appeals on the mainland. Decisions of Zanzibar’s qadi courts may be appealed to a special court consisting of the Zanzibar chief justice and five other sheikhs. The President of Zanzibar appoints the chief qadi, who oversees the qadi courts and is recognized as the senior Islamic scholar responsible for interpreting the Quran. There are no qadi courts on the mainland.

Religious groups must register with the Registrar of Societies at the Ministry of Home Affairs on the mainland and with the Office of the Registrar General on Zanzibar. Registration is required by law on both the mainland and in Zanzibar. The fines for offenses under the Societies Act, including operating without registration, range from one million to 10 million shillings ($430-$4,300).

To register, a religious group must provide the names of at least 10 members, a written constitution, resumes of its leaders, and a letter of recommendation from the district commissioner. Such groups may then list individual congregations, which do not need separate registration. Muslim groups registering on the mainland must provide a letter of approval from the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA). Muslim groups registering in Zanzibar must provide a letter of approval from the mufti, the government’s official liaison to the Muslim community. Christian groups in Zanzibar may register directly with the registrar general.

On the mainland, BAKWATA elects the mufti. On Zanzibar, the President of Zanzibar appoints the Mufti, who serves as a leader of the Muslim community and as a public servant assisting with local governmental affairs. The Mufti of Zanzibar nominally approves all Islamic activities and supervises all mosques on Zanzibar. The Mufti also approves religious lectures by visiting Islamic clergy and supervises the importation of Islamic literature from outside Zanzibar.

Public schools may teach religion, but it is not a part of the official national curriculum. School administrations or parent-teacher associations must approve such classes, which are taught on an occasional basis by parents or volunteers. Public school registration forms must specify a child’s religious affiliation so that administrators can assign students to the appropriate religion class if one is offered. Students may also choose to opt out of religious studies. Private schools may teach religion, although it is not required, and these schools generally follow the national educational curriculum unless they receive a waiver from the Ministry of Education for a separate curriculum. In public schools, students are allowed to wear the hijab but not the niqab.

The government does not designate religious affiliation on passports or records of vital statistics. Police reports must state religious affiliation if an individual will be required to provide sworn testimony. Applications for medical care must specify religious affiliation so that any specific religious customs may be observed. The law requires the government to record the religious affiliation of every prisoner and to provide facilities for worship for prisoners.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Following the unexpected death of President John Magufuli in March, Vice President Samia Hassan assumed the presidency. In a break with the country’s long-standing tradition of presidents appointing Prime Ministers of the other religious group, Hassan, who is a Muslim, opted to maintain the then-sitting Prime Minister, Kassim Majaliwa, also a Muslim.

On June 16, the Director of Public Prosecution dropped charges against 34 of the 40 members of the Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation (UAMSHO), an Islamist group advocating for Zanzibar’s full autonomy, who had been in custody on the mainland following their arrests in 2013 on terrorism charges. On June 9, the Office of the Mufti of Zanzibar had urged Zanzibar President Hussein Mwinyi to speed up the case against UAMSHO members, citing their almost eight-year detention. At year’s end, six clerics who were included among the 34 UAMSHO members remained in prison due to additional nonterrorism-related charges.

On August 10, the Office of the Registrar of Societies issued a new directive changing the status of all religious institutions and community faith-based organizations registered under the Ministry of Home Affairs to time-based registration from permanent registration. The government subsequently agreed to exclude churches, mosques, and other places of worship from the directive, but not faith-based organizations such as church-affiliated groups. By year’s end, there had been no reports of religious associations or faith-based organizations being deregistered under this directive. The directive also stated that time-based registration would be valid for five years, requiring all societies and organizations to reregister with the registrar every five years with supporting documentation. All previously registered societies, including faith-based organizations, were required to undergo a new registration to receive a five-year registration certificate. All associations and organizations were granted a grace period of 90 days to implement and adopt the changes as required by the registrar, who said failure to reregister would result in deregistration. On August 16, Societies Registrar Emmanuel Kihampa stated that reregistration would enable the government to evaluate active societies and their compliance with registration conditions and legal requirements according to the law. According to religious and civil society organizations, the reregistration process would affect long-term planning and projects, as well as intimidate organizations deemed to be too critical of the government or ruling party. Independent Tanzanian political analyst Buberwa Kaiza said the change violated human rights, especially for religious organizations, by leaving the existence of faith-based entities to be determined by a single registrar. Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) secretary-general Charles Kitima, representing the Catholic Church, stated that while the government was obligated to provide guidelines on registering organizations, it should have been a participatory process with stakeholders and religious leaders to discuss the directive’s potential impact.

On July 25, police in Mbeya Region instructed Catholic Church staff and security guards at Mwanjelwa Parish to deny access to the church building to women dressed in Chadema opposition party colors. Police stated that the Church did not allow political-themed apparel. This followed the July 21 arrest of Chadema chairman Freeman Mbowe on terrorism charges. After the incident was recorded and posted online, TEC Secretary-General Kitima clarified that the Church does not have a dress code for worshippers, just for Church leaders. On August 15, 22 Chadema members were arrested outside of Bugando Catholic Church in Mwanza Region, where members went to pray for the release of Mbowe. Acting Regional Police Commander Gideon Msuya confirmed the arrests, stating that Chadema members were disturbing prayer services, which government officials were attending.

On September 11, following a bilateral meeting between the Tanzanian Police Force and Rwanda National Police in Kigali focused on enhancing cooperation against cross-border terrorism, IGP Sirro directed the police to review Quranic and Bible studies in madrassahs and church-affiliated schools. He stated that the police force would begin inspecting houses of worship to verify whether religious training was “building or demolishing” children, questioning if the training “provided for terrorism, or if it is training for the destruction of the country.” On September 12, Sheikh Issa Ponda, secretary of the Council of Imams and an outspoken government critic, held a meeting with other imams to discuss Sirro’s statements, stating that the directive was contrary to freedom of religion and pledging to meet with bishops to coordinate joint measures to address potential interference in religious education.

On October 2, during the inauguration of a local mosque in Rufiji District in Pwani Region, Prime Minister Majaliwa commended the Istiqaama community – an Ibadi Islam organization – for its efforts to strengthen unity between Muslims and persons of other faiths. In his remarks, he urged religious leaders to refrain from using houses of worship as political platforms and instead continue working closely with the government to build a respectful and peaceful country. Prime Minister Majaliwa said the government would continue working with all religious institutions to ensure social and spiritual projects were well implemented. He said that faith leaders should comply with government guidelines to build a “God-fearing” nation with a strong spiritual and moral foundation. Sheikh Badar bin Sood, chairman of the Istiqaama community Board of Trustees, commended President Hassan’s government, which he said promoted solidarity and unity among all citizens.

According to some religious leaders, the government penalized prominent religious leaders for expressing views it deemed political and inflammatory. On August 17, the government ordered the arrest of Bishop Josephat Gwajima, Member of Parliament and Pentecostal pastor, for misrepresentation of government efforts to combat the spread of COVID-19. While addressing worshippers at his church in Dar es Salaam, Gwajima opposed the government’s acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines and urged all persons to refuse them.

Other prominent religious leaders voiced support for government COVID-19 prevention efforts and social distancing measures in their establishments. On September 2, religious leaders, high-profile soccer players, and government officials organized a soccer match in Dar es Salaam encouraging fans to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Chief Mufti of Tanzania Sheikh Abubakar Zubeir encouraged all citizens to accept the vaccine and continue taking precautions recommended by the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly, and Children. The government and religious groups cooperated to establish and adhere to COVID-19 guidelines.

On September 28, President Hassan called on religious leaders to help create public awareness on the importance of COVID-19 vaccinations as the government intensified measures against the pandemic. The President issued the call during an event marking the 50th anniversary of the Anglican Church in Dodoma Region, stating that religious leaders had a crucial role to play in sensitizing their communities to the effectiveness of vaccines. Some religious leaders expressed their readiness and commitment to honor the president’s request. Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania and Chairman of the Christian Council of Tanzania Fredrick Shoo stated he would continue to educate his followers through preaching. According to observers, religious leaders of various faiths were at the forefront of the awareness campaign to encourage their followers to be vaccinated as a way of reducing the number of COVID-19-related deaths.

On June 25, President Hassan met with TEC religious leaders to acknowledge the Catholic Church’s contributions to development efforts in the areas of health, education, and water and sanitation. Hassan applauded the Church for providing services without discrimination based on religious affiliation, and for converting some Catholic universities into technical colleges to advance vocational education opportunities. She also encouraged cooperation between the Church and the private sector, suggesting that they could work together to decrease unemployment and reduce poverty in the country. TEC president Archbishop Gervas Nyaisonga told President Hassan that taxes imposed on religious institutions providing social services adversely impacted the provision of services to the public. The President said that all religious institutions should increase transparency and trust in order that the Tanzanian Revenue Authority could fairly conclude whether services provided by faith-based organizations were for or not for profit. On September 28, the President announced that authorities were reevaluating activities by religious institutions, including faith-based organizations, to better determine reasonable tax obligations and award tax exemptions on not-for-profit activities.

On June 20, President Hassan awarded a certificate of recognition to Catholic Archbishop emeritus of Dar es Salaam Cardinal Polycarp Pengo for fostering peace, unity, and relationships among different faiths. The President expressed gratitude and pledged that the government would continue supporting the Catholic Church’s peace and tolerance initiatives. The President also donated to Cardinal Pengo’s initiative to build a church in the Diocese of Morogoro. According to media reports, this was a gesture to illustrate religious tolerance.

On September 20, 10-15 suspected members of the Islamic State in Mozambique (ISIS-M) crossed into the country from Mozambique and attacked Mahurunga village in Mtwara Region. Sources reported that attackers killed at least two villagers, looted homes and shops, and abducted several villagers and forced them to carry stolen goods across the border to Mozambique. Witnesses said the attackers were “al-Shabab from Mozambique.” (Local residents and fighters frequently refer to ISIS-M as “al-Shabab,” although the group has no known connection with the Somalia-based terrorist group.) On September 23, local media reported that ISIS-M brought the victims across the border to Quissengue, Palma District in Cabo Delgado Province, where they decapitated at least four men and released the women. Sources reported that the attackers asked the hostages if they could recite the Quran, and if they were unable to, they were killed. According to counterterrorism experts, the attack in Mahurunga was the first ISIS-M incursion inside the country during the year and the first since Tanzanian troops landed in Mozambique as part of the Southern African Development Community’s mission to Mozambique. Analysts stated that the attack closely resembled the attacks in Mtwara in 2020, during which ISIS-M looted and burned homes, killed villagers, and kidnapped others.

On August 25, police shot and killed Hamza Mohammed after Mohammed killed three police officers and a security guard in the diplomatic quarter of Dar es Salaam. According to Director of Criminal Investigations Camilius Wambura, Mohammed had accessed extremist content from social media pages depicting terror acts by al-Shabab and ISIS. Wambura stated that during the investigation, police discovered that Mohammed was “a type of terrorist who is ready to die for his religion,” although he did not specify which religion. In several other comments, IGP Sirro speculated the attack was linked to ISIS-M. Head of Police Operations Liberatus Sabas, however, told reporters the incident was not terror related.

Although the government outlawed witchcraft in 2015, a press release from Under the Same Sun – a Christian organization advocating for the rights of persons with albinism – stated it was likely that witchcraft-related killings continued throughout the country. On May 3, a five- or six-year-old boy with albinism was found dead, his body mutilated, in Uyui District of Tabora Region. Witnesses stated the body was found with severed arms and organs harvested and said they were likely sold to witch doctors. No persons were arrested in relation to the incident and the boy was not identified.

The Ambassador met with religious leaders regarding vaccine hesitancy in Tanzania. The meeting included a discussion about the potential effects of vaccination and public awareness issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 44.7 million (midyear 2021). According to the most recent census, conducted in 2014, 82 percent of the population is Christian. The largest Christian group is Roman Catholic at 39 percent; 32 percent of the population is Anglican, and 11 percent is Pentecostal Christian. The census reports Muslims constitute 14 percent of the population. The UMSC states that Muslims (primarily Sunni) are closer to 35 percent of the population. There is also a small number of Shia Muslims, mostly in Kampala and the eastern part of the country, particularly in the Mayuge and Bugiri Districts. Other religious groups, which collectively constitute less than 5 percent of the population, include Seventh-day Adventists, adherents of indigenous beliefs, Baptists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Orthodox Christians, Hindus, Jews, Baha’is, and those with no religious affiliation.

According to the Indian Association in Uganda, the largest non-African ethnic population is of Indian origin or descent, most of whom are Hindu. The Jewish community of approximately 2,000 members is mainly concentrated in Mbale Town, in the eastern region of the country. Generally, religious groups are dispersed evenly across the country, although there are large concentrations of Muslims in the eastern and northwestern parts of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and establishes there shall be no state religion. It provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief and the right to practice and promote any religion, as well as to belong to and participate in the practices of any religious body or organization in a manner consistent with the constitution. The constitution also stipulates the government may limit these rights by measures that are “reasonably justifiable for dealing with a state of emergency.” The constitution prohibits the creation of political parties based on religion.

The penal code criminalizes “disturbance of religious gatherings” and “wounding religious feelings.”

The country’s coat of arms bears the motto “For God and My Country.” The law prohibits secular broadcasters from stating opinions on religious doctrine or faith. The law also prohibits radio and television stations from broadcasting advertisem*nts that “promote psychic practices or practices related to the occult,” material that encourages persons to change their faith, and content that uses or contains blasphemy, which is not defined by law. The government, however, seldom enforces these provisions of the law.

The government requires religious groups to register to obtain legal entity status. The government also requires religious groups to register with the Uganda Registration Services Bureau and then to secure a five-year operating license from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The bureau requires faith-based organizations to provide a copy of a land title or proof of ownership of premises; a copy of the board resolution to start a faith-based organization; a copy of the memorandum and articles of association spelling out what the organization intends to do; allotment of shareholding; and copies of the national identity cards of the directors. The government does not require the larger and more historically established religious groups – including Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, Seventh-day Adventist groups and the UMSC – to obtain operating licenses.

The law exempts registered religious groups and their nonprofit activities from direct taxation.

Religious instruction in public schools is optional at the postprimary level. Primary schools must teach either Christianity, Islam, or both in their social studies classes. Many schools teach both and allow students to select which to attend. Secondary schools may choose which, if any, religious studies to incorporate into their curricula, and students who choose to attend that school must take the course offered. Primary school students may choose to answer questions about either Islam or Christianity during the religion portion of the national social studies exams. The state has separate curricula for world religions, including Christianity and Islam, and all schools must adhere to the state-approved curriculum for each religion they choose to teach. The majority of students in the country attend schools run by religious organizations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Muslim community accused security officials of extrajudicial killings of some Muslims and Muslim clerics suspected of involvement in radicalism and terrorism. On November 26, Muslim advocacy groups petitioned the Uganda Human Rights Commission “to open and conduct investigations, hear, make orders, and issue a report about the alleged extrajudicial killings by security agencies” of 12 Muslim terror suspects, including one cleric. In a televised address on November 20 following two suicide bombings in Kampala on November 16, President Museveni announced that officers from the military intelligence and crime intelligence units had killed 12 terror suspects as they tried to resist arrest. Muslim advocacy groups, however, reported that security agencies had already subdued the suspects before shooting them. On November 28, the patron of the Kibuli Muslim community, Prince Kassim Nakibinge, called upon the security agencies to avoid profiling Muslims when investigating terrorism cases and called upon them to prosecute all suspects in courts of law. The UMSC and Muslim civil society organizations also called upon authorities to lawfully provide fair and speedy trials for Muslims, stating the government’s failure to successfully prosecute Muslims it arrested for murder or terror-related charges and held for long periods of pretrial detention created the impression that it was biased and discriminated against the Muslim community.

Some Muslims complained that security agencies unfairly singled out Muslims while enforcing security and antiterrorism measures. On November 30, a police officer at Kyambogo University in Kampala stripped a female Muslim student of her veil before she could enter a room to take her exams. Police and the university issued apologies and promised to reprimand the officer in question.

On August 20, the government suspended 54 NGOs, including some faith-based aid groups, for failure to comply with registration requirements. The suspended organizations included the Islamic Da-awah and Orphanage Foundation, the St. Francis Foundation for the Poor, Jesus Shines Youth Ministries International, and Rays of Hope for Uganda. Pastor Michael Kyazze, the founder of Omega Healing Center in Kampala, stated, “The registration process requires NGOs to go through security agencies, such as the Internal Security Organization, to vet them.”

Members of the ruling NRM party accused some Roman Catholic priests serving in remote parishes in the central region of subtly telling their congregations to vote for the main opposition candidate in the January 14 general elections. Some members of the opposition’s National Unity Platform and Forum for Democratic Change parties also accused some Anglican Church of Uganda and evangelical clerics in the north of the country and in Kampala of using their sermons to campaign for the NRM. The churches and clerics denied the allegations. Observers noted that each of the major political parties accused at least one religious group of supporting its opponent.

On June 6, the government suspended all public gatherings until September 22 as part of its countermeasures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Some religious leaders said the government’s actions infringed on their religious freedom. On August 4, evangelical Protestant minister Wisdom Peter Katumba and Muslim cleric Imam Muhammed Bbale filed a suit in the High Court against the government, seeking to declare the suspensions illegal, since some commercial enterprises remained open; the UMSC was not a party to the suit. The petitioners’ suit argued that the suspensions were “unjust, arbitrary, disproportionate, discriminatory, unjustifiable, and constitute a violation of the applicants’ rights to practice, manifest, enjoy, profess, maintain and promote their religion.” The High Court had not ruled on the suit by year’s end. In October, UMSC representatives reported that prior to the suspensions, the government consulted the IRCU. Based on the consultations and after witnessing COVID-19-related deaths of many religious followers, the UMSC stated it agreed with the government’s measures to curb COVID-19 and said the government implemented the suspensions equitably, without prejudice against religious groups.

On September 26, the Seventh-day Adventist Church of Uganda complained to Prime Minister Nabbanja regarding a plan that it said the Ministry of Education and Sports had proposed requiring students to attend classes on Saturdays (Adventist Sabbath), to replace instruction time lost to COVID-19-related school closures. The Church said the proposal “directly violated freedom of worship and freedom of conscience and the rights to education for the Adventist citizens.” According to local media, the Prime Minister in a meeting told the Adventist Church to ignore the Ministry of Education and Sports’ proposal because the cabinet had not yet approved it. During the meeting, the Church also petitioned the Prime Minister to halt the practice of public universities scheduling examinations on Saturdays.

In October, UMSC representatives reported that although President Museveni increased the number of Muslims in the cabinet from four to six 81 ministerial or junior ministerial positions, the government continued to use census figures that they said undercounted Muslims as a justification for underrepresentation of Muslims in government employment and limited access to government-facilitated social programs. In a December 31 address, President Museveni refuted criticisms that his government discriminated against Muslims, although he acknowledged a delay in the operationalization of Islamic banking. He noted that his government was providing interest-free start-up capital to Ugandans, including Muslims, as well as free vocational programs and agricultural subsidies.

In October, UMSC representatives reported that some elite Christian high schools limited the number of qualified Muslim students for admission, often admitting as few as five out of more than 100 applicants.

The UMYDF reported that some Muslims experienced discrimination in employment. According to the UMYDF, a telecom company dismissed a Muslim staffer who defied an instruction not to wear her veil at work. The UMYDF also reported that a church in Kampala dismissed a plumbing contractor upon realizing that he was a Muslim.

Users of social media made religiously intolerant and inflammatory statements. In August and October, Twitter users trolled and referred to evangelical minister Prophet Elvis Mbonye as a “false prophet” after Mbonye recorded a sermon in which he prophesied that the country’s lockdown restrictions to combat COVID-19, including on religious congregations, would soon end. In response, some Twitter users attacked his congregation as “lacking brains” for believing his preaching.

In January, the IRCU sent delegations from each faith community among its membership to travel to six towns in the eastern, northern, western, and central regions for peacebuilding and tolerance exercises with local officials, administrative officials, media, and civil society. On January 13, the IRCU called for a peaceful election, instructing its national, regional, and district-level committees to encourage tolerance, peace, and stability.

Embassy representatives regularly discussed religious freedom issues with government officials. The Ambassador met on several occasions with President Museveni and emphasized the government’s obligations to respect the rights of all persons, regardless of religious affiliation. In January, the Ambassador met with the IRCU to discuss the group’s efforts to expand peace-building initiatives around the country in advance of the January 14 elections. At the start of Ramadan on April 13, the Ambassador used the embassy’s social media platforms to promote religious tolerance, charity, and unity. Embassy representatives also met with local government officials in the eastern part of the country to promote religious tolerance.

Embassy representatives regularly engaged with religious leaders. Embassy representatives also met with the UMSC and the Kibuli Order of the Supreme Mufti (both Sunni umbrella organizations), Nadwa (a coalition of Muslim scholars), the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church of Uganda, and the Tabliq Sunni community to promote religious tolerance, education, and peacebuilding in the country.

The embassy used social media to publicize continued U.S. engagement and cooperation with the Muslim community. The embassy used social media to communicate seasonal greetings for both the Easter and Christmas holidays.

The constitution protects freedom of religion and provides for “the separation of church and religious organizations from the state.” By law, the objective of domestic religious policy is to foster the creation of a tolerant society and provide for freedom of conscience and worship. A new law, adopted by parliament in September, defines the concept of antisemitism and reaffirms that crimes motivated by antisemitism are punishable in accordance with the law. Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to report attacks on their followers that went unpunished and detentions of members, reportedly for draft evasion. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, amendments to a law on military duty and service passed in April provided no possibility of an exemption from military reserve service until the end of the “special period” (i.e., while hostilities with Russia-led forces continue in parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts), even for conscientious objectors. Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to call on the government to implement four 2020 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decisions to ensure effective investigation of hate crimes committed against the group and its places of worship between 2009-13 and to prosecute the perpetrators of those religiously motivated attacks. During the year, the government paid compensation awarded by the ECHR to some, but not all, of the Jehovah’s Witnesses whom the ECHR found to be victims of hate crimes. In March, following an appeal by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine concerning the State Migration Service and the police practice of profiling worshipers at one of Kyiv’s largest mosques during Friday prayers in 2020, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said it would adhere to recommendations by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance to reduce or eliminate criminal profiling. Members of multiple religious groups welcomed a law on military chaplaincy, adopted by the parliament in November, that defined selection criteria for clergy to become chaplains. According to the International Center for Law and Religious Studies, the government at times continued to try to balance tensions between the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) – granted autocephaly by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in 2019, but not recognized by the Patriarch of Moscow – and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which competed for members and congregations. According to the Orthodox Times and other media, the Russian government continued to use a disinformation campaign to fuel further discord between the two churches. Local authorities in Lviv continued to allow a local developer to construct a private medical clinic on the grounds of an historical Jewish cemetery despite an August 2020 stop-work order from the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy. According to observers, government investigations and prosecutions of vandalism of religious sites continued to be generally inconclusive, although the government condemned attacks and police arrested perpetrators.

Media sources, religious freedom activists, the OCU, Muslims, Protestant churches, and Jehovah’s Witnesses stated that Russia-backed “authorities” in the Russia-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts continued to exert pressure on minority religious groups. In the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”), “authorities” continued their ban of Jehovah’s Witnesses as an “extremist” organization, while the “Supreme Court” in the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) upheld a similar ban. Russia-backed “authorities” in the “DPR” and “LPR” continued to implement “laws” requiring all religious organizations except the UOC-MP to undergo “state religious expert evaluations” and reregister with them. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), most religious groups recognized under Ukrainian law continued to be unable to reregister because of stringent legal requirements under Russian law preventing or discouraging reregistration. Many religious groups continued to refuse to reregister because they did not recognize the Russia-installed “authorities” in Donetsk and Luhansk. In its oral update on Ukraine in October, the OHCHR also highlighted that the self-proclaimed “republics” continued to restrict freedom of religion, in particular of evangelical Christian denominations. All but one mosque remained closed in Russia-controlled Donetsk. Russia-led forces continued to use religious buildings of minority religious groups, including those of Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as military facilities.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the UOC-MP continued to label the OCU a “schismatic” group and continued to urge other Orthodox churches not to recognize the OCU. UOC-MP and OCU representatives continued to contest some parish registrations as not reflecting the true will of their congregations. UOC-MP leaders continued to accuse the OCU of seizing churches belonging to the UOC-MP; the OCU responded that parishioners, rather than the OCU, had initiated the transfers of affiliation. The independent National Minorities Rights Monitoring Group (NMRMG) reported three documented violent acts of antisemitism, compared with four in 2020. During Hanukkah (November 28-December 6), individuals vandalized several public menorahs in different cities, prompting condemnations from Jewish leaders, some of whom stating that the widespread vandalism must have been orchestrated. There were again reports of vandalism of Christian monuments; Holocaust memorials, synagogues, and Jewish cemeteries; and Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Kingdom Halls. Church ownership disputes between UOC-MP and OCU members in Zadubrivka village, Chernivtsi Oblast, and in some other villages and cities continued. UOC-MP-affiliated media reported perpetrators attacked a man due to his church affiliation; OCU-affiliated media, however, citing the police report, stated the drunken teenage perpetrators were not religiously motivated. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO) and the All-Ukrainian Council of Religious Associations (AUCRA) continued to promote interfaith dialogue and respect for religious diversity.

U.S. embassy officials, including the Charge d’Affaires, engaged with officials of the Office of the President, ministry officials, members of parliament, and municipal governments to discuss the importance of fair and transparent treatment of religious groups, preservation of religious heritage sites, support for religious minorities, and combating manifestations of antisemitism. Embassy officials continued to urge government and religious leaders to practice tolerance, restraint, and mutual understanding to ensure respect for all individuals’ religious freedom and preferences. Embassy officials also continued to encourage religious groups to resolve property disputes peacefully and through dialogue with government officials, in particular a dispute regarding ongoing construction of parts of the Krakivskyy Market on the site of the Lviv Old Jewish Cemetery. Embassy officials continued to meet with internally displaced Muslims and other religious minorities from Crimea to discuss their continuing inability to practice their religion freely in Russia-occupied Crimea. In May, the U.S. Secretary of State met with OCU leadership to discuss pressure on the OCU in Crimea and occupied territories of eastern Ukraine.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 43.7 million (midyear 2021). According to the annual November national survey conducted by the Razumkov Center, an independent public policy think tank, 60.0 percent of respondents identify as Christian Orthodox, compared with 62.3 percent in 2020; 8.8 percent Greek Catholic (Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, UGCC), compared with 9.6 percent in 2020; 1.5 percent Protestant, the same as in 2020; 0.8 percent Roman Catholic, compared with 1.8 percent in 2020; 0.1 Jewish, the same as in 2020; and 0.2 percent Muslim, compared with under 0.5 percent in 2020. The survey found another 8.5 percent identify as “simply a Christian,” while 18.8 percent state they do not belong to any religious group, compared with 8.9 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively, in 2020. Small numbers of Buddhists, pagans (following traditional pre-Christian polytheistic beliefs, including animism), followers of other religions, and individuals choosing not to disclose their beliefs constitute the remainder of the respondents. According to the same survey, groups included in the 60.0 percent who identify as Christian Orthodox are as follows: 24.4 percent as members of the OCU, compared with 18.6 percent in 2020; 12.1 percent the UOC-MP, compared with 13.6 percent in 2020; 2.7 percent Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), compared with 2.3 percent in 2020; 19.8 percent “simply” an Orthodox believer,” compared with 32.7 percent in 2020; and 1.1 percent undecided, compared with 0.7 percent in 2020. According to the same poll, most of the self-identified OCU followers are in the western, central, and eastern parts of the country. UOC-MP followers were evenly dispersed throughout the country with a slightly higher concentration in the eastern part of the country. Most of the “just Orthodox” respondents live in the eastern, southern, and central parts of the country. Followers of the UGCC reside primarily in the western oblasts. Most Roman Catholic Church (RCC) followers are in the western and southern oblasts.

According to government statistics, followers of the UGCC reside primarily in the western oblasts of Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk. Most RCC congregations are in Lviv, Khmelnytskyy, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsya, Zakarpattya, and Ternopil Oblasts, in the western part of the country. According to the government’s estimate as of January 1, most OCU congregations (formed by the merger of the UOC-KP, Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and part of the UOC-MP) are in the central and western parts of the country, except for Zakarpattya Oblast. Most UOC-MP congregations are also in the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Odesa Oblasts, and in the central and western parts of the country, excluding Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil Oblasts.

The Evangelical Baptist Union of Ukraine is the largest Protestant community. Other Christian groups include Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Lutherans, Anglicans, Calvinists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ).

Government agencies and independent think tanks estimate the Muslim population at 500,000, while some Muslim leaders estimate two million. According to government figures, 300,000 of these are Crimean Tatars.

The Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities (VAAD) states there are approximately 300,000 persons of Jewish ancestry in the country, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to VAAD, prior to the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, approximately 30,000 Jews lived in the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts). Jewish groups estimate between 10,000 and 15,000 Jewish residents lived in Crimea before Russia’s purported annexation. According to the London-based Institute for Jewish Studies, the country’s Jewish population declined by 94.6 percent from 1970 to 2020. According to NewLines Magazine, Jewish emigration has slowed to 2,000 to 3,000 persons per year.

There are also small numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, practitioners of Falun Gong, Baha’is, and adherents of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including worship. By law, the government may restrict this right only in the “interests of protecting public order[or] the health and morality of the population or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons.” The constitution provides for the “separation of church and religious organizations from the state” and stipulates, “No religion shall be recognized by the state as mandatory.”

The criminal code determines punishment, in the form of a fine or imprisonment, for “willful actions inciting national, racial, or religious enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honor and dignity, or the insult of citizens’ feelings with respect to their religious convictions, and also any direct or indirect restriction of rights, or granting direct or indirect privileges to citizens based on race, color of skin, political, religious and other convictions, disability, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, [or] linguistic or other characteristics.” By law, the objective of religious policy is to “restore full-fledged dialogue between representatives of various social, ethnic, cultural, and religious groups to foster the creation of a tolerant society and provide for freedom of conscience and worship.” The law on the condemnation of the Communist and Nazi regimes establishes punishment for public denial of the criminal nature of those regimes, dissemination of information aimed at justifying their criminal nature, and the production and/or dissemination and public use of products containing their symbols.

The law requires the government to investigate crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed by the Communist and Nazi regimes, and to identify and preserve mass graves of their victims, research and publish information about repression, mass and individual murder, deaths, deportation, torture, use of forced labor and other forms of mass physical terror, and persecution based on “ethnic, national, religious, political, class, social, and other factors.” The law also requires the government to raise public awareness of Communist and Nazi-era crimes and to support nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) conducting research and education in that area.

The criminal code determines punishments (fines or imprisonment) for “willful actions inciting national, racial, or religious enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honor and dignity, or the insult of citizens’ feelings in respect to their religious convictions, and also any direct or indirect restriction of rights, or granting direct or indirect privileges to citizens based on race, color of skin, political, religious and other convictions, disability, sex, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, [or] linguistic or other characteristics.”

A new law adopted by parliament in September and signed by President Zelensky on October 7 defines the concept of antisemitism and reaffirms punishment for crimes motivated by antisemitism. The law also reaffirms punishment for making false or stereotypical statements about persons of Jewish origin, producing, or disseminating materials containing antisemitic statements or content, and denying the facts of the persecution and mass killing of Jews during the Holocaust. The state may charge those found guilty of violating the law with civil, administrative, and criminal liability. Victims may also receive compensation for “material and moral damages.” Parliament’s passage of implementing legislation of the law was pending at year’s end.

Religious organizations include congregations, theological schools, monasteries, religious brotherhoods, missions, and administrations of religious associations consisting of religious organizations. To register and obtain legal-entity status, an organization must register either with the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, which is the government agency responsible for religious affairs, or with regional government authorities, depending upon the nature of the organization. Religious centers, administrations, monasteries, brotherhoods, missions, and schools register with the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy. Congregations register with the regional authorities where they are present. While these congregations may form the constituent units of a nationwide religious organization, the nationwide organization does not register on a national basis and may not obtain recognition as a legal entity. The constituent units instead register individually and obtain legal-entity status.

mendments to religious freedom legislation enacted in 2019 direct regional governments’ religious affairs departments to handle the dual registration. The amendments require all religious organizations to update and reregister their statutes by January 31, 2020. The amendments also specify reregistration requirements for organizations that wish to change their affiliation, particularly UOC-MP parishes seeking to join the OCU. The amended law requires a quorum, as defined by each congregation and usually comprising two-thirds or three-fourths of a religious organization’s members, to decide on a change of affiliation. The law also requires a vote by two-thirds of those present to authorize such a decision. The law bans any transfer of an organization’s property until the affiliation change is finalized.

To be eligible for registration, a religious congregation must comprise at least 10 adult members and submit to the registration authorities its statute (charter), certified copies of the resolution that created it and was adopted by founding members, and a document confirming its right to own or use premises.

Registered religious groups wishing to acquire nonprofit status, which many do for banking purposes, must register with tax authorities.

Without legal-entity status, a religious group may not own property, conduct banking activities, be eligible for utility bill discounts, join civic or advisory boards of government agencies, or establish periodicals, nongovernmental pension funds, officially accredited schools, publishing, agricultural and other companies, or companies manufacturing religious items. Religious groups without legal-entity status may meet and worship and may also publish and distribute religious materials. In accordance with the stipulation against national registration, however, only a registered constituent unit of a nationwide religious organization may own property or conduct business activities, either for itself or on behalf of the nationwide organization. The law grants property tax exemptions to religious organizations and considers them nonprofit organizations.

The law requires commanders of military units to allow their subordinates to participate in religious services but bans the creation of religious organizations in military institutions and military units. The law prohibits UOC-MP priests from serving as chaplains on bases or in conflict zones, ostensibly due to concerns about their affiliation with Russia through the Moscow Patriarchate.

A law on military chaplaincy, adopted by parliament on November 30, defines selection criteria for clergy to become chaplains, their status in the chain of command, and their rights and duties in the Armed Forces, National Guard, State Border Guard Service, and other military formations. The legislation institutionalizes military chaplaincy according to NATO principles, gives chaplains the status of full-fledged service members, and provides for the same type of financial and social security support as other service members. The law protects the confidentiality of confession to a military chaplain and provides for the creation of interfaith councils on military chaplaincy as advisory bodies at the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs.

According to the constitution, organizers must notify local authorities in advance of any type of planned public gathering, and authorities may challenge the legality of the planned event. According to a 2016 Constitutional Court decision, religious organizations need only inform local authorities of their intention to hold a public gathering and need not apply for permission or notify authorities within a specific period in advance of the event.

Government regulations on identity documents, including passports, allow religious head coverings in photographs.

The law allows religious groups to establish theological schools to train clergy and other religious workers as well as to seek state accreditation through the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance for their curriculum. The law states theological schools shall function based on their own statutes.

Government agencies authorized to monitor religious organizations include the Prosecutor General, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and all other “central bodies of the executive government.”

Only registered religious groups may seek restitution of communal property confiscated by the former Communist regime. Religious groups must apply to regional authorities for property restitution. The law states authorities should complete their consideration of a restitution claim within a month.

The law prohibits religious instruction as part of the mandatory public school curriculum and states public school training “shall be free from interference by political parties, civic, and religious organizations.” Public schools include “ethics of faith “or similar faith-related courses as optional parts of the curricula. The law provides that Christian, Islamic, and Jewish-focused curriculums may offer ethics of faith courses in public schools.

The law provides for antidiscrimination screening of draft legislation and government regulations, including for discrimination based on religion. The law requires the legal department of each respective agency responsible for verifying draft legislation to conduct screening in accordance with instructions developed by the Cabinet of Ministers to ensure the draft legislation does not contain discriminatory language and to require changes if it does. Religious groups may participate in screening draft legislation at the invitation of the respective agency.

The law allows alternative nonmilitary service for conscientious objectors. The law also allows government officials to deny a conscript’s application for alternative service due to missing the application deadline. The law does not exempt the clergy from military mobilization. Amendments to a law on military duty and service passed in April allows no exemption from military reserve service during the “special period” (i.e., while hostilities with Russia-led forces continue), even for conscientious objectors.

The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights (“Ombudsperson”) is constitutionally required to release an annual report to parliament containing a section on religious freedom.

The law restricts the activities of foreign-based religious groups and defines the permissible activities of noncitizen clergy, preachers, teachers, and other representatives of foreign-based religious groups. By law, foreign religious workers may “preach, administer religious ordinances, or practice other canonical activities,” but they may do so only for the registered religious organization that invited them and with the approval of the government body that registered the statute of the organization. Missionary activity is included under permissible activities.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Since 2015, the government has exercised the right of derogation from its obligations under the ICCPR regarding the portions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts under the control of Russia-led forces, including the ICCPR provisions pertaining to religious freedom.

Government Practices

Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to call on the government to implement four 2020 ECHR decisions to ensure effective investigation of the hate crimes committed against the group and its places of worship between 2009-13 and to prosecute the perpetrators of those religiously motivated attacks. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, during the year the government paid compensation awarded by the ECHR to the victims in the cases Zagubnya and Tabachkova v. Ukraine, Migoryanu and Others v. Ukraine, and Tretiak v. Ukraine. By year’s end, the government had not paid compensation to the victims in the case of Kornilova v. Ukraine. Jehovah’s Witnesses stated the government took no specific measures to implement those ECHR judgments by improving the current practice of hate crime investigations.

Some Jewish leaders and human rights activists continued to state concerns about what they considered impunity for hate crimes, including acts of antisemitism, and about the government’s long delays in completing investigations of these crimes. They also objected to authorities’ prosecuting many antisemitic acts as hooliganism rather than as hate crimes. According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, the lack of proper punishment for hate crimes “has long been a major problem, exacerbated by Article 161 of the criminal code [on incitement to enmity, religious, racial and other discrimination, etc.], which is notoriously difficult to prove and therefore most often avoided by the police and prosecutors.” Some Jewish leaders said law enforcement authorities often charged antisemitic actors, if apprehended, with hooliganism or vandalism instead of a hate crime in what they assessed was an attempt to downplay the criminal behavior. According to Freedom House, “Qualified professional legal assessment of hate crimes remains a serious problem: a motive either being ignored immediately with the crime qualified under other articles of the criminal code, or it is ‘lost’ at the stage of judicial inquiry.” Because it was harder to prove intent in hate crimes, some prosecutors reportedly chose to charge suspects with hooliganism instead.

Although the constitution and a law on alternative military service recognize the right to conscientious objection and provide the option of alternative civilian service, according to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the government did not uniformly recognize conscientious objection claims. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, officials frequently denied requests for alternative civilian service on the grounds of conscientious objection. Despite courts and the Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsperson protecting the right of Jehovah’s Witness conscientious objectors to perform alternative civilian service, Jehovah’s Witnesses said some military enlistment officials arbitrarily detained Witnesses summoned for military service, and some district and oblast state administrations denied them the right to alternative service. Authorities also reportedly detained some Jehovah’s Witnesses for days while they faced criminal prosecution for “draft evasion.” According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, amendments to a law on military duty and service passed in April provided no possibility of an exemption from military reserve service during the “special period” (i.e., while hostilities with Russia-led forces continue), even for conscientious objectors.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, during the year, some local state administrations rejected applications for alternative civilian service, stating the applicants had missed the deadline for submission of their applications. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that on June 1, military conscription officers escorted Arthur Garry to the Lviv Regional Enlistment Office and attempted to return him to his army unit after denying his right to conscientious objection in May. Following a complaint filed by his attorney, the officers released him after three days. In November, the local authorities approved his request for alternative service.

On June 1, according to Jehovah’s Witnesses, military conscription officers escorted Myroslav Sobutskyy to the Rivne Regional Enlistment Office and tried to enlist him in the army after denying his right to conscientious objection in March. The Witnesses reported that Sobutskyy fled to avoid forced conscription, which they said made him subject to possible criminal prosecution. Following a local court order, the local government approved his request for alternative service.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, on January 15, the Ternopil District Administrative Court closed a draft-evasion case against Ihor Zherebetskyy based on his refusal to report for military service after authorities in 2017 denied his request for alternative service, stating he had missed the deadline for making such a request. On May 26, officials granted his request for alternative service, more than three years after he applied.

During the year, the State Service for Ethnopolicy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS), an office under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, stated its commitment to promoting uniformity and transparency in the provision of administrative services to religious organizations, including the examination of their registration applications, and it initiated the creation of an electronic register of religious organizations. On October 17, in response to press reports about alleged attempts by some oblasts’ state administrations, including the Kyiv Oblast State Administration, to impede the transfer of parish affiliations from the UOC-MP to the OCU, the DESS invited the congregations facing such obstacles to submit their reregistration applications to the DESS for assessment and offered to help resolve registration-related disputes.

On November 20, parliament passed a law on military chaplaincy, defining selection criteria for clergy to become chaplains, their status in the chain of command, and their rights and duties in the Armed Forces, National Guard, State Border Guard Service, and other military formations. Members of various religious groups welcomed the new law. In an interview with Radio Liberty, OCU Primate Metropolitan Epiphaniy stated, “In the Ukrainian army, about 80 percent of chaplains are chaplains of the OCU. Therefore, we are grateful to the Verkhovna Rada [parliament] that we finally managed to adopt the relevant bill.” The UOC-MP Legal Department head, Archpriest Alexander Bakhov, said the new law removed text from the initial draft that prohibited or restricted UOC-MP priests from serving as military chaplains; however, he said that during the implementation of the law “there may be surprises” that would discriminate against the UOC-MP. The UGCC head, Major Archbishop Sviatoslav, expressed confidence that the UGCC would continue to take care of the spiritual and religious needs of soldiers at various levels, ensure proper pastoral care, and promote the personal integrity and spiritual growth of the defenders of Ukraine.

Some religious experts continued to call on the government to abolish the dual registration requirement that congregations apply for both entry into the State Register of Legal Entities database and for government registration of their statutes. A September article written by columnist Dmytro Horyevoy, who follows religious freedom issues, called on the government to streamline and remove flaws in the registration process. He emphasized the inconvenience of requiring in-person registration at both an oblast’s and a city center’s government offices, which, in some cases, were located hundreds of kilometers from one another, in a 24-hour period.

According to the International Center for Law and Religious Studies, the government continued to struggle to manage tensions between the OCU and the UOC-MP, which often competed for members and parishes. The Orthodox Times, which states it is an independent news and information portal, reported that Russia continued to use a disinformation campaign to fuel further discord between the two Churches. News sources reported that the UOC-MP continued to question the legitimacy of the OCU and the UOC-MP stated that the OCU was “stealing” its property. The OCU stated the UOC-MP legally challenged the reregistration of parishes from the UOC-MP to the OCU. The UOC-MP continued to report instances of “unlawful” reregistration by some local governments. The OCU denied these charges.

The Constitutional Court continued reviewing a 2020 petition by a group of members of parliament questioning the constitutionality of 2018 amendments to the law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations requiring the UOC-MP, formally registered as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), to rename itself to reflect its affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC). The petition and a 2019 Supreme Court ruling in a separate suit by the UOC-MP Metropolitan Administration against the amendments prevented the government from enforcing the name change requirement for 267 UOC-MP organizations. The organizations were a third party in the lawsuit filed by the UOC-MP Metropolitan Administration. On February 5, the head of the Religion Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, Andriy Yurash, stated the courts’ failure to address the 2020 petition was criminal, saying that “not responding is a sign that this is either unprofessionalism, or unwillingness, or a conscious return to that scheme and an attempt to challenge the existing realities.” In a May 8 Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) interview, Minister of Culture and Information Policy Oleksandr Tkachenko cautioned against attempts to escalate the debate over the renaming and said dialogue was the best way to address the situation.

Oblast-level religious affairs departments were still unable to meet the one-year registration deadline for congregations under the amended 2019 registration law, partly due to a lengthy restructuring of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy in 2020, including a transition from the Department for Religions and Nationalities to the DESS. The law did not include a penalty for missing a reregistration deadline. According to the Institute of Religious Freedom, congregations reregistered their statutes according to the new law when they needed to amend their statutes.

In September, authorities worked with Israeli and U.S. health authorities to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 during the annual Rosh Hashanah pilgrimage to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov in Uman, Cherkasy Oblast. An estimated 25,000-50,000 pilgrims celebrated Rosh Hashanah in Uman. Officials estimated approximately 10,000 pilgrims arrived weeks ahead of the holiday to ensure they were in-country should Ukraine close its borders due to the pandemic, as it did in 2020. In 2020, the government closed the country’s borders for the month of September, coinciding with the Jewish holidays when thousands of pilgrims travel to the country, and it extended domestic quarantine regulations by two months, limiting the number of travelers who could participate in the pilgrimage.

In March, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said it would adhere to general recommendations by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance to reduce or eliminate criminal profiling, following an appeal by the Umma Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine about the State Migration Service and the police practice of worshiper profiling near one of Kyiv’s largest mosques during Friday prayers in 2020. In the annual presentation of a report to parliament in March, the Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsperson requested the Ministry of Internal Affairs review the Umma’s appeal. The ombudsperson requested the ministry consider recommendations by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance to counter ethnic profiling.

In February, UOC-MP-associated media reported local supporters continued to face resistance from the Zolochiv Municipal Council, Lviv Oblast to their request to build a church in the town. On March 9, an administrative court ruled against Zolochiv authorities’ request that the court declare the construction of the parish church illegal. On March 12, the Zolochiv regional police department closed criminal proceedings against local deputies accused of “hooliganism” and “inciting religious hatred” in connection with the construction. Lawyers for the UOC-MP said they believed that the closure of the criminal case indicated local authorities had improperly pressured the investigators and said they planned to appeal. In 2020, the Zolochiv Municipal Council refused to allow the construction on the grounds that many UOC-MP representatives had supported Russia’s war against the country.

Law enforcement authorities continued to report no progress in the investigation of allegations that the Kyiv Islamic Cultural Center of the Umma Spiritual Administration possessed materials promoting “violence, racial, interethnic, or religious hatred.” The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Kyiv city procuracy originally searched the center in May 2018. A lawyer for the Umma described the search as an attempt to undermine the Umma’s reputation and called the charges baseless.

In July, the Kryvyy Rih City Council approved a change to a zoning plan in favor of designating land for Jehovah’s Witnesses to use for a Kingdom Hall. This decision resulted from a 2019 ECHR judgment that ruled against deputies of the Kryvyy Rih City Council who had refused to lease land to Jehovah’s Witnesses for the Kingdom Hall’s construction.

On November 11, media reported the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy agreed to return the Roman Catholic parish of St. Nicholas Cathedral to the parish for permanent use on June 1, 2022. Soviet authorities took over the cathedral in the 1930s. The congregation shares the cathedral with the National House of Organ and Chamber Music. The ministry stated it would return the church after completing necessary emergency repairs following an electrical fire on September 3.

In May, the Volyn Oblast State Administration returned a synagogue to the Jewish community in Lutsk confiscated by the Soviet-era government. According to Hanna Matusovska, a representative of the Jewish Community of Lutsk, the community was considering creating a synagogue/museum in the building with financial support from Ukrainian communities living in Israel, Europe, and the United States.

Small religious groups stated local authorities continued to discriminate when allocating land for religious buildings in Sumy, Mykolayiv, and Ternopil Oblasts, and the city of Kyiv. Roman Catholics, OCU members, UGCC members, Jews, and Muslims continued to report cases of discrimination. UGCC representatives said local authorities in Bila Tserkva were still unwilling to allocate land for a UGCC church at year’s end, a request originally made in 2008.

Kyiv’s Muslim community said the local government, responsible for allocating land for cemeteries, had still not acted on the community’s request from 2017 for additional free land in or near Kyiv for Islamic burials, which the Muslim community considered its legal right because by law local authorities may designate cemetery land for the use of a specific religious group. Consequently, some Muslim families living in Kyiv reportedly had to bury their relatives in other cities.

All major religious organizations continued to appeal to the government to establish a transparent legal process for addressing property restitution claims. According to observers, the government made little progress on unresolved restitution issues during the year. Representatives of some organizations said they experienced continuing problems and delays reclaiming property seized by the former Communist regime and said a review of claims often took far longer than the month prescribed by law. Christian, Jewish, and Muslim groups stated several factors continued to complicate the restitution process, including intercommunity competition for particular properties, current use of some properties by state institutions, the designation of some properties as historic landmarks, local governments disputing jurisdictional boundaries, and previous transfers of some properties to private ownership.

Muslim community leaders continued to state concern about the continuing lack of resolution of a restitution claim involving the site containing the ruins of an historic mosque in Mykolaiv, in the southern part of the country. According to Muslim leaders, the local government was reluctant to resolve the issue.

Jewish community leaders continued to report illegal construction on the site of the old Jewish cemetery in Uman, where businesspersons had purchased old houses bordering the cemetery to demolish them and build hotels for Jewish pilgrims. According to news reports, developers had reportedly made deals with local government officials to obtain building permits. A representative from the Uman mayor’s office said in October that the government could not stop the sale of or ban digging on privately owned land and that it was impossible to stop illegal construction. The official said, however, that the government had not issued new building permits and had agreed not to sell any municipality-owned cemetery property.

The Jewish community continued to express concern about the ongoing operation of the Krakivskyy Market on the grounds of an historical Jewish cemetery in Lviv. City authorities, Jewish community members, and market kiosk owners agreed to install three memorials to renowned rabbis buried beneath the active market. Construction on the first memorial started on October 20. Despite a 2020 Ministry of Culture and Information Policy order that a local developer halt construction of a private health clinic on the protected site, Lviv authorities allowed construction to continue during the year, stating that the renovation of the clinic did not require excavation. Jewish community representatives said they feared the Lviv government would sell more of the public land to private groups, which could further diminish their ability to protect the cemetery. The Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ) continued to urge the government to halt permanently the construction of a multistory commercial building on the cemetery grounds separate from the health clinic construction that had been ordered suspended in 2017. According to local authorities, the commercial building project in question involved reconstruction of an existing building and required no excavation.

The UCSJ continued to express its concern about the possible continuation of construction of a high-rise building at the site of the World War II Jewish ghetto during the Nazi occupation of Lviv. In 2016, a court suspended the project after human remains were reportedly found and removed from the site. In the past, the UCSJ had requested the remains be reburied on the site but as of year’s end, the remains had not been reburied. Lviv authorities denied the construction had unearthed any remains.

Jewish community leaders said they continued to experience difficulties with the Ternopil municipal and district governments regarding property restitution. The Ternopil District Council continued to reject requests from the local Jewish community to return a prayer house confiscated during the Soviet era.

According to observers, government investigations and prosecutions of vandalism against religious sites continued to be generally inconclusive, although the government condemned attacks and police arrested perpetrators.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, on January 24, unidentified individuals wrote the word “sect” on a fence surrounding a Kingdom Hall in Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Volyn Oblast. A local court ordered police to open an investigation, which they did, adding it to the investigations of three similar acts of vandalism committed against the Kingdom Hall in 2020. According to the privately owned court verdicts database Verdictum.ligazakon.net, on January 14, police began to investigate the three 2020 incidents as “hooliganism,” following the filing of a complaint of religiously motivated hate crimes. The cases remained pending at year’s end.

On June 7, Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives reported unidentified vandals damaged the facade of the local Kingdom Hall in Tismenytsya, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, with stones. The police did not initiate an investigation by year’s end.

On August 6, media reported unidentified vandals had desecrated the grave of the daughter of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov with “pieces of pigs, including a skull” in Kremenchuk. A Breslov Hasidic resident who was visiting the grave saw the vandalism and reported it to the police. “This is not the first time that antisemites have harmed the grave,” Breslov Hasid Rabbi Avraham Chezin said, adding that he hoped the vandals would be found and taken to court. According to the Kremenchuk Jewish community, law enforcement officials identified the perpetrators and solved the case.

On October 6, President Zelenskyy and the privately funded Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center (BYHMC) cohosted an 80th anniversary commemoration ceremony in honor of Holocaust victims of the September 1941 Babyn Yar massacre, held at the Babyn Yar Historical Memorial Preserve in Kyiv. The presidents of Israel, Germany, and Albania spoke at the event, and prominent members of the Jewish community, including Natan Sharansky and Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and all Ukraine Yaakov Bleich, also spoke or attended. Jewish community members and historians continued to express concern that the BYHMC’s symbolic “pop-up” synagogue, opened on May 14 and commemorating the Babyn Yar massacre, stood on historical Jewish and Christian Orthodox cemeteries.

On October 25, the Prosecutor General’s Office reported that a court in Zaporizhzhya sentenced to seven years in prison a local resident who in 2019 organized an attempt to set fire to a local UOC-MP church. The SBU prevented the arson attack. Law enforcement authorities said the “DPR Ministry of State Security (MGB)” directed and paid the individual. According to the SBU, the “MGB” instructed the offender to post a video of the arson that media would portray as an attack on a UOC-MP church by the laity of the newly established OCU.

On January 2, Israeli Ambassador Joel Lion tweeted his criticism of decisions by some parliamentarians and government authorities to commemorate and honor on January 1, Ukrainian figures and organizations who were also associated with antisemitism and the killing of tens of thousands of Jews and Poles during World War II. On January 7, after the Israeli ambassador condemned the commemoration, dozens of protesters rallied outside the Israeli Embassy in Kyiv, which was closed for Orthodox Christmas, to demand that Jews apologize for Soviet oppression and that they assume responsibility for the Holodomor, the Stalin-engineered famine that killed millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s. “Israel deliberately spreads antisemitism in Ukraine,” said Vladislav Goranin during a speech at the rally. He said Jews and Israel must “repent for the genocide” of Ukrainians. A VAAD copresident said a pro-Russian group had funded the protest; a member of the protest subsequently denied that claim on Expresso.tv news.

Media reported that on April 28, hundreds of persons attended marches celebrating Nazi SS soldiers, including the first such event in Kyiv. The March of Embroidered Shirts took place on the 78th anniversary of the establishment of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division (1st Galician) of the SS, also known as the Galicia Division – a force set up under the German occupation composed of ethnic Ukrainian and German volunteers and conscripts. The marchers held banners displaying the unit’s symbol. One of the participants used a Nazi salute. Police identified the suspect and charged him with Nazi propaganda and petty hooliganism. President Zelenskyy condemned the marches honoring the Waffen SS unit, stating they were illegal. “We categorically condemn any manifestation of propaganda of totalitarian regimes, in particular National Socialism, and attempts to revise the truth about World War II,” he said in a statement on April 30. ollowing the April 28 march, Anton Drobovych, director of the Ukraine Institute of National Memory (UINM), an executive body under the Cabinet of Ministers, condemned the glorification of the SS forces as unacceptable and expressed confidence that the absolute majority of Ukrainians did not support such glorification. On May 1, the Kyiv City-State Administration issued a statement saying, “There can be no justification for the propaganda of totalitarian regimes.” According to the administrators, organizers of the gathering had described the planned event to the local government as an ordinary March of Embroidered Shirts, an annual event that celebrates national identity.

In his opening speech to the All-Ukrainian Forum “Ukraine 30: Humanitarian Policy” in Kyiv on July 13, President Zelenskyy referenced the beginning of the Babyn Yar massacre, calling it “a terrible symbol of the Holocaust on our Ukrainian land. We cannot get rid of it, but we can win by honoring the memory of all the victims, all the deceased… We are responsible to all past and all future generations for historical justice.” In his speech, he said 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews were murdered, including those murdered at Babyn Yar. He continued, “We have no right to forget and will not forget this. It is extremely important for Ukraine to honor, at a high level, all the victims of this tragedy.” Speaking about the Babyn Yar 80th anniversary commemoration ceremony, he added, “We will hospitably receive on our land everyone who comes on this day to share with us our common pain, to honor the memory of the tragedy that shocked the whole world, to remember the dead, to thank, first of all, our Righteous.” In reference to the planned BYHMC memorial complex, he said, “It is our duty to make Babyn Yar a place of memory, not a place of oblivion… As a state, we strive to make this place worthy of the memory of more than 100,000 Holocaust victims. It is very important that these aspirations are shared by our community. I am sure that all Ukrainians share them.”

Media reported that in an August 21 meeting in Kyiv with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, President Zelenskyy called Ukraine a unique example of the peaceful coexistence of many religious denominations. President Zelenskyy also stated that Russia used religion as a “hybrid weapon” against Ukraine by violating fundamental human rights and freedoms, in particular freedom of religion, in Ukrainian territory controlled by Russia.

At a September 1 visit to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., President Zelenskyy lit candles at the Babyn Yar memorial and gave the museum digitized copies of 43 Yiddish letters from the country’s Unread Letters 1941 collection. He said, “Most of the authors of the letters, including children, died in August 1941 during the first mass executions of the Jewish population in Ukraine. Today, we are providing copies of these valuable documents, which preserve human pain and hope, to the U.S. Holocaust Museum. Today we are doing everything to make ‘Never Again’ really mean – never again.” Zelenskyy said that of the six million Jews who died in Europe, every fourth person was from Ukraine. He told the story of four brothers, three of whom, together with their families, were shot by the German invaders. The fourth brother served on the frontline through World War II, contributing to the victory over Nazism. “His grandson became President of Ukraine. And now he is standing in front of you,” President Zelenskyy said. He also said that in modern Ukraine, the ideology of racism and intolerance had no chance, referencing his own election as a president with Jewish ancestry. He continued, “The people of Ukraine cannot have the germs of antisemitism and Nazism at the genetic level. It cannot be in the heart or in the soul of the Ukrainian people who survived Babyn Yar on their land.”

Media reported that in President Zelenskyy’s October 5 meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog, the presidents had agreed to continue to cooperate to preserve and enrich the cultural heritage and traditions of the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples. President Herzog noted what he stated were the systematic efforts of Ukraine to create appropriate conditions for Jewish pilgrims to visit historical and holy places on its territory and perform religious rites, including the annual pilgrimage of Hasidim to Uman. Both parties stressed the need to preserve the memory of the Holocaust and the importance of educational efforts at the national and international level to prevent a recurrence of such horrific crimes. The presidents noted the role of the Righteous Among Nations from Ukraine (gentiles who assisted Jews) in the rescue of Jews during World War II. They condemned all manifestations of intolerance, xenophobia, and antisemitism. President Herzog praised the efforts of President Zelenskyy and his government to fight antisemitism, specifically noting the country’s September 23 adoption of the Law on Preventing and Combating Antisemitism, which defines antisemitism as hatred of Jews and bans it. The law also states that manifestations of antisemitism could encompass actions against Jewish individuals as well as their property, religious buildings, or communities.

In April, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ representatives held a series of virtual academic and press events to mark the 70th anniversary of Operation North, the 1951 Soviet deportation of 9,793 Jehovah’s Witnesses to Siberia. Participants, including foreign scholars and government officials, unanimously condemned the Soviet deportation. The head of UINM, Anton Drobovych, noted that, thanks to individuals who actively defended their values, the country’s laws considered the specific dimensions and needs of different religious groups. For example, the law provided for alternative service for those who could serve in the military due to their religious beliefs. A religious scholar called on the community of Jehovah’s Witnesses to create information materials, brochures, exhibitions, and videos to teach the history of Operation North and assured them UINM would support such promotional work.

The Constituent Assembly of the Congress of Muslims held its inaugural meeting on November 27. According to representatives of the congress, its composition and further activities would be based on the principles of equality for representatives of all Islamic scientific and legal trends and ethnic groups for the development of the country’s Muslim community. In an address, representative of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers Ivan Papayani read a welcoming address from Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stating, “On behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and on my own behalf, let me congratulate you on the start of this important Congress for Muslims of our state. Islam has always been and will continue to be a significant component of the religious and confessional space of Ukraine.”

During the year, the Russia-instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine continued, with parts of the country’s Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts under the control of Russia-installed “authorities” in the “DPR” and “LPR.” According to press reports, religious groups not approved by Russia continued to face restrictions, especially religious groups that were legal in Ukraine but illegal in Russia, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and the independent Muslim congregation Hizb ut-Tahir, whose members continued to face arrest, detention, and harassment. In its oral update on Ukraine in October, the OHCHR highlighted that the self-proclaimed “republics” continued to restrict freedom of religion, in particular of evangelical Christian denominations.

Sources reported that Russia-supported “authorities” in the “DPR” and “LPR” continued to detain and imprison Jehovah’s Witnesses as well as leaders of other religious groups. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the “DPR” continued to label the group as an extremist organization, while the “LPR” “Supreme Court” refused to acknowledge the Witnesses as an organization. According to Protestant and Jehovah’s Witnesses groups, many of their members continued to flee these areas to escape oppressive conditions and to seek greater religious freedom in government-controlled territory. The Jehovah’s Witness annual report stated that, “In general, Jehovah’s Witnesses practice their faith freely in Ukraine. They are legally registered, and the government does not restrict their religious activity.” In the occupied territory of Donetsk, however, their report stated, “[t]here is a real threat of kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment at all times for every Jehovah’s Witness.” In Luhansk, the Jehovah’s Witnesses reported “authorities” did not allow the group to officially register, and any religious activity without official registration was strictly prohibited.

The OHCHR reported that a majority of religious groups recognized under Ukrainian law continued to be unable to reregister because of stringent legal requirements under Russian legislation preventing or discouraging reregistration. Many religious groups continued to refuse to reregister because they did not recognize the Russia-installed “authorities” in the “DPR” and “LPR.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives said the group had limited access to information on the situation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the “DPR” and “LPR” during the year. They said that since 2014, “LPR” and “DPR” “authorities” had seized 14 Kingdom Halls in Russia-controlled parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, official and de facto bans on their activities in the “DPR” and “LPR” deprived their congregations of houses of worship. Russian-led military units destroyed some of those buildings, and occupied others. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, none of the buildings could be used due to threats of kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment.

Russia-established “LPR” “authorities” continued to deny the reregistration applications of Baptist, Pentecostal, and Seventh-day Adventist groups, in accordance with a 2018 law by “LPR” “authorities” that required religious communities, with the exception of the UOC-MP, which was recognized “within the framework of the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate,” to reregister with “LPR” “authorities”. In denying the applications, “authorities” also cited a 2015 decree that banned mass events while the area was under martial law. According to Forum 18, an international religious freedom NGO, the latest figures from December 2019 reported 195 religious organizations registered by “LPR” “authorities.” Of these 195 organizations, 188 belonged to the UOC-MP, four were Muslim, and there was one each of Old Believers, Jews, and Roman Catholics.

Religious leaders continued to say “LPR’s” reregistration denials represented a complete ban on their religious activities, since without reregistration, religious groups were not able to hold services, even in believers’ homes. According to “LPR” “authorities,” to be eligible for registration, a local religious organization must have at least 30 adult members, while a centralized religious organization must be composed of at least five such local organizations. These requirements effectively disqualified some smaller religious associations. The law also required Christian Orthodox congregations to register as part of a “diocese recognized by the Orthodox Churches around the world within the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate,” thereby forcing several remaining OCU parishes to conduct any activities underground.

“LPR” “authorities” continued to ban many religious leaders from outside their territory from reaching their congregations, according to Forum 18.

On July 20, the office of the “LPR” “Prosecutor General” announced that the Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk) “City and District Court” of the “LPR” had banned some missionary publications distributed by the Luhansk Oblast branch of the International Union of Churches of Evangelical Baptist Christians (Union of Churches Baptists). The office deemed the materials to be extremist. The court declared that the Baptist organization was functioning without proper registration. The declaration indicated that the publications could incite religious discord, contained “propaganda of exceptionalism, superiority, and inadequacy of the individual on the basis of religious adherence or attitude to religion,” and violated “the rights, freedoms and legal interests of a person and a citizen depending on his religious adherence or attitude to religion.” According to Forum18, the declaration noted that the Union of Churches Baptists had conducted its activities in the region without Justice Ministry registration. According to Forum18, the “State List of Extremist Materials” contained 26 items: 18 published by Protestants and six by Jehovah’s Witnesses.

On May 15, the Novosti Donbassa news website posted photographs of tombstones reportedly destroyed by a tank of Russia-led forces at a cemetery in Perevalsk, in a Russia-controlled part of Luhansk Oblast. The website quoted eyewitnesses as saying the tank went deep into the cemetery, turned around, and left the area, crushing multiple tombstones and uprooting trees. According to local residents, occupation “authorities” had ignored their complaints following a similar incident in the cemetery in 2020.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, on February 1, an elderly Jehovah’s Witness visited the migration service of the Kirovsky District of Donetsk to receive a passport. The service staff checked her phone and began to question her. When she said she was a Jehovah’s Witness, “authorities” took her to the prosecutor’s office, where another employee of the migration service questioned her. The woman later said she believed “DPR” representatives were trying to link her to the Ukrainian security services.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, in May, “L” and her adult daughter, who was not a Jehovah’s Witness, returned from government-controlled Ukraine to the “DPR.” Upon crossing the border, “DPR” “MGB” officers detained L’s daughter on charges of espionage for Ukraine and then searched L’s house in connection with her daughter’s case. During the search, the “MGB” confiscated Watchtower and Awake magazines and the New World Translation Bible. The “MGB” summoned L and questioned her about other fellow believers, Witnesses elders, and religious services.

According to media, on May 8, Olha Solodovnik, the “head of the Khartsyzsk Department of Education,” instructed kindergartens in the town of Zugres to immediately provide “lists of students and their parents who may belong to prohibited organizations.”

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, on July 31, when Jehovah’s Witness “D” entered the “DPR” from Russia’s Rostov Region, an MGB representative examined his phone and tablet and found Jehovah’s Witnesses’ publications on it. The “MGB” arrested D and took him to Chystyakove (formerly Torez) for questioning. During the interrogation, an “investigator” mentioned to him the names of other believers. “MGB” representatives beat the detainee, hitting his head in a manner that did not to leave bruises. They seized his Ukrainian passports, mobile phone, and tablet. During a second interrogation on August 3, the “MGB” sought to recruit D as an informant and asked questions about other believers and religious services. The “MGB” said “DPR” “authorities” would soon open criminal cases against Jehovah’s Witnesses and carry out searches, without specifying the kinds of searches. The “MGB” did not return the confiscated items to D.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, throughout the year, “DPR” “authorities” often required male believers to undergo military training and threatened those who refused with large fines. For several hours, “MGB” representatives intimidated a Jehovah’s Witness from the city of Makiyivka after he refused to participate in training and fined him.

The “DPR’s” law on worship and religious associations continued to “ban all religious organizations that did not meet a March 2019 registration deadline and to require previously registered religious groups to reregister.” The law accords the “Ministry of Culture” authority to “monitor the registration of religious associations in the region and to abolish such groups on various grounds. Any newly created religious association not seeking legal entity status must submit written notification to “DPR” “authorities” detailing its function, location, administration, and the names and home addresses of its members.” According to the law, “authorities” have 10 days either to put the group on the register of religious groups or to cancel its legal status. “Authorities” have a month to examine the application documents of a religious association seeking legal status. In either case, a state religious expert may conduct an evaluation of the documents, which could take up to six months, or deny a registration request on several grounds, including on the grounds that application materials lacked required information or that the group was previously banned. All religious organizations and religious groups must notify “authorities” annually of their continued viability. The law allows the UOC-MP to undergo a simplified legalization procedure without reregistration and state religious expert evaluation.

On March 30, the “DPR” amended the law defining what constitutes a religious association, upholding the stipulation that religious associations exist only if they are registered. The amendments tightened the definition of a religious association, restricting its activities to only “participants and/or members.” The amendment defines a religious association’s activities as holding religious beliefs, conducting worship services and other religious rites and ceremonies, and “the teaching of religion and the religious education of its participants and/or members.” The amendment removed the definition of religious activity as “missionary practice and religious educational activity, including the spread of religious knowledge, the provision of professional religious education and the religious education of its participants.”

According to Forum 18, “DPR” “authorities” denied registration to almost all religious communities, apart from the UOC-MP. As of September 2019, “DPR” “authorities” had registered only 36 non-Moscow Patriarchate religious communities. On September 28, the “Justice Ministry” told Forum 18 it was no longer responsible for the registration of religious communities. On March 16, the “Minister of Culture,” which assumed responsibility for the registration of religious groups, reported to the “DPR” “parliament” registrations of religious organizations it handled in 2020. The “DPR” had not published new registration statistics by year’s end.

According to religious organizations and civil society activists, “DPR” authorities continued to harass Protestant congregations attempting to host public religious events, even if such groups possessed a DPR registration. “DPR” authorities charged that the United States government might be funding such events, and they publicly labeled congregations “American agents.” Protestant leaders and religious experts said they attributed such activities by the Russia-administered “DPR” (and “LPR”) as attempts to undermine the strong prewar presence of Protestants in the region.

Forum 18 reported that a wide range of religious groups, in particular Protestant groups, preferred not to discuss their situation in the “DPR.” Religious communities also told Forum 18 they feared that meeting in private homes for worship could lead to raids and possible punishment.

According to Forum 18, in June, the “DPR” “Justice Ministry” released an updated “List of Extremist Materials” containing 97 items, some of them religious. Most publications banned by the “Supreme Court” – including Jehovah’s Witness and Muslim publications – also appeared on the list. “DPR” “authorities” did not respond either to Forum 18’s inquiry into who initiated the suit to ban six publications by the Latvian-based Pastor Aleksey Ledyayev, head of New Generation Protestant Church, or to its request for a copy of the court’s 2020 verdict against Ledyayev.

According to Forum 18, on June 25, “Culture Minister” Mikhail Zheltyakov instructed all institutions under the ministry’s control to publicly display the lists of banned organizations and banned publications in their institutions.

Forum 18 reported that Article 329 of the “DPR” criminal code punished “organizing an extremist organization” with fines, compulsory labor, or imprisonment of up to eight years. “Participating in an extremist organization” carried a maximum punishment of four years’ imprisonment. Recruiting others to join such an organization carried a maximum punishment of six years’ imprisonment. Forum 18 also reported that Article 330 of the criminal code punished “organizing the activity of an extremist organization,” including religious organizations that a court had banned. Organizing such activity carried a maximum eight-year prison term, participation in such activity a maximum four-year prison term, and recruiting others a maximum six-year prison term.

Forum 18 reported that Jehovah’s Witnesses remained on the “DPR” list of 53 “liquidated or banned social and religious associations and other organizations.” According to Forum 18, on June 17, “DPR” authorities banned two Protestant churches, Good News Baptist Church and the Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, due to violations of the registration requirement of the Religion Law. On June 25, “authorities” also tried to ban the activity of the Church of the Awakening, a Baptist church in the town of Yenakievе, as well as any branches or sub-divisions. According to Forum 18, the Church of the Awakening was still able to meet for worship while it tried to reregister. “Officials” from the “Prosecutor General’s Office,” “the Arbitration Court,” and Religion and Nationalities Department of the “Culture Ministry” in Donetsk did not answer Forum 18’s telephoned or written inquiries about the closures of the churches.

“DPR” “authorities” continued to use seized places of worship for their own purposes. According to Forum 18, the “authorities” used a former Donetsk Church of Jesus Christ building as a registry office and the former Makeyevka New Life Baptist Church as a Red Guard district registry office.

On November 30, Ukrainian media reported pro-Russia Donetsk militants had converted a Church of Jesus Christ building into a “Russian house” in order to “strengthen ties with Russia.” According to Ukrainian journalist, Denis Kazansky, “It is symbolic that it is located in a captured Mormon temple. Mormons once built the house at their own expense. But the Russians do not think so. Why build something if you can just squeeze someone else?”

According to media reports, all but one mosque remained closed in the “DPR.”

The NMRMG reported a decrease in antisemitic violence, with one suspected case reported during the year compared with four cases in 2020. As of September 1, the NMRMG recorded four cases of antisemitic vandalism, compared with seven incidents during the same period in 2020.

The United Jewish Community of Ukraine (UJCU) reported 49 cases of antisemitism in 2020 (the last year for which data was available), compared with 56 cases in 2019. The difference in the count of antisemitic acts between the NMRMG and the UJCU was due to variations in methodologies. NMRMG said it counted vandalism only on Jewish property, such as synagogues, cemeteries, or memorials, while the UJCU included a wider range of incidents, such as a Jewish student’s dormitory being vandalized with swastikas, as well as verbal disputes involving antisemitic epithets.

On July 21, NMRMG reported a man attacked a Hasidic man in a park in the village of Torhovytsya in Kirovohrad Oblast. The attacker approached the man as he walked with his wife and nine children and aggressively demanded to shake the hand of the man’s wife. According to the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, when the woman refused, the attacker began punching and kicking the Hasidic man, breaking his nose. The attacker and a second individual pursued the victim and his family by car as they drove to the hospital, aggressively pulling up alongside them. Police detained the suspected attacker and his accomplice on charges of attempted robbery.

According to the local Jewish community, as of year’s end, the person armed with an ax who attempted to enter a synagogue in Mariupol in July 2020 remained in a psychiatric hospital in Rostov-on-Don while a Russian district court reviewed the case against him. According to media, law enforcement authorities had previously identified the suspect, and a Mariupol court had sanctioned his arrest, but he subsequently fled to Russia. In August 2020, Russian authorities detained him in Rostov-on-Don.

On June 2, media reported an unknown gunman shot at a synagogue in Kremenchuk on May 1. According to Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, local Jewish community leaders kept the incident quiet for nearly a month to avoid panic. Local Rabbi Shlomo Salamon said, “It was one bullet…. We suddenly saw that the window had a hole, and the guard didn’t hear it. The bullet didn’t penetrate the second pane of glass and go into the synagogue.” Salamon said he decided to discuss the attack after he was contacted by the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, which said its “policy is to make it public, to attract attention.” Asked about how his congregants responded to the news, Salamon replied that while some persons were concerned, others downplayed the incident. “When I go in the street with a kippah, I don’t feel any antisemitism,” he said.

In July 12, the Kherson City court found two local residents guilty of deliberate destruction of property by arson motivated by national and religious intolerance in connection with an April 2020 arson attack on a synagogue. According to law enforcement, the perpetrators supported Nazi ideology and carried out the attack to mark Hitler’s birthday. The suspects received four-year suspended sentences, with one year of probation. During their trial, the Chief Rabbi of Kherson requested leniency for the teenaged suspects, which the judge granted. After meeting with the individuals, the rabbi said he decided to give them a second chance in life, stating, “What would happen to those young empty-headed men in prison? Most likely they will turn into criminals.” A few weeks before their court hearing, local television channels broadcast the suspects’ public apology to the Jewish community.

According to the UJCU, on October 14, two unidentified individuals raised a large banner in front of President Zelenskyy’s office reading, “Jewish President Zelenskyy” and condemning the country’s “occupation and robbery” by “the Dnipro Jewish clan of Vova [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy.” Michael Tkach, UJCU executive director, said the banner was an act of incitement and called on authorities to punish those responsible for it. Police opened an investigation, which continued through year’s end.

Media reported that during Hanukkah (November 28-December 6), individuals vandalized several public menorahs in different cities. On November 24, Yuriy Tebenko attempted to vandalize a menorah at Independence Square (Maidan) in Kyiv. Municipal security guards stopped him. According to the UJCU, Tebenko was accompanied by Andriy Rachok, a vandal who toppled the menorah in Kyiv’s Podil district in 2020. During the year, Rachok continued to post antisemitic statements on his Facebook page. Police reportedly briefly detained Rachok and Tebenko. On December 22, Kyiv’s Shevchenkivsky District Court upheld an UJCU complaint regarding police inaction in response to UJCU’s report on the incident. The court ordered police to open an investigation.

According to media, on November 30, unidentified persons cut electric cables on a menorah in Mykolayiv, making it impossible to light. Chief Rabbi of Mykolayiv Sholom Gottlieb said, “We have been lighting these Hanukkah candles in the city center for many years. Thank God everything is calm, cozy, and pleasant. We have support and state support, including to celebrate this holiday in peace. But the fact is that it happened to us and in other cities at the same time – this may indicate that someone is trying not to let this holiday go smoothly.” Also on November 30, unidentified vandals toppled a Hanukkah menorah in Kyiv’s Troyeshchyna District.

On December 4, unidentified individuals destroyed an electrical switch and light bulbs on a menorah in Rivne. After installing the menorah, the local Jewish community reportedly received threats from a local resident who expressed support for the menorah vandalism Andriy Rachok committed in Kyiv in 2020. According to press reports, police were investigating the case as hooliganism.

On December 5, unidentified individuals threw an eight-meter (26-foot) menorah into the river in Uzhhorod. Representative of the Jewish community in Transkarpattya, Yuri Galbert, speaking of the vandalism said, “Uzhhorod residents, in my subjective opinion, they couldn’t have done that. I’ve already heard that there are several such cases in Ukraine. Apparently, it was coordinated in some way. I would like to know the answer to these questions from law enforcement agencies.” The vandals who overturned the Uzhhorod menorah left swastika graffiti nearby and posted a leaflet there accusing Jews of orchestrating the Holodomor. According to the local Jewish community, police initially referred to the incident as hooliganism, refusing to investigate it as a hate crime. After police identified the suspect, the prosecutor’s office charged him with committing a hate crime. The suspect entered a plea bargain and on December 30, the Uzhhorod City and District Court handed him a one-year suspended sentence.

According to sources, the ROC, including the UOC-MP, continued to describe the OCU as a “schismatic” group, despite its recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Church of Greece, the Patriarchate of Alexandria and All Africa, and the Church of Cyprus. The ROC continued to urge other Orthodox churches not to recognize the OCU. UOC-MP and OCU representatives continued to contest some parish registrations as not reflecting the true will of their congregation. The UOC-MP continued to file lawsuits aimed at challenging the process of congregations transitioning from the UOC-MP to the OCU.

On October 2, the OCU website posted Metropolitan Epiphaniy’s address to a congregation in the town of Vorzel near Kyiv. The Metropolitan spoke on the independence of his Church despite resistance from Russia, saying, “the self-proclaimed ‘older brothers’ believe that there is no Ukrainian people. We were disgraced, they tried to erase our Church and cultural identity and destroy by famines. But with God’s help, our people persevered and proved that we are a strong and resilient nation that is working together to build its state and an independent local Church… Unfortunately, not everyone has realized the reality that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has its own canonical territory and all parishes in Ukraine belong to this Church.”

In February 2021, UGCC priest Andriy Mykhaleyko estimated in an article published by the Religious Information Service of Ukraine that the UOC-MP had approximately 12,000 registered churches, compared with the OCU, which had approximately 7,000 parishes. Of the 541 UOC-MP congregations that had joined the OCU since its creation in 2018, most were in the western and central oblasts. UOC-MP representatives, however, often contested parish reregistrations, stating some local government officials allowed individuals unaffiliated with the UOC-MP to vote in meetings to change the affiliation of local parishes to the OCU. UOC-MP representatives said such officials also helped OCU supporters take possession of disputed UOC-MP church buildings before the change of affiliation was officially registered. OCU representatives accused the UOC-MP of contesting legitimate changes of parish affiliation, including through numerous lawsuits. They said these suits were part of the UOC-MP’s strategy to discourage OCU followers from joining the new Church. According to the government and the OCU, the UOC-MP often falsely described eligible voters at such congregation meetings as unaffiliated with the parish, saying they rarely or never participated in religious services. These lawsuits remained unresolved through year’s end.

According to the UOC-MP, some local authorities continued to transfer parish affiliations from the UOC-MP to the OCU against the will of parishioners. According to the UOC-MP, almost all voting in favor of the OCU was illegitimate and “against the will of the parishioners.” In September, social media posts by Right Sector, commonly characterized as a violent radical group, stated that since 2014, it had helped members of approximately 50 UOC-MP congregations leave the “church of occupiers” and join the former Kyiv Patriarchate, and then the OCU. The group called on Ukrainians to “deal new blows” to the UOC-MP.

On April 6, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in a cassation appeal upheld the Khmelnytskyy Oblast State Administration’s decision to register a statute of an OCU congregation in Sutkivtsi village that changed the parish’s affiliation from the UOC-MP to the OCU. The Grand Chamber ruling overturned separate 2020 decisions by the Kyiv City Economic Court and Northern Appellate Economic Court in favor of the congregation’s remaining UOC-MP parishioners. According to the UOC-MP’s website, in May, the head of the UOC-MP’s Legal Department, Archpriest Oleksandr Bakhov, said, “The religious community of the village of Sutkivtsi, Khmelnytsky Oblast intends to continue to protect its rights and once again go to court.”

On April 8, the OCU stated that since 2019, the UOC-MP had initiated more than 100 lawsuits against oblast government decisions to register UOC-MP congregations that joined the OCU. The UOC-MP stated that local residents not belonging to respective UOC-MP parishes should not have been allowed to vote on the change of affiliation.

According to the UOC-MP, on May 10, OCU supporters seized a UOC-MP church in Zabolottya village, Rivne Oblast, following a two-year church ownership dispute between residents remaining in the UOC-MP parish and those who had joined a newly created OCU congregation in 2019. Members of the OCU rejected the accusation, saying the church’s congregation had lawfully changed its affiliation from the UOC-MP to the OCU, and that the UOC-MP had therefore lost its ownership rights of the building. Two OCU supporters reportedly discharged fire extinguishers and noxious gas at their opponents, who tried to enter the disputed church where the OCU parishioners were holding a religious service. Members of the OCU congregation left the church building when police arrived at the scene and deescalated the situation. According to the Rivnenews website, a local news outlet, approximately one dozen persons sought medical assistance after the skirmish. One of them was hospitalized. The local authorities sealed the church entrance pending a court decision on the church affiliation dispute.

According to the UOC-MP, on February 22, approximately 350 representatives from village parishes who were split on the proposed change of affiliation from the UOC-MP to the OCU met at the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, the UOC-MP’s headquarters. Many representatives gave speeches detailing what they described as the seizure of their parish and their efforts to build new UOC-MP churches cosponsored by the “Favor” (Tabor) Fund. According to the UOC-MP, the fund had helped build new UOC-MP churches in dozens of communities. At the February 22 meeting, parishioners from Zadubrivka village in Chernivsti Oblast spoke about their three-year efforts to protect their parish from the OCU. According to priest Vitaly Durov, the rector of St. Michael’s the Archangel Church, after a May 2020 attack in which the UOC-MP successfully defended its parish from the OCU, the UOC-MP had grown stronger, and more worshippers attended church regularly. Durov said that despite threats, discrimination, and insults such as being called “Muscovites,” “we continue to live.”

On March 13, the UOC-MP-linked Union of Orthodox Journalists reported that six OCU supporters attacked a parishioner in Zadubrikva village because of his affiliation with the UOC-MP. According to UOC-MP-linked media, the rector, Vitaliy Durov, said the attack stemmed from a conflict between the late grandfather of one of the attackers and the former rector, Archpriest Leonid Delikatny of St. Michael’s the Archangel Church. According to a March 23 report by the Dukhovny Front (Spiritual Front) media outlet, the police report concluded the assault occurred at the hands of a group of inebriated teenagers, who were offended that the victim would not drink with them. The victim of the attack, however, stated, “with respect to this statement, the village is divided [between OCU and UOC-MP], and everything that is happening has religious grounds.”

The ownership dispute between UOC-MP and OCU members in Zadubrivka village concerning St Michael’s the Archangel Church also continued in the courts. On May 12, the Zastavna District Court rejected a UOC-MP petition to revoke the registration of a newly created OCU parish in Zadubrivka and to transfer ownership of the Church of St. Michael the Archangel from the UOC-MP to the OCU. On July 29, the Chernivtsi Appellate Court overturned the May 12 ruling and referred the case to the Kyiv City Economic Court, where it remained pending at year’s end.

There were again reports of vandalism of Christian monuments; Holocaust memorials, synagogues, and Jewish cemeteries; and Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Kingdom Halls. According to the Svoboda.fm news website, on the eve of Metropolitan Epiphaniy’s visit to Chernihiv on October 21, unidentified individuals overturned a cross at a site designated for construction of an OCU church. According to the OCU, on July 13, unidentified persons damaged a statue of the Virgin Mary near an OCU church in Kyiv’s Vynohradar District.

AUCCRO and AUCRA continued to meet regularly to promote religious diversity and discuss issues affecting the country, such as the continued COVID-19 pandemic, the religious situation in the temporarily occupied territories in the eastern part of the country, and peacemaking efforts in the Donbas. AUCCRO is an interfaith organization representing more than 90 percent of all religious groups in the country, including the OCU, UOC-MP, UGCC, RCC, All-Ukraine Baptist Union, Ukrainian Church of Evangelical Pentecostal Christians, Ukrainian Union Conference, Seventh-day Adventist Church, Ukrainian Christian Evangelical Church, Ukrainian Lutheran Church, Ukrainian Evangelical Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, Ukrainian Diocese, Union of Jewish Religious Organizations of Ukraine, Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine, German Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ukraine, Ukrainian Bible Society, and the Trans-Carpathian Reformed Church. The council rotates its chairmanship.

On December 15-16, the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine sponsored the third annual Kyiv Jewish Forum to highlight the global fight against antisemitism. The conference featured speeches by prominent Jewish leaders from around the world, including President Zelenskyy, President of Israel Herzog, the U.S. Deputy Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, the President of the World Jewish Congress, and Soviet-era dissident and human rights activist Natan Sharansky. Panel discussions addressed opportunities and challenges for the Jewish world in 2022, combatting antisemitism and hate speech, and empowering the next generation of Jewish leaders through education.

In October, Limmud FSU, an international organization working with the Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora, hosted a four-day festival celebrating Jewish life in Lviv. Mayor Andriy Sadovyy provided a video recorded welcome. This was the first event Limmud FSU sponsored in the country, and it focused partly on giving young adults the opportunity to revitalize and restore Jewish learning and to strengthen Jewish identity in their communities.

U.S. embassy officials, including the Charge d’Affaires, met with officials of the Office of the President, Ministries of Culture, Interior, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, members of parliament, political parties, and local officials to engage on issues of religious freedom. They discussed the importance of fair and transparent treatment of religious groups following the establishment of the OCU, the preservation of religious heritage sites, support for religious minorities, and combating antisemitism.

In meetings with government officials at both the national and local levels, the Charge d’Affaires, the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, and the chairman for the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad called for unequivocal condemnation and swift prosecution of antisemitic acts. The Charge d’Affaires, the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, and the Chairman for the U.S. Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad also urged government officials to increase their efforts to ensure the preservation of historic religious sites and called for the government to protect the right of all religious groups to freely practice their religions according to their beliefs.

In May in Kyiv, the Secretary of State met with OCU leadership to discuss pressure on the OCU in Crimea and occupied territories of eastern Ukraine. He and Metropolitan Epiphaniy laid flowers at a memorial to Ukrainian soldiers killed in the war in the east and toured St. Michael’s Monastery (the OCU headquarters).

On October 6, the Secretary of State provided a video statement aired at the 80th anniversary commemoration of the Babyn Yar Massacre. In his speech, he reminded the audience of the tragedy at Babyn Yar, saying, “For much of the last eight decades, the world did not remember what happened at Babyn Yar. That was by design.” His speech recounted his stepfather’s personal connection to Babyn Yar and ended with, “So on this anniversary, we honor the memory of all those lost at Babyn Yar, recommit ourselves to ensuring that their full history is told, and pledge to act, every day, so that history is not repeated.”

The Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, the Chairman of the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, and embassy officials also participated in the 80th anniversary commemorations of the 1941 Babyn Yar Massacre to honor the victims and to emphasize the importance of preserving the memory of that tragedy.

The embassy continued to engage with leaders of AUCCRO, which represents most religious groups in the country, to discuss the status of religious freedom in the country and religious persecution in the Russia-occupied territories. The meetings were an occasion for Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox leaders to express their concerns about the state of religious freedom in the country and the status of religion in the temporarily occupied territories of eastern Ukraine and Crimea, and to hear views on how the United States could further help promote religious freedom.

In October, the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues and the Chairman of the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad traveled to the country to discuss the preservation of Jewish heritage sites and efforts to promote Holocaust memorial efforts. They traveled to Lviv and Uman to discuss those cities’ efforts to preserve their rich Jewish heritage and to express concern about construction on historical Jewish cemeteries. The Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues met with both the Lviv mayor and officials of the Ministry of Culture to express concern about the continued construction of a private clinic occurring on the grounds of an ancient Jewish cemetery in Lviv. They also met with Jewish community members to discuss community views on religious freedom and what Jewish leaders considered to be an appropriate commemoration of the Holocaust, and with government officials to stress the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and the preservation of historical Jewish heritage sites. The October visit followed on the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues’ virtual visit in March, when she met online with members of the Jewish community and government officials about the preservation of Jewish heritage sites and efforts to promote Holocaust memorial efforts.

The embassy continued to engage with Jewish religious leaders and organizations to discuss issues of antisemitism and to promote Holocaust memorial efforts. In January, the Charge d’Affaires gave video remarks to an audience of Holocaust survivors, family members, and other members of the diplomatic community at the official Holocaust memorial event “Six Million Hearts.” She also gave remarks at a separate Holocaust memorial event organized by members of the Kyiv Jewish community, Chief Rabbi of Kyiv Jonathan Benjamin Markovitch, United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine Osnat Lubrani, and members of parliament. In both speeches, she reiterated U.S. government support for Jewish Ukrainians in their fight for equality, tolerance, and acceptance within society, and its commitment to always protect the most vulnerable members of religious communities from violence and hatred. The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials participated in Hanukkah and other Jewish holiday events and Holocaust commemorations during which they emphasized the importance of religious dialogue and equality and encouraged efforts to combat antisemitism and preserve cultural heritage, including an ancient Jewish cemetery in Lviv.

On August 23, the U.S. Secretary of Energy spoke at the government-hosted Crimea Platform Summit to affirm U.S. support for the country, including “restoring control of Crimea to Ukraine and holding Russia accountable for its human rights abuses on the peninsula.”

Although embassy officials had no access to Russia-controlled or occupied territories in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the embassy continued its outreach to religious representatives from these areas and on several occasions publicly condemned Russia’s continued measures to impede the exercise of religious freedom there. The Charge d’Affaires and embassy officials met with Crimean Tatars, both internally displaced persons and those who had come to mainland Ukraine, including lawyers, family members of political prisoners, and representatives of the Crimean Tatar community residing in Kherson and Kyiv Oblasts. Embassy officials continued to denounce the persecution of Crimean Tatars and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as the continued harassment of officials of the OCU seeking to operate in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

Embassy officials met with representatives of Jehovah’s Witnesses to discuss their treatment in the country.

The embassy continued to use social media to reiterate U.S. government support for religious freedom, including the rights of religious minorities. It regularly highlighted religious holidays and responded to the systematic mistreatment of religious minorities in Crimea and the Russia-controlled regions in eastern Ukraine. On October 27, the embassy posted a Facebook message stating, “On International Religious Freedom Day, the United States celebrates the tolerance and openness that encourage religious freedom to thrive across Ukraine. We urge Russia’s occupying forces in Crimea and its proxies in the Donbas to allow Crimean Tatars, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and all others to worship freely without fear or influence.” In December, the embassy condemned the series of acts of vandalism of public menorahs during Hanukkah.

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Crimea

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 102 million (midyear 2021). The government’s 2019 National Population and Housing Census reported approximately 13 million religious adherents, accounting for 14 percent of the total population. The census noted Roman Catholics represented the largest number of adherents, with six million followers, accounting for 45 percent of the total number of believers nationwide and 6 percent of the overall population. The census, which recorded only Buddhists formally registered with the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS) showed them as the second largest religious group, accounting for five million followers, or 35 percent of the total number of religious adherents nationwide, and 5 percent of the overall population.

According to the census data, VBS membership decreased from nearly seven million in 2009 to approximately five million in 2019. The VBS noted that this number did not account for potentially tens of millions of others who believe in and observe Buddhist practices to various degrees without formal participation in a registered Buddhist religious group. The GCRA estimates the number of Buddhist followers is more than 10 million. Within the Buddhist community, Mahayana Buddhism is the dominant affiliation of the Kinh (Viet) ethnic majority, while approximately 1 percent of the total population, almost all from the ethnic minority Khmer group, practices Theravada Buddhism.

According to the census, Protestants were the third largest group, with nearly one million followers, accounting for 7 percent of the total number of believers nationwide and 1 percent of the overall population. The census results contrast with January 2018 statistics released by the GCRA in which 26 percent of the population was categorized as religious believers participating in registered activities, with 15 percent of the population Buddhist, 7 percent Catholic, 2 percent Hoa Hao Buddhist, 1 percent Cao Dai, and 1 percent Protestant. GCRA officials, however, estimated 90 percent of the population followed some sort of faith tradition, registered or otherwise. According to observers, many religious adherents chose not to make their religious affiliation public for fear of adverse consequences, resulting in substantial discrepancies among various estimates.

According to government statistics, the total number of religious adherents reportedly decreased by roughly 2.5 million and the ratio of religious adherents dropped from more than 18 percent to 14 percent of the total population between the 2009 and 2019 censuses. Catholics and Protestants saw increases in membership, while Buddhists and religious groups based on local traditions saw a declining number of adherents, according to census data. Anecdotal reporting from provincial VBS, Catholic, and Protestant leaders, however, indicated membership in all religious traditions continued to grow.

Smaller religious groups combined constitute less than 0.16 percent of the population and include Hindus (mostly an estimated 70,000 ethnic Cham in the south-central coastal area); approximately 80,000 Muslims scattered throughout the country (approximately 40 percent are Sunni, and 60 percent practice Bani Islam); an estimated 3,000 members of the Baha’i Faith; and approximately 1,000 members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ). Religious groups originating in the country (Buu Son Ky Huong, Tu An Hieu Nghia, Minh Su Dao, Minh Ly Dao, Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi, and Phat Giao Hieu Nghia Ta Lon) comprise a total of 0.34 percent of the population. A small, mostly foreign, Jewish population resides in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. National statistics on religious adherents from the GCRA and the Vietnam Fatherland Front, an umbrella group for government-affiliated organizations under the guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), are considered less comprehensive, as they do not account for members of unregistered religious groups.

Other individuals have no religious affiliation or practice animism or the veneration of ancestors, tutelary and protective saints, national heroes, or local, respected persons. Many individuals blend traditional practices with religious teachings, particularly Buddhism and Christianity. Research institutions, including the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, estimate there are approximately 100 “new religions,” mostly in the North and Central Highlands.

Ethnic minorities constitute approximately 14 percent of the population. Based on adherents’ estimates, two-thirds of Protestants are members of ethnic minorities, including groups in the Northwest Highlands (H’mong, Dzao, Thai, and others) and in the Central Highlands (Ede, Jarai, Sedang, and M’nong, among others). The Khmer Krom ethnic group overwhelmingly practices Theravada Buddhism.

Legal Framework

The constitution states that all individuals have the right to freedom of belief and religion, including the freedom to follow no religion. The constitution acknowledges the right to freedom of religion or belief of those whose rights are limited, including inmates or any foreigners and stateless persons. It states all religions are equal before the law and the state must respect and protect freedom of belief and religion. The constitution prohibits citizens from violating the freedom of belief and religion or taking advantage of a belief or religion to violate the law.

The LBR and implementing Decree 162 serve as the primary documents governing religious groups and their activities. The LBR reiterates citizens’ rights to freedom of belief and religion and states that individuals may not use the right of belief and religious freedom to undermine peace, national independence, and unification; incite violence or propagate wars; proselytize in contravention of the state’s laws and policies; divide people, nationalities, or religions; cause public disorder; infringe upon the life, health, dignity, honor, or property of others; impede the exercise of civic rights and performance of civic obligations; or conduct “superstitious activities” or otherwise violate the law.

The government recognizes 38 religious organizations that affiliate with 16 distinct religious “traditions,” as defined by the government: Buddhism, Islam, the Baha’i Faith, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao Dai, Buu Son Ky Huong, Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi, Tu An Hieu Nghia, Phat Duong Nam Tong Minh Su Dao, Minh Ly Dao Tam Tong Mieu, Cham Brahmanism, Hieu Nghia Ta Lon Buddhism, and the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Distinct denominations within these religious traditions must seek their own registration and/or recognition. Five additional groups – the Assemblies of God, Ta Lon Dutiful and Loyal Buddhism, Vietnam Full Gospel Church, Vietnam United Gospel Outreach Church, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Vietnam – have “registrations for religious operation” but are not recognized as official organizations.

The law specifies that recognized religious organizations and their affiliates are noncommercial legal entities. The law also stipulates that religious organizations are allowed to conduct educational, health, social protection, charitable, and humanitarian activities in accordance with relevant laws. The government does not allow unauthorized organizations to raise funds or distribute aid without seeking approval and registration from authorities.

The GCRA, one of 18 “ministerial units” under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), is responsible for implementing religious laws and decrees; it maintains offices at the central, provincial, and, in some areas, district levels. The law lays out specific responsibilities for central-, provincial-, and local-level GCRA offices and delegates certain religion-related management tasks to provincial- and local-level people’s committees (i.e., local leaders). The central-level GCRA is charged with disseminating information to authorities and assuring uniform compliance with the legal framework on religion at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels.

The law prohibits forcing others to follow or renounce a religion or belief.

Military conscription is universal and mandatory for males between 18 and 25 years of age, although there are exceptions. None of the exceptions is related to religious belief.

The law requires individuals to register religious activities with communal authorities where the “lawful premises for the religious practice is based,” and it prescribes two stages of institutionalization for religious organizations seeking to gather at a specified location to “practice worship rituals, pray, or express their religious faith.” The first stage is “registration for religious operation” with the provincial- or national-level GCRA, depending on the geographic extent of the group’s activities. Registration for religious operation allows a group to organize religious ceremonies and religious practice; preach and conduct religious classes at approved locations; elect, appoint, or designate officials; repair or renovate headquarters; engage in charitable or humanitarian activities; and organize congresses to approve its charter. To obtain registration, the group must submit a detailed application with information about its doctrine, history, bylaws, leaders, and members, as well as proof it has a legal meeting location. The relevant provincial GCRA office or the MHA – depending on whether the group in question is operating in one or more provinces – is responsible for approving a valid application for registration within 60 days of receipt. The law requires the relevant provincial GCRA office or the MHA to provide any rejection in writing.

The second stage of institutionalization is recognition. A religious group may apply for recognition after it has operated continuously for at least five years following the date it received approval of its “registration for religious operation.” A religious group is required to have a legal charter and bylaws, leaders in good standing without criminal records, and to have managed assets and conducted transactions autonomously. To obtain recognition, a group must submit a detailed application to the provincial- or national-level GCRA, depending on the geographic extent of the organization. The application must include a written request specifying the group’s structure, membership, geographical scope of operation and headquarters location; a summary of its history, dogmas, canon laws, and rites; a list and the resumes, judicial records, and summaries of the religious activities of the organization’s representative and tentative leaders; the group’s charter; a declaration of the organization’s lawful assets; and proof of lawful premises to serve as a headquarters. The relevant provincial people’s committee or the MHA is responsible for approving a valid application for recognition within 60 days of receipt. The law requires the relevant provincial people’s committee or MHA to provide any rejection in writing. Recognition allows the religious group to conduct religious activities in accordance with the organization’s charter; organize religious practice; publish religious texts, books, and other publications; produce, export, and import religious cultural products and religious articles; renovate, upgrade, or construct new religious establishments; and receive lawful donations from domestic and foreign sources, among other rights.

The law states religious organizations and their affiliates, clergy, and believers may file complaints or civil and administrative lawsuits against government officials or agencies under the relevant laws and decrees. The law also states religious organizations and individuals have the right to bring civil lawsuits in court regarding the actions of religious groups or believers. There were no analogous provisions in previous laws.

Under the law, a religious organization is defined as “a religious group that has received legal recognition” by authorities. The law provides a separate process for unregistered, unrecognized religious groups to receive permission for specific religious activities by applying to the commune-level people’s committee. Regulations require the people’s committee to respond in writing to an application within 20 working days of receipt. The law specifies that a wide variety of religious activities requires advance approval or registration from authorities at the central and/or local levels. These activities include “belief activities” (defined as traditional communal practices of ancestor, hero, or folk worship); “belief festivals” held for the first time; the establishment, division, or merger of religious affiliates; the ordination, appointment, or assignment of religious administrators (or clergy with administrative authority); establishment of religious training facilities; conducting religious training classes; holding major religious congresses; organizing religious events, preaching or evangelizing outside of approved locations; traveling abroad to conduct religious activities or training; and joining a foreign religious organization.

Certain religious activities do not need advance approval but instead require notification to the appropriate authorities. Activities requiring notification include recurring or periodic “belief festivals”; dismissing clergy; conducting fundraising activities; reporting enrollment figures at a seminary or religious school; repairing or renovating religious facilities not considered cultural-historical relics; ordaining, appointing, or assigning religious clergy (such as monks); transferring or dismissing religious administrators (or clergy with administrative authority); conducting operations at an approved religious training facility; conducting routine religious activities (defined as “religious preaching, practicing religious tenets and rites, and management of a religious organization”); and holding the internal conferences of a religious organization.

The law provides prisoners access to religious counsel as well as religious materials, with conditions, while in detention. It reserves authority for the government to restrict the “assurance” of that right. Decree 162 states detainees may use religious documents that are legally published and circulated, in line with legal provisions on custody, detention, prison, and other types of confinement. Prisoner access to religious counsel and materials must not, however, affect the rights of others to freedom of religion and belief or nonbelief or contravene other relevant laws. The decree states the Ministries of Public Security, Defense, and Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs shall be responsible for providing guidelines on the management of religious documents and the time and venue for the use of these documents.

The law specifies that religious organizations must follow numerous other laws for certain activities. Religious organizations may conduct educational, health, charitable, and humanitarian activities in accordance with the law, but the law does not provide clarification as to which activities are permitted. In addition, construction or renovation of religious facilities must occur in accordance with laws and regulations on construction, and foreigners participating in religious activities must abide by immigration laws.

Publishing, producing, exporting, or importing religious texts must occur in accordance with laws and regulations related to publishing. Legislation requires all publishers be licensed public entities or state-owned enterprises. Publishers must receive prior government approval to publish all documents, including religious texts. By decree, only the Religious Publishing House may publish religious books, although this is not enforced in all cases. Any bookstore may sell legally published religious texts and other religious materials.

The constitution states the government owns and manages all land on behalf of the people. According to the law, land use by religious organizations must conform to the land law and its related decrees. The land law recognizes that licensed religious institutions and schools may acquire land-use rights and lease or be allocated land. The law specifies religious institutions are eligible for state compensation if their land is seized under eminent domain. The law allows provincial-level people’s committees to seize land via eminent domain to facilitate the construction of religious facilities. Under the law, provincial-level people’s committees may grant land use certificates for a “long and stable term” to religious institutions if they have permission to operate, the land is dispute-free, and the land was not acquired via transfer or donation after July 1, 2004.

Religious institutions are not permitted to exchange, transfer, lease, donate, or mortgage their land-use rights. In land disputes involving a religious institution, the chairperson of the provincial-level people’s committee has authority to settle disputes. Parties may dispute the chairperson’s decision by appealing to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment or filing a lawsuit in court.

In practice, if a religious organization has not obtained recognition, members of the congregation may acquire a land-use title individually.

The renovation or upgrade of facilities owned by religious groups requires notification to authorities, although it does not necessarily require a permit, depending on the extent of the renovation.

The government does not permit religious instruction in public and private schools. This prohibition extends to private schools run by religious organizations.

There are separate provisions of the law that permit foreigners legally residing in the country to request permission to conduct religious activities, teach, attend local religious training, or preach in local religious institutions. The law requires religious organizations or citizens to receive government permission in advance of hosting or conducting any religious activities involving foreign organizations, foreign individuals, or travel abroad. Regulations also contain requirements for foreigners conducting religious activities within the country, including those involved in religious training, ordination, and leadership, to seek permission for their activities.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported cases of government officials physically abusing individuals from religious minority groups, particularly ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and Northern Highlands, although it was not clear the reported cases were related to religious affiliation. In the Northwest and Northern Highlands, leaders representing both registered and unregistered religious groups said authorities increasingly used nonviolent or less aggressive means, for example, inviting representatives to tea or offering to pay for property repairs, to pressure them to comply with government demands, including seeking registration and ceasing illegal gatherings. Because religion, ethnicity, and politics were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In December, authorities in Tuyen Quang Province detained at least 56 members of the ethnic Hmong Duong Van Minh group when they gathered to pay respects following the death of their founder and leader, Duong Van Minh. Due to what authorities said was the mourners’ failure to comply with COVID-19 mitigation requirements and undergo testing following likely COVID-19 exposure, police raided Duong Van Minh’s home on December 12, where Hmong members had gathered. Police, who had arrived in support of local health authorities, allegedly beat and arrested those who failed to comply with testing protocols. According to government officials, however, the government worked with Duong Van Minh’s family to ensure COVID-19 testing of children who were present and to facilitate the funeral service in a relatively timely manner. Government officials also said the mourners gathering at Duong Van Minh’s home exceeded the number of persons permitted to gather under COVID-19 mitigation restrictions and refused to submit to testing following the detection of confirmed COVID-19 cases. Police reportedly forcibly held more than 36 followers incommunicado in several quarantine centers, where those detained reported police interrogated them for hours on their religious activities and threatened them to force them to renounce their faith, including through what some described as torture and beatings. Others reported being held and beaten at police stations in Ham Yen District. Several persons reported police “tortured” them until they signed confessions and other documents renouncing their faith and threatened them with extended detention in a quarantine center without the ability to communicate with family or friends if they refused. At year’s end, 21 Duong Van Minh followers remained in detention.

Local authorities in some parts of the Central Highlands reportedly intimidated and threatened violence against members of certain unregistered Protestant groups that had reported human rights violations to international bodies or had attempted to force these groups’ members to recant their faith or join a registered religious organization. Vietnamese security officers arrested and detained at least 21 individuals in the Central Highlands province of Dak Lak on July 16. All were released by July 18. Many of those detained had participated in civil society training organized by a U.S.-based human rights NGO and were members of two ethnic minority Protestant churches, the Evangelical Church of Vietnam and the Vietnam Good News Mission Church, which had long been targeted by authorities. At least one victim reported that police officers beat him during interrogations and threatened to kill him. Some detainees also reported authorities told them that studying their rights under the LBR and constitution was illegal, and they reported that authorities threatened them in order to make them renounce their faith.

Government officials in different parts of the country reportedly continued to monitor, interrogate, arbitrarily detain, and discriminate against some individuals, at least in part because of their religious beliefs or affiliation. The majority of the victims of the reported incidents were members of unregistered groups engaged in political or human rights advocacy activities or with ties to overseas individuals and organizations that were outspoken and critical of authorities. There were several reports of local authorities banning, disrupting gatherings, and confiscating publications of new religious movements, such as Dang hoang thien cach mang the gioi dai dong (The Party of God’s Revolution for the Great Unity) in Dong Nai and Binh Phuoc Provinces, Tam Linh Ho Chi Minh (The Spirit of Ho Chi Minh) and Long Hoa Di Lac I (Followers of Maitreya Buddha) in Vinh Phuc Province, and in a number of cases arresting leaders and followers of other religious groups, such as Phap mon can khai vung tru luat lam chinh tam (The Dharma Door of Enlightening Universal Law and Unified Consciousness) in Kinh Mon town, Hai Duong Province.

According to reports from the NGO Boat People SOS (BPSOS), during the year local police in Dak Lak and Phu Yen Provinces questioned at least 30 members of the unregistered Evangelical Church of Christ, Good News Mission Church, and International Degar Church at local police stations or their residences. BPSOS stated that in some cases, local police forced individuals to report to police stations and then interrogated them for hours before releasing them without charges. Authorities reportedly demanded those detained to cease affiliation with unregistered religious groups and refrain from providing “negative” reports to international organizations. Local police in some cases demanded some religious adherents request permission from authorities prior to traveling outside of their communes. Independent Cao Dai adherents similarly reported police harassed them to prevent them from participating in civil society events, including during a virtual Southeast Asia Freedom of Religion or Belief conference in December.

In September, Tien Giang Province authorities arrested three independent Cao Dai leaders and detained them for hours while questioning them about their religious activities.

There were multiple reports of government discrimination against individual religious believers and religious groups across the country. Members of some religious groups whose members were poor or ethnic minorities continued to report that authorities denied them some of the legal benefits to which they were entitled. The Vietnam Baptist Convention (VBC), an unregistered group, reported that few of its members received any pandemic-related assistance from government authorities, and a number reported difficulties obtaining COVID-19 vaccines when such assistance would have been routinely administered to local communities. A VBC pastor in Hanoi reported difficulty acquiring a “land use right certificate” from local officials and said that his neighbors, who were not affiliated with a religious group, had no difficulty receiving a certificate.

Protestant and Catholic groups continued to say that legal restrictions and lack of legal clarity on operating faith-based medical and educational facilities made them wary of attempting to open hospitals or parochial schools, despite government statements welcoming religious group participation in health, education, and charitable activities. Catholic representatives said the government refused to return hospitals, clinics, and schools it seized in 1954 and 1975.

On September 6, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh signed a decision assigning the portfolio of religious affairs and human rights issues to Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh, the senior of four Deputy Prime Ministers.

According to the GCRA, in northern mountainous provinces, local authorities cumulatively granted registrations to nearly 800 local congregations, known as “meeting points,” and they recognized 14 local congregations, out of more than 1,600 local congregations. The registrations and recognitions affected approximately 250,000 congregation members in total (of which 95 percent were ethnic minorities, mostly H’mong). In the Central Highlands, local authorities granted registration to more than 1,400 local congregations and recognized 311 local congregations, together affecting nearly 584,000 congregation members.

The Ministry of Public Security estimated approximately 70 Protestant groups comprising nearly 200,000 members operated outside of the legal framework mandated by the LBR. These groups neither sought nor received registration certificates or recognition during the year.

Authorities did not recognize any new religious organizations during the year. The GCRA registered approximately 70 local congregations in 2020, to include four Protestant local congregations, approximately 50 Catholic parishes, and 12 Cao Dai local congregations. Many unregistered religious groups continued to report that the registration of religious activities with local authorities remained difficult. Some well-established and recognized religious groups such as the Catholic Church reported challenges in their efforts to establish new parishes in the Northwest Highlands. Registered and unregistered religious groups continued to state that government agencies sometimes did not respond to registration applications or approval requests for religious activities within the stipulated time period, if at all, and often did not specify reasons for refusals as required by law. In other cases, religious groups were unaware they had been granted local approval of religious activities. Some local authorities reportedly requested documents or information beyond what was stipulated by law. Several religious leaders said authorities sometimes solicited bribes to facilitate approvals. Authorities attributed the delays and denials to the applicants’ failure to complete forms correctly or provide complete information. Religious groups said the process of registering groups or notifying authorities of activities in new or remote locations was particularly difficult. Some religious groups reported that authorities urged them to register as affiliates of recognized religious groups instead of as new groups.

GCRA officials stated that government officials assisted unregistered religious groups to navigate the bureaucratic procedures required for registration, using features such as an interactive portal on the GCRA website that allowed religious organizations to track the status of their document submissions. The GCRA, however, acknowledged the web portal was not useful for remote religious groups that often lacked the technical skills to utilize the digital forms provided by the government. The GCRA continued to provide provincial-level training to facilitate local registration of religious groups.

Local authorities continued to obstruct the assignment and transfer of religious leaders to unregistered local congregations, particularly those who were from other localities. In several cases, local authorities harassed members of these unregistered local congregations. The Evangelical Church of Vietnam-North (ECVN) reported the recognition of its local congregations was still time consuming, although many of them had been operating stably for many years without official confirmation of their registration and, from their perspective, had fully met the registration requirements. According to the ECVN, authorities recognized 23 local congregations and granted registration to approximately 500 out of 1,200 local congregations and houses of worship (meeting points). The ECVN reported it continued to experience difficulties obtaining registration of its meeting points with local authorities in Quang Binh and Nghe An Provinces.

At year’s end, the VBC was still awaiting the final results of a new approach, initiated in 2020, to register local congregations, in coordination with the GCRA. Unlike earlier applications, in which representatives of local congregations completed the relevant paperwork for local authorities in relative isolation, the VBC chief pastor completed multiple registration packages under his name for submission to the GCRA. The VBC said it submitted approximately 30-40 registration applications for local congregations in the Northwest Highlands in recent years under the old approach but was unable to verify the number of registration requests still pending.

Authorities required most, if not all, applicants seeking the registration of their religious operation or recognition of their organization to include in their applications language stating the religious organization would be in harmony with the nation and would serve the Vietnamese people. For example, the Catholic Church used the slogan “Live the gospel amidst the nation,” while the VBS used “dharma, nation, and socialism.” Religious groups continued to publicize the slogans after their registration and recognition.

According to local religious leaders, authorities continued to impose a rigid upper management structure on religious organizations. According to religious community representatives, authorities preferred a two-level, top-down hierarchy to better control the religious organization and its affiliates through the religious group’s internal administrative structure.

For example, the Catholic Church reported that the authorities no longer recognized “sub-parishes,” as they had in the past. As a result, the Church was required to establish full parishes, a lengthy and challenging process, or to register local congregations; the authorities did not recognize anything in between. Under the old approach, sub-parish status gave a religious community more leeway than a local congregation on some issues. A local congregation did not have the right to submit paperwork for the construction of religious facilities or for religious practice, example, but a sub-parish could submit that paperwork.

According to several Catholic bishops, parishes in remote areas or with majority ethnic minority populations continued to face difficulty registering with provincial authorities due to their inconsistent application of national laws. Catholic leaders reported that the most problematic regions were in the Central Highlands (Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Kon Tum, and Lam Dong Provinces), and the Northwest Highlands, including Son La, Lao Cai, and Yen Bai Provinces.

According to local religious leaders, Protestant groups also experienced authorities’ inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the law when attempting to register their local congregations. Local authorities in Dien Bien Province, for example, continued to deny the registration applications of an independent Pentecostal congregation in Noong Luong commune, Dien Bien District, Dien Bien Province, stating that the congregation was affiliated with an unrecognized religious group. The Pentecostal group’s religious leader, however, said the law did not require a local congregation to be affiliated with a recognized organization to receive registration. The leader also noted that members had practiced their faith at the local congregation for nearly 30 years before filing registration applications in April 2017. Dien Bien authorities continued to deny registration of a group called Assembly of God of Vietnamese People (Hoi Thanh Phuc Am Ngu Tuan Nguoi Viet), reasoning that the applicant’s dogma was indistinguishable from that of the recognized Assembly of God of Vietnam (Giao hoi Phuc Am Ngu Tuan Viet Nam).

The VBC reported authorities did not register new local congregations in Thanh Hoa, Hanoi, Hai Phong, Quang Ninh, Hai Duong, and the Northwest Highlands.

Religious leaders reported that the central authorities continued to deny applications for the religious operation of several Protestant groups – Vietnam Baptist Convention (VBC), United Presbyterian Church in Vietnam, and the Full Gospel Church of Vietnam led by Pastor Ly Xuan Hoa. Religious freedom advocates stated that the determining factor as to whether local authorities approved registration applications was more closely linked to the religious groups’ perspective on politics than on religious dogma. The GCRA continued to deny public access to pending registration actions.

There were reports that local authorities denied new ID applications in which applicants identified their religion and that authorities ignored applicants’ expressed faith and labeled them “nonbelievers” or members of another religion. VBS, however, reported that despite initial difficulties, it had resolved its ID problems by coordinating with authorities and was able to provide the relevant documentation to its members.

During the year, most religious ceremonies and services were cancelled or were conducted online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. There were reports of authorities disrupting gatherings that violated pandemic restrictions, including religious gatherings. Authorities continued monitoring, preventing, or disrupting the gatherings of some unregistered groups and harassed their members in different ways, including bringing Christian leaders into police stations for questioning and threatening that they could not celebrate Christmas. In most cases, members of these religious groups were also involved in human rights advocacy activities or had links to individuals and organizations that were critical of the government. Religious leaders in urban areas and the ethnic-majority Kinh largely reported authorities permitted them to practice without significant restrictions as long as they acted transparently and facilitated or allowed official oversight. This remained true for both officially registered and unregistered religious groups. Unrecognized religious denominations operating in the Central and Northwest Highlands and in certain parts of the Mekong Delta – especially those that had a predominantly ethnic minority following – were more likely to report harassment from government officials. Recognized religious denominations in these areas reported rapid growth and generally fewer problems with officials.

There were no clear regulations for religious expression in the military, leaving individual unit commanders to exercise significant discretion. According to religious leaders of multiple faiths, the government did not permit members of the military to practice religious rites at any time while on active duty; military members were required to take personal leave to do so. State-run media, however, reported military officials praying for peace and happiness while visiting pagodas.

Male Khmer Krom Buddhists traditionally enter the monastery for a period of at least one month before the age of 20. Adherents reported that mandatory conscription into the military with no possibility of alternative service interfered with this traditional religious rite of passage.

In March, authorities permitted the display of Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh’s Zen Buddhism calligraphy works for the first time at a Ho Chi Minh City exhibition.

According to the monks of Thien An Monastery in Thua Thien in Hue Province, senior provincial leaders visited the monastery on September 22 and discussed land-related issues. At the meeting, authorities committed to establishing a working group to resolve land issues and to help the monastery obtain “stable and harmonious development.”

Many ordained pastors conducted pastoral work, despite not having completed the paperwork mandated by law to be recognized as clergy by the government. For example, the ECVN reported only approximately one-fifth of its pastors had applied to be officially recognized by the government.

Some pastors of unregistered groups stated that authorities did not interfere with their clerical training, despite their lack of legal authorization.

According to family members, unlike in previous years, prisoners, including Catholics Le Dinh Luong, Ho Duc Hoa, Nguyen Nang Tinh, and Protestant Nguyen Trung Ton, had access to the Bible and other religious materials.

Media sources continued to report tension and disputes between Catholics and authorities in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Thua Thien Hue, and Binh Thuan Provinces, mostly regarding land disputes or relating to the activities of human and environmental rights advocacy groups. In March and April, local authorities of Ky Khang commune, Ky Anh District, Ha Tinh Province prevented Du Thanh parishioners from building a fishpond. The local authorities accused parishioners of encroaching on agricultural land and starting construction work without permits, while parishioners said the work they were carrying out on parish property did not require a permit. State-run media and progovernment websites accused the parish leadership of inciting the parishioners to act against the authorities and causing social unrest prior to National Assembly and People’s Council elections, while the parish leadership stated the authorities harassed them because of their criticism and protests.

Leaders of the unregistered Christian Duong Van Minh group reported local authorities in Ha Giang, Thai Nguyen, and Cao Bang Provinces no longer destroyed “Nha Don” structures built years ago for storing funeral-related items and were allowing the renovation of a small number of these structures. However, local authorities in parts of Tuyen Quang Province continued prohibiting and destroying these structures. The Duong Van Minh group, which the government considered either an “evil-way” religion or an “illegal organization,” reported local authorities monitored key members and stated that local police officials “visited” their residences from time to time or “invited” them to local authorities’ headquarters. Those who refused such “invitations” said they were not subjected to reprisals.

Provincial and local authorities continued to exercise eminent domain over land belonging to individuals and religious organizations in the name of social and economic development projects. Authorities continued many projects that required the revocation of land rights and the demolition of properties of religious organizations or individuals across the country. Authorities reportedly did not intervene effectively in many land disputes that involved religious organizations or believers, and in most of these cases, the religious organizations or believers were unsuccessful in retaining land use rights. Such actions resulted in land disputes involving recognized, registered, and unregistered religious organizations.

State media and progovernment websites alleged that Catholic priests in many parishes occupied – or urged their parishioners to use or illegally occupy – land legally used by non-Catholics or authorities. There were also cases in which Catholics were alleged to have “misused” their land, for example, by turning an agricultural plot into a soccer field without the approval of the proper authorities. From March to May, Dang Cao parishioners at Dien Doai commune, Dien Chau District, Nghe An Province unsuccessfully, attempted to fill and level an aquaculture pond to expand parish church facilities and build a fence surrounding a stadium it claimed as church property. The parish also claimed a lot that was used as community property of the commune. Many parishioners in this area said they were dissatisfied with the local authorities concerning the construction of a north-south highway in which the local authorities exercised eminent domain over parish land without providing adequate compensation and assistance. Local authorities said they considered the parish’s claims groundless and unreasonable. Some progovernment websites accused the parish leadership of attempting to cause social unrest before the May National Assembly and People’s Council elections.

From June to October, independent Hoa Hao followers in An Giang reported that local authorities and state-recognized Hoa Hao Buddhist groups in Phu Tan District, An Giang Province, citing a need to build a new pagoda, advocated tearing down the 100-year-old An Hoa Tu Pagoda. That building is one of the first independent Hoa Hao pagodas built by Prophet Huynh Phu So, founder of the Hoa Hao religious tradition. Independent Hoa Hao followers opposed the pagoda’s demolition due to its religious importance; they proposed it be renovated instead. Plainclothes police reportedly assaulted independent Hoa Hao Buddhists who tried to prevent the pagoda’s demolition. The government temporarily halted demolition of the pagoda, and it remained intact at year’s end.

Members of some unregistered religious groups, including independent Pentecostals in Dien Bien; unregistered Baptists in Thanh Hoa; Duong Van Minh in Tuyen Quang, Ha Giang and Cao Bang; and ethnic minority Protestants in the Central Highlands; reported administrative difficulties and an inability to access social welfare benefits. There were cases in which individuals from these groups stated that local authorities told them the “difficulties would go away” if they recanted their faith. Duong Van Minh followers in Cao Bang Province, for example, said local authorities denied new residential registrations and subsequently denied or delayed approval of businesses for those Duong Van Minh followers who lacked residential registration. Local authorities required Duong Van Minh followers to sign a commitment to stop following Duong Van Minh if they wanted to receive assistance the authorities provided to ethnic minority households to construct housing. In many cases, the individuals said they assumed authorities discriminated against them because of their faith.

On February 22, the Central Commission for Propaganda and Education of the Communist Party issued guidance on ethnic and religious issues. Among its key contents relating to religion was an affirmation of the state’s respect for and guarantee of religious freedom that noted that religions are equal with each other and before the law. The guidance also stressed the state’s determination to combat those who act against the Communist Party, the state, and “solidarity” under the cover of religion. Numerous state officials, the GCRA, Ministry of Information and Communication, Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Ministry of Education and Training, Vietnam Fatherland Front, local authorities, and others helped to disseminate the key messages of the guidance. In connection with issuing the guidance, state officials, state-run media, and progovernment websites highlighted the foundation and operation of “illegal religious groups” that, they said, conducted activities that went against well-established and well-recognized religions and what they called “fine national traditions.”

The government continued efforts to deepen knowledge about the LBR among government officials and religious adherents. Authorities also called for registered and recognized religious organizations to share publicly more information about their dogma and belief systems in an effort to persuade religious adherents to affiliate with established faith groups rather than with “new religious movements” or groups about which the government lacked information.

State-run media and progovernment blogs continued to accuse religious leaders and members who were vocal in their opposition to the government of exploiting religion for personal gain and of “colluding with hostile forces with the purpose of inciting public disorder and acting against the Communist Party and State.” On July 12, Propaganda and Education magazine, a publication of the Communist Party, published an article criticizing outspoken priests. The article labeled such priests “extremists” and asserted their criticism was fabricated or based on distorted information in order to tarnish the Communist Party and state, “to sow seeds of division,” and “to disrupt social order.”

State-run media and progovernment websites sometimes equated particular Christian denominations and other religious groups, often ones associated with ethnic groups such as the Vang Chu H’mong in the Northwest Highlands, Ha Mon Catholics and Degar Montagnard Protestants in the Central Highlands, and Khmer Krom in the southwestern region, with separatist movements, blaming them for political, economic, and social problems.

State media reported local and provincial authorities in the northern mountainous provinces, including Cao Bang, Tuyen Quang, Bac Can, and Thai Nguyen, continued to call the Duong Van Minh religious group a threat to national security, political stability, and social order. State media and progovernment websites continued referring to the group as “an evil-way religion” or “an illegal group.” Some progovernment websites continued sharing sensational stories about Duong Van Minh’s leading a depraved life and misappropriating contributions of his followers for personal use.

A National Assembly deputy, Major General Sung Thin Co, at a National Assembly meeting in March criticized local officials for a “lack of responsibility and understanding about the Duong Van Minh group” and for turning it into an illegal organization. According to Co, Duong Van Minh and his group helped H’mong to modify what he called outdated and burdensome traditions. Progovernment websites heavily criticized General Co’s statement.

Several provincial-government, state-run, and progovernment websites continued referring to Falun Gong as an “evil-way religion” and an “extremist religious group.” Many progovernment websites associated Falun Gong with acts against the Communist Party and the state and with having a hostile political agenda. Some accused Falun Gong of doing harm to traditional culture and disrupting the social order and public safety. During the year, local police in several provinces, including Hanoi, Yen Bai, Quang Binh, Can Tho, An Giang, Tien Giang, and Tra Vinh, disrupted gatherings of Falun Gong practitioners and confiscated their publications and other items. In a number of cases, local police summoned the practitioners to local police stations for interrogation or fined them for violating COVID-19-related restrictions. On July 7, local authorities of Tan Hung commune, Cai Be District, Tien Giang Province fined seven Falun Gong practitioners more than 50 million dong ($2,200) for violating social distancing regulations when they were found gathering at the house of a practitioner. On September 29, local police of Tan Xa commune, Thach That District, Hanoi city summoned two Falun Gong practitioners for disseminating materials relating to the group. Local police confiscated nearly 170 publications and items relating to Falun Gong and required them to stop the dissemination of similar materials.

During the year, authorities at the central to local levels encouraged the engagement of recognized religious groups in charitable and healthcare activities. Many religious groups and religious adherents directly organized and ran these activities or joined with authorities and other organizations and individuals to do so. Religious groups also contributed to COVID-19-related funding and communication campaigns. Thousands of members of different religious organizations volunteered to work at field hospitals, directly taking care of COVID-19 victims or otherwise assisting persons in need.

In what observers stated was a growing trend, local authorities permitted religious organizations to operate social services and to gather for training. For example, in Hanoi and surrounding areas, city officials continued to allow Protestant house churches to operate drug rehabilitation centers.

Most representatives of religious groups continued to report anecdotally that adherence to a registered religious group generally did not seriously disadvantage individuals in nongovernmental, civil, economic, and secular life, but that adherence to an unregistered group was more disadvantageous. Religious leaders said that religious belief itself did not lead to official discrimination, but rather it was the implication of being affiliated with any type of extralegal group that could attract additional scrutiny from authorities. Practitioners of various registered religious groups served in local and provincial government positions and were represented in the National Assembly. In May, one Catholic priest and four VBS monks were elected to the 499-member National Assembly. Many nationally recognized religious organizations, such as the VBS, as well as other clergy and religious followers, were members of the Vietnam Fatherland Front. High ranking government officials sent greetings and visited churches during Christmas and Easter and attended Vesak activities commemorating the birth of the Buddha. The official resumes of the top three CPV leaders stated they followed no religion; however, while many senior CPV leaders were reported to hold strong religious beliefs, particularly Buddhist, they generally did not publicly discuss their religious affiliation.

During the year, the GCRA initiated a three-year review of the LBR and its implementing decree in numerous provinces. The National Assembly Committee for Culture, Education, Youth, Adolescence and Children and the Vietnam Fatherland Front also met with local authorities and leaders of religious organizations to oversee implementation of the law. During the year, authorities conducted many of the training sessions and inspections related to the review online. On July 24, GCRA Buddhism Department Director Nguyen Phuc Nguyen gave a presentation about the LBR and its implementing decree at the VBS online proselytizing center. The National Assembly Committee for Culture, Education, Youth, Adolescence and Children on October 8 worked with Tuyen Quang authorities to share information about the implementation of the laws in the field of belief and religions, among other legal rights and obligations.

Although the law prohibited publishing all materials, including religious materials, without government approval, some private, unlicensed publishing houses continued to unofficially print and distribute religious texts without active government interference. Other licensed publishers printed books on religion. Publishers had permission to print the Bible in Vietnamese and other languages, including Chinese, Ede, Jarai, Banar, M’nong, H’mong, C’ho, and English. Other published texts included works pertaining to ancestor worship, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Cao Dai.

The Church of Jesus Christ continued to report authorities permitted it to import sufficient copies of the Book of Mormon, although at year’s end, the Church was still working with the GCRA to import additional faith-based periodicals.

Authorities permitted Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Baha’i, and Buddhist groups to provide religious education to adherents in their own facilities, and religious leaders noted increased enrollment in these education programs in recent years. Students continued to participate in online training sessions on fundamental Buddhist philosophy when many pagodas could not organize offline training, due to COVID-19.

There were reports of conflicts, at times violent, between members of unregistered and registered or recognized religious groups or between religious adherents and nonbelievers. Religious activists blamed the authorities for “manipulating” members of recognized religious groups and accused undercover government agents and proxies of causing these conflicts to intimidate or suppress the activities of unregistered groups.

On October 14, the Ministry of Information and Communication fined “Rap Nha Lam” 45 million dong ($2,000) for producing and disseminating a music clip insulting Gautama Buddha following strong protests of Buddhist communities and the public against the clip.

Representatives of the embassy and the consulate general in Ho Chi Minh City regularly raised concerns about religious freedom with a wide range of government officials and CPV leaders, including the President, Prime Minister, and senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the GCRA, and other government offices in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and various provinces and cities. They stressed to government officials that progress on religious freedom and human rights was critical to an improved bilateral relationship.

The Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, and other embassy and consulate general officials continued to urge authorities to allow all religious groups to operate freely, including the UBCV, Protestant and Catholic house churches, and independent Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups. They also sought greater freedom for recognized and registered religious groups, advocated for access to religious materials and clergy for persons who were incarcerated, and urged an end to restrictions on unregistered groups. Embassy and consulate general officials raised specific cases of abuses, as well as of government harassment against Catholics, Protestant groups, the UBCV, independent Hoa Hao groups, independent Cao Dai, and ethnic minority house churches with the GCRA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and provincial and local authorities. U.S. government officials continued to call for the increased registration of church congregations around the country and for improvement in registration policies to make them more uniform and transparent. In addition, U.S. officials urged the government to peacefully resolve outstanding land rights disputes with religious groups.

The Department of State senior official for international religious freedom raised these issues during the annual U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue in November, and raised specific concerns about implementation of the LBR, the status of religious believers detained or imprisoned, property issues involving religious groups, and the situation of ethnic religious minority groups.

The Ambassador and other embassy and consulate general officials met with religious leaders of both registered and unregistered religious groups and attended religious ceremonies to demonstrate support for religious freedom. On March 25, the Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City met with Archbishop Nguyen Chi Linh, President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Vietnam, during her visit to Thua Thien-Hue Province. On April 12, the Ambassador and the Consul General met with Pastor Le Quoc Huy, General Secretary of the Vietnam Evangelical Alliance, in Ho Chi Minh City. On May 24, the Consul General met with Deputy Patriarch of the VBS Thich Tri Quang on the occasion of Vesak.

Embassy and consulate general officials traveled throughout the country, including to the Northwest and Central Highlands, to monitor religious liberty and meet with religious leaders. Representatives of the embassy and consulate general maintained frequent contact with leaders and members of numerous religious communities, including recognized, registered, and unregistered organizations.